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Abstract
How have advanced economies developed over the last few decades? Some common trends
are clear even to the casual observer: a move away from manufacturing and towards services;
an increasing reliance on intangible capital, such as intellectual property or organisational
capital; and an increase in the size and importance of the financial sector. This thesis asks
whether the first of these phenomena can be partly explained by the second and third.
Investment in intangible capital is one kind of irreversible investment: such capital can
only be resold at a discount to its purchase price, if it can be resold at all. Chapter 1 devel-
ops a partial equilibrium model of an individual firm’s optimal investment programme across
its life cycle, when investment is partially irreversible. This model is consistent with many
stylised facts found in the empirical literature: young firms are reliant on external financing
to grow, but eventually reach maturity and are self-financing, while investment irreversibil-
ity is positively associated with aggregate corporate savings and negatively associated with
aggregate corporate borrowing.
Firms with these characteristics are embedded in a two-sector general equilibrium model
in Chapter 2. The degree of investment irreversibility is found to affect the relative sizes of the
two sectors – which we label ‘manufacturing’ and ‘services’ – but the direction of this effect
depends on consumer preferences. Government subsidies to capital liquidation are found
often to be welfare-enhancing, but these subsidies increase the size of the manufacturing
sector relative to the services sector, so may be misinterpreted as a deliberate boost to
manufacturing.
In Chapter 3, the relationship between finance and structural change is examined both the-
oretically and empirically. A general equilibrium model is developed, predicting that financial
development will accelerate structural change towards services and away from manufactur-
ing. This prediction is supported by empirical evidence that structural change accelerated
following bank branching deregulation in the United States, which happened in a staggered
fashion from the 1970s to the 1990s, where the principal estimation strategy is a pooled ridge
augmented synthetic controls study.
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The structure of advanced economies is changing. In former ages the backbone of the United
Kingdom’s economy was industrial: textile manufacturing, or ship building, or coal mining.
Today, most British workers are employed in the services sector – healthcare workers, baristas,
finance professionals, shop attendants – while manufacturing accounts for a relatively small
portion of the economy. Nor is this unique to the United Kingdom. Across the rich world,
services form an increasingly large share of national economies.
On the one hand, the decline in manufacturing has been argued to have contributed to
growing inequality (Novta and Pugacheva, 2019), to Brexit (Becker et al., 2017) and to the
election of Donald Trump (Bonvillian, 2016) and other populist leaders; moreover, it seems
clear that the changing locus of global manufacturing has exacerbated tensions between China
and the West. On the other hand, the move towards services has been coincident with growing
GDP per capita, and some would argue that a transition towards the jobs of the future should
actively be encouraged. This thesis is agnostic about whether structural change away from
manufacturing and towards services is ‘a good thing’. Nonetheless, regardless of whether
policymakers might wish to accelerate or inhibit such change, understanding its causes is an
indispensable first step.
In particular, this thesis seeks to understand whether other broad trends in advanced
economies have contributed to structural change. The rise of intangible capital – software
rather than factories, for instance – particularly among fast-growing high-technology firms is
likely to have substantial macroeconomic impacts. While there are various ways of thinking
about the distinction between traditional capital and intangible capital, we focus on the
difficulty in reselling such capital. Chapter 1 describes the life cycle of a firm that undertakes
partially irreversible investment; that is, investment in capital which can only be resold at
a discount to its purchase price. Despite the lack of explicit adjustment costs, we find that
firms accumulate capital gradually, and we find that irreversibility is positively associated
with net corporate savings, both of which are consistent with stylised empirical facts. In
Chapter 2 we embed these firms in a two-sector general equilibrium model, and study the
effect of investment irreversibility on the structural composition of the economy. We find that
there is such an effect, but its direction depends on whether households consider services and
manufactured goods to be complements or substitutes. In either case, increased irreversibility
is associated with reduced output.
The irreversibility of investment affects the collateral value of capital, which helps deter-
mine the risk taken by lenders – and hence the interest rate charged – when extending credit
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to firms. In turn, this affects firms’ accumulation decisions. When studying irreversible
investment, therefore, the financial sector plays a crucial role, but we can abstract from
irreversibility and study the effect of finance as the channeller of savings into investment.
The increasing financialisation of economies such as the United States and the United King-
dom is widely appreciated even among lay audiences. There is a general consensus among
economists that financial development causes output growth to accelerate, but there is much
less work explicitly linking finance to structural change, either theoretically or empirically.
This relationship is explored in Chapter 3. We predict that financial development should
cause structural change to accelerate – a better functioning financial sector channels savings
more effectively into investment, increasing the pace of capital accumulation and productivity
growth, the latter of which is the ultimate engine of structural change in our model – and we
confirm this prediction empirically.
This thesis examines the links between structural change, investment irreversibility and
financial development. This work is novel: there is relatively little existing literature studying
the effect of finance on structural change, and even less concerning the effect of investment
irreversibility on the structure of the economy. Before turning to the substance of the research,
we will briefly describe some of these important concepts.
Structural change
As economies develop, the shares of output, employment and consumption accounted for by
particular industries do not remain static. At the highest level, economic activity can be cate-
gorised into four broad sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, services and government. Figure
1 shows clearly some stylised facts of structural change in currently advanced economies. As
incomes rise, considering each market sector as a share of either aggregate employment or
aggregate output (value added): agriculture declines; services increase; and manufacturing
increases up to a middle income level, before declining as economies become more advanced.
Comparable trends exist among output measures in lower-income countries, and although
the pattern is a little less neat, consumption dynamics also follow a reasonably similar pattern.
Herrendorf et al. (2014) present a comprehensive discussion of theory and evidence concerning
growth and structural change. Of particular relevance to this thesis, once countries reach
middle income level, manufacturing appears to decline monotonically and services increase
monotonically as a share of the economy, with agriculture accounting for only a very small
share of workers or output.
There are at least two existing theories which purport to explain the mechanisms under-
lying structural change1. First, Kongsamut et al. (2001) suggest that structural change is
a consequence of the form of household preferences, with consumers shifting into manufac-
1Another obvious potential contributor to the decline in manufacturing in advanced economies is increased
trade competition from middle-income economies. In particular, Autor et al. (2013) find that increased Chinese
import competition exacerbated job losses in U.S. manufacturing between 1990 and 2007. However, they find
that this explains only a quarter of the decline in aggregate U.S. manufacturing employment. Trade therefore
does not seem to explain the entire phenomenon of strcutrual change, but is rather an accelerant of the process.
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Figure 6.1 Sectoral shares of employment and value added—selected developed countries 1800–
2000. Source: Various historical statistics, see Appendix A.
value added share in services. Manufacturing has behaved differently from the other two
sectors: its employment and nominal value added shares follow a hump shape, that is,
they are increasing for lower levels of development and decreasing for higher levels of
development.
Figure 1: S ructural cha ge in currently rich countries
Structural composition of currently rich countries as incomes rise. As a share of either aggre-
gate employment or aggregate output (value added): agriculture declines; services increase; and
manufacturing increases up to a middle income level, before eclini g as economies b come more
advanced.
Source: Figure 6.1 in Herrendorf et al. (2014, p. 861)
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tured goods and then services as incomes rise. In particular, such a story is able to generate
the inverted ‘U’ shape of the share of manufacturing. Second, Ngai and Pissarides (2007)
assume different rates of technological progress in different sectors, with labour flowing to
the slow-growing sector to satisfy consumers, who consider goods from different sectors to be
complementary. This is consistent with observed structural change in advanced economies,
and with observed differences in total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates (Jorgenson
and Stiroh, 2000). In Chapter 3, we take the latter, supply-side story as a starting point and
include a financial sector in the general equilibrium model.
Before stating the research questions of this thesis explicitly, we will discuss financial
development and irreversible investment.
Intangible capital and irreversible investment
A important phenomenon in the last few decades of advanced economies’ development has
been the rise of intangible capital. Haskel and Westlake (2018) describe intangible capital as
having four distinctive features: spillovers, scalability, synergies and sunkenness. Intangible
capital such as software can generate spillovers, since the ideas around which that software
is crafted can be hard to protect. By a similar token, such capital is often scalable; software,
once written, can be deployed more widely at essentially zero marginal cost. Intangible capital
can often exhibit synergies as ideas complement each other, such as the synergy between GPS
data and mapping software.
We focus particularly on the final characteristic of intangible capital, sunkenness. Such
capital can take the form of investments in process improvements, for example, which can
increase the productivity of a firm but which have no resale value. Thus investment in
intangible capital can be thought of as being partly or completely irreversible. Figure 2 shows
the increasing share of intangible capital in U.S. firms; if this capital is harder to liquidate,
then investment is becoming commensurately more irreversible. A substantial portion of this
thesis is concerned with the effects of irreversible investment on macroeconomic outcomes,
where the precise degree of investment irreversibility can be parametrised.
Figure 2 shows that decreasing leverage has been coincident with the rise of intangible
capital, and Falato et al. (2013) suggest that the two are causally linked. Indeed, the models
advanced in Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis also have the characteristic that the corporate
sector becomes less leveraged as investment becomes more irreversible. When capital cannot
be liquidated at a high price, its collateral value is reduced and its effective cost to the firm
is increased. Thus less capital is employed when irreversibility is high, and less debt finance
is extended to firms in the growth phase.
There is a large body of literature showing that investment irreversibility can affect the
firm’s investment programme (e.g. Bertola and Caballero, 1994; Abel and Eberly, 1996, 1999;
Cui and Shibata, 2017) and can affect – to a greater or lesser extent – a general equilibrium
economy (e.g. Bernanke, 1983; Faig, 2001; Kogan, 2001; Veracierto, 2002; Hugonnier et al.,
2005; Sim, 2007). Debt finance is an important channel through which investment irre-
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Figure 1: Intangible Capital, Cash Hoardings and Leverage
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Note: Panel (a), (b) and (c) show intangible capital ratio relative to total (tangible) assets, cash-to-total
(tangible) assets and net-debt-to-total (tangible) assets, respectively. The sample includes all Compustat
firm-year observations from 1970 to 2010 with positive values for the book value of total assets and sales
revenue for firms incorporated in the United States. Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999) and utilities
(SIC codes 4900-4999) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel of 176,877 observations for 18,535
unique firms. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix.
Figure 2: Changes in Intangible Capital and Cash: Cross-Industry, Cross-Firm Variation
















































Note: The sample includes all Compustat firm-year observations from 1970 to 2010 with positive values
for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for firms incorporated in the United States. Financial
firms (SIC code 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are excluded from the sample, yielding a
panel of 176,877 observations for 18,535 unique firms. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix
Table 1 also shows the levels of each combination of cash ratio and intangible ratio across time and
industry.
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Figure 2: The rise of intangible capital in the United States
Rising intangible capital and cash, and declining lever ge a ong firms in the United States. “The
sample includes all Compustat firm-year observatio s from 1970 to 2010 with p sitive values for
th book v lue of total as ets and sales rev nue for firms incorporated in the United States.”
(Falato et al., 2013, p. 41).
Source: Figure 1 in Falato et al. (2013, p. 41)
versibility can affect economic outcomes, but the financial sector is important regardless of
the presence of irreversibility. We therefore turn to a short discussion of financial development
and its effects.
Fin ncial development
Economists have long considered that finance might be important for economic growth. The
financial sector has been argued to play a number of important roles in the economy: the
pooling of savings; the assessment of risk and project screening; the diversification of risk;
‘grease in the wheels’ of commerce and trading, and so on. While this idea has at times
been contested, with some economists arguing that finance follows growth and not vice versa
(see e.g. Levine, 2005, p. 867), there is now a general consensus that financial development
– the better functi ning and great r reach f the financi l sec or – has caus l effect on
increased economic growth (see e.g. King and Levine, 1993; Levine et al., 2000; Rioja and
Valev, 2004b,a).
It is well known that the financial sectors of countries like the United Kingdom and the
United States are rather large, and have grown over time. This is true more generally: the
richer a country is, the larger its financial sector tends to be. Figure 3 shows various measures
of financial depth (liquid liabilities of the financial sector as a fraction of GDP, private money
as a fraction of total money, and commercial credit as a fraction of GDP) for countries
grouped into quartiles by GDP per capita. Clearly, the richer the country, the larger the
financial sector.
Often in the empirical literature size measures such as these are taken as proximate
indices of financial development. However, recent evidence suggests that financial sectors
can grow inefficiently large (Arcand et al., 2015), so financial depth is an imperfect measure
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Fig. 1. Financial development across income groups, 1960}1995.
rich cross-country variation for exploring the link between growth and "nancial
intermediary development.
The positive relationship between income per capita and "nancial develop-
ment is illustrated in Fig. 1. Fig. 1 shows that all three "nancial intermediary
development indicators tend to increase as we move from low- to high-income
countries. Since conditional convergence is a feature of cross-country data sets
over the post 1960 period (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995), the positive correla-
tion between income per capita and "nancial development may then suggest
a negative relationship between "nancial development and economic growth.
Indeed, four out of the "ve countries with the highest level of PRIVATE
CREDIT have slower than average growth rates (Japan is the lone exception).
In any case, these summary statistics highlight the importance of controlling for
the level of real per capita GDP } as well as a host of other economic and
political factors } in assessing the independent relationship between "nancial
intermediary development and economic growth.
Fig. 2 illustrates that countries with higher levels of PRIVATE CREDIT tend
to enjoy faster growth rates over the 1960}1995 period than countries with
lower levels of "nancial intermediary development. Indeed, of the ten fastest
growing countries over this 35-year period, all of them had larger-than-average
values of PRIVATE CREDIT. Many well-known &Asian Miracles', such as
Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, were in the top quartile of
countries as ranked by "nancial intermediary development. It is worth noting
that four European countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus) were also
among the ten fastest growing countries during this sample period. Each of these
40 R. Levine et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000) 31}77
Figure 3: Financial depth and national income
Financial depth by quartile of national GDP per capita, average 1960-1995. See Table 9 in Levine
et al. (2000, p. 67) for a list of countries included in the sample. “LIQUID LIABILITIES = liquid
liabilities of the financial system (currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks
and nonbank financial intermediaries) divided by GDP, times 100. COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL
BANK = assets of deposit money banks divided by assets of deposit money banks plus central
bank assets, times 100. PRIVATE CREDIT = credit by deposit money banks and other financial
institutions to the private sector divided by GDP, times 100.” (Levine et l., 2000, p. 66)
Source: Figure 1 in Levine et al. (2000, p. 40)
of the quality of the financial sector. When assessing the effects of financial development,
an alternative approach is to estimate the impact of a shock to the financial sector, such as
bank branching deregulation in the United States. From the 1970s to the 1990s, individual
U.S. states deregulated th ir b king markets to allow multi-branch banks2. Jayaratne and
Strahan (1998) find that this episode caused ‘financial development’ in the sense we wish to
isolate: banks’ operating costs and loan losses reduced, and these savings were substantially
passed on to borrowers, who faced a lower cost of credit post-deregulation. A reduction in
losses suggests tha banks were bett r at screening or m nitoring the projects th y funded,
while lower overheads led to a reduced spread between savers’ rate of return and borrowers’
cost of credit. It seems plausible that this should have macroeconomic consequences, and in
fact bank branching deregulation has been found to accelerate output growth (Jayaratne and
Strahan, 1996), supporting the general proposition th t finance encourages growth.
Indeed, the preponderance of the evidence suggests that finance causally affects growth.
Structural change is known to go hand in hand with growth, but there is comparatively
little work directly considering the link between financial development and structural change.
This link is considered explicitly in Chapter 3, where we build a general equilibrium model
of finance and structural change and estimate the effect of bank branching deregulation on
the structure of U.S. state economies.
2See Section 3.2.2 for a more detailed description of bank branching deregulation in the United States.
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Figure 4: Net lending by U.S. nonfinancial corporations
Net lending by U.S. nonfinancial corporations between 1990 and 2020.
Source: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NCBLACQ027S
Research questions
Put very simply, this thesis asks the following question: do finance and investment irre-
versibility affect structural change in advanced economies? The rise of intangible capital,
the increasing sizes of financial sectors, and structural change away from manufacturing and
towards services have all been happening in rich countries over recent decades, but there is
relatively little theory or evidence linking them. Specifically, we seek to answer the following
questions:
1. Can simple financial frictions generate a realistic life cycle for firms in the
absence of adjustment costs? This thesis focuses on the effects of finance and
investment irreversibility. In order for the financial sector to have an effect on firms’
investment decisions, at some point in their lives firms must rely on credit from banks
(we focus on credit rather than equity markets in this thesis). However, as shown by
Figure 4, U.S. nonfinancial corporations have saved more than they have borrowed for
most of the last two decades, meaning some individual firms must be net lenders. One
way for these two characteristics to coexist is for firms to be borrowers when young and
lenders when mature. This implies a life cycle for firms. Convex adjustment costs can
artificially induce gradual capital accumulation, but a life cycle that arises from more
fundamental frictions would throw more light on the process of firm growth.
2. Does investment irreversibility affect such firms’ life cycle? Since we embed
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microfounded firms into a general equilibrium model in order to study the effect of
investment irreversibility on the aggregate economy, we require that irreversibility must
affect the firms themselves. Empirical evidence suggests that an increased reliance on
intangible capital leads to increased corporate savings; if irreversibility changes firms’
life cycle, size and revenue in order that the average firm saves more across its lifetime,
this will aggregate to give rise to the observed macroeconomic effects.
3. Does investment irreversibility affect long-run macroeconomic outcomes,
including the structural composition of the economy? As previously noted,
greater use of intangible capital is a significant trend in the recent development of
advanced economies, as is structural change away from manufacturing and towards
services. There is no existing literature considering whether the former affects the
latter, as far as we are aware. To the extent that structural change is an important
contributor to the changing nature of society, understanding its catalysts and retardants
is useful for policymakers, with potential policy implications.
4. Does finance have a role to play in structural change? There is a large lit-
erature assessing the relationship between finance and growth, both theoretically and
empirically. While much attention has been paid to the effect of finance on the size
of the economy, comparatively little work has considered the link between finance and
the structure of the economy. An appreciation of the structural change implications
of finance is important when determining financial regulation, for example, or when
setting industrial policy, particularly in light of the increasing financialisation of many
advanced economies.
All of these questions are addressed theoretically, and the final question is also addressed
empirically. In order not to bury the lede, the answers are yes, yes, somewhat3, and yes
respectively. Chapter 1 considers the first two of these questions, while Chapter 2 considers
the third and Chapter 3 the fourth.
Contributions
In this thesis, we make a number of original research contributions.
• Chapter 1 develops a model of the firm’s life cycle in the presence of financial and
liquidity constraints. Other work considers elements of this problem, but as far as we are
aware, this is the only model to consider a firm’s optimal investment programme, across
its entire life cycle, with a parameter that directly encodes the degree of investment
irreversibility. This parameter is found to have a significant effect on corporate leverage
and firm dynamics: increased irreversibility leads to decreased leverage, and to smaller
firms that reach maturity (that is, reach their terminal size) at a younger age.
3The answer to the third question is ‘somewhat’ because we predict that increasing irreversibility should
have a large effect on long-run output, wages and consumption, but a modest effect on the long-run structural
composition of the economy.
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• Chapter 2 advances a general equilibrium model of structural change in response to
changing investment reversibility. While not the first model to consider irreversibility in
a general equilibrium setting, it is unique in studying the structural change implications
of irreversibility. We predict that when consumers consider services and manufactured
goods to be complements, increased irreversibility is associated with a larger manu-
facturing sector and a smaller services sector, in proportional terms, and it leads to
decreased output, wages and consumption. We also consider the policy implications of
the model, concluding that subsidies to capital liquidation are often welfare-enhancing,
particularly when investment is substantially irreversible.
• Chapter 3 considers the link between finance and structural change, both empirically
and theoretically. We make several contributions in this chapter: we contribute to a
rather small literature in modelling the link between the financial sector and structural
change; we add to an ever-expanding body of work on the synthetic control method
and its extensions, and in particular we propose a simple statistical test for the validity
of pooling multiple case studies; and we use bank branching deregulation in the United
States to show empirically that financial development does indeed accelerate structural
change.





and the Firm’s Life Cycle
Abstract
We develop a model of a financially constrained firm’s optimal investment programme when investment
is partially irreversible, which generates many of the stylised facts of a firm’s life cycle: gradual capital
accumulation, growth when young followed by maturity, and retention of liquid wealth alongside
reliance on borrowing during the growth phase. Investment is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint.
Firms with little internal liquid wealth must therefore borrow from banks, which extend one-period
loans, in order to finance investment. The risk of firm failure makes lending risky, so banks charge
higher interest rates when firms do not have sufficient collateral. A reduction in the reversibility
of investment – for example, a reduction in the tangibility of firms’ capital – increases aggregate
corporate cash holdings as a multiple (share) of output, while reducing aggregate corporate borrowing
as a multiple (share) of output, consistent with empirical evidence.
1.1 Introduction
Capital functions as a productive input for firms, but also as collateral for loans, and as an
asset with potential resale value. This multiplicity of uses hints at a rich role for capital
to play in investment decisions. In this chapter, we develop a partial equilibrium model of
an individual firm’s life cycle, when investment is partially reversible and subject to a cash-
in-advance constraint. There are several stylised facts identified in the empirical literature
which we wish to capture. First, growing firms tend to be young, and young firms tend
to experience credit constraints which inhibit growth (Binks and Ennew, 1996; Beck et al.,
2005). Second, and on a related note, small firms’ growth is inhibited by a lack of internal
funds, and a typical small firm retains all its revenue (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Oliveira
and Fortunato, 2006). Third, on a macroeconomic level, an increased reliance on intangible
capital – which can be thought of, among other things, as a reduction in the reversibility of
investment – leads to increased corporate cash balances and reduced debt capacity (Falato
∗This chapter is the result of joint work with Mich Tvede and Simone Valente.
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et al., 2013). The model developed below is consistent with all of these stylised facts, which
arise from simple financial frictions and the three uses of capital we have identified.
The study of investment theory in the neoclassical framework stretches back at least to
Jorgenson (1963), who formalised a model in which firms wish to maximise their net worth
and undertake an optimal programme of investment to that end. As with our model, much
subsequent theory has taken the same essential premise and enriched the setting in some
respect.
The present model considers firms which have access to debt financing, so relates to the
literature on investment in the presence of financial frictions. Hubbard (1997) surveys the
literature to that date and develops a model in which finance plays a role in determining
business investment, where markets are subject to frictions such as information asymmetry
and principal-agent problems. This gives rise to the proposition, familiar from the study of
corporate finance, that firms fund themselves hierarchically: preferably using internal funds,
then using external financing if necessary. Many other models posit real effects of finance.
Bernanke et al. (1999), for example, envisage a setting in which financial frictions exacerbate
real shocks. They include a costly-state-verification problem which is similar in spirit to our
hypothesis, described in more detail in Section 1.2, that banks can only liquidate capital at
a discount to firms.
Cash-in-advance constraints are another way to generate the non-neutrality of finance or
monetary policy (Abel, 1985; Lucas and Stokey, 1985; Chu and Cozzi, 2014). Firms in our
model face a cash-in-advance constraint, so must borrow to finance investment when they do
not have sufficient internal wealth. Firms face an exogenous death risk in any given period,
so lending to firms is risky. Banks therefore request collateral from firms.
There is a rich literature concerning the role of collateral in financial markets. Demanding
collateral from borrowers limits the risk to lenders, so collateral is most often associated
with riskier borrowers and riskier loans (Berger and Udell, 1990). Indeed, theory has long
predicted that increased collateral lowers borrowing costs (Barro, 1976), and that collateral
is used as a means to cope with adverse selection and moral hazard issues (Bester, 1987).
Collateral can therefore have real effects. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) model the relationship
between borrowers’ net worth and the business cycle: in an upturn, net worth is increased,
which lowers borrowing costs and encourages investment, exacerbating the boom. Clementi
and Hopenhayn (2006) examine optimal contracting when lenders cannot monitor project
outcomes, and consider the effects on investment behaviour and firm dynamics. As in our
model, collateral plays an important role; a lack of suitable collateral can constrain firms’
borrowing. Similarly, in Rampini and Viswanathan (2010) enforcement constraints give rise
to a need for collateral, which is important therefore in the firm’s investment and financing
decisions. In richer settings, the quantity of collateral required – equivalently, borrowers’
leverage – is endogenously determined. Fostel and Geneakoplos (2014) survey the theory of
endogenous leverage and collateral determination in models with incomplete markets.
As well as the quantity, the quality of collateral is important. Gorton and Ordoñez
(2014) suppose that is is costly for borrowers to learn about the quality of collateral, so when
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there is a credit boom, lenders are willing to lend without incurring this cost. This leads
credit to be extended to poor quality borrowers. When a shock causes lenders to have an
incentive to produce information about the quality of collateral, a crisis occurs, and credit is
(potentially severely) restricted. In an empirical study of the U.S. airline industry, Benmelech
and Bergman (2009) confirm that collateral quality matters: borrowing costs are lower when
debt is secured by more ‘redeployable’ capital. Redeployability is closely related to the notion
of investment reversibility – capital is likely to resell at a price closer to its purchase cost if
it is useful to other producers – and in the model we develop, reversibility has a substantial
effect on borrowing.
The reversibility, or irreversibility, of investment has garnered much attention in recent
decades. Bertola and Caballero (1994) generate smooth investment in the presence of shocks
by relying on irreversible investment: once a firm has made an investment, the resale value
of installed capital is zero. Abel and Eberly (1999) examine the joint effects of irreversibility
and uncertainty on the long-run accumulation of capital. Abel and Eberly (1996) enrich this
essential premise by allowing partial reversibility of investment, which is the approach we
take below. Cui and Shibata (2017) examine a similar problem when there is informational
asymmetry between the firm owner and manager.
A particular kind of irreversible investment is investment in intangible capital. Haskel and
Westlake (2018) describe intangible capital as having four defining characteristics: scalability,
sunkenness, spillovers and synergies. For our purposes in particular, sunkenness is important.
Intangible capital such as improved production processes or knowledge capital is very hard
to liquidate, so the expenditure on such capital is – to a greater or lesser extent, which
we parametrise in our model – sunk, with important economic consequences. Falato et al.
(2013) find that U.S. businesses have held steadily increasing cash balances in recent decades,
and attribute much of this change to firms’ growing reliance on intangible capital, a trend
which is increasingly well-documented (Corrado et al., 2009; Corrado and Hulten, 2010).
This reduction in firms’ indebtedness is confirmed by D’Mello et al. (2018), who find that
the leverage ratio of the median non-regulated firm in the United States declined by almost
50% between 1980 and 2010. Rampini and Viswanathan (2013) construct a model in which
the tangibility of capital affects firms’ leverage: higher tangibility allows higher leverage and
increases investment. These stylised facts are also consistent with our model.
Once we understand the firm’s optimal investment programme, we can describe the entire
life cycle of a firm that is born with zero liquid wealth and zero capital. Mueller (1972)
described two competing theories of the firm’s life cycle, shareholder value maximisation
and growth maximisation. Either way, the youngest and smallest firms are likely to be
the fastest growing. This is consistent with the empirical evidence (Evans, 1987a,b), and
is generated by financial market frictions in the model by Cooley and Quadrini (2001). In
broad terms, our model generates a similar life cycle for the firm. Convex adjustment costs
are sometimes invoked as a means of generating smooth investment and other empirical
regularities (Cooper, 2006; Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006); by contrast, our model does
not rely on any adjustment costs (except for the partial irreversibility of investment), but
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still generates gradual capital accumulation. Young firms retain all their revenue, rely on
borrowing to finance investment, and grow quickly; mature firms can be entirely self-financing,
and may choose to pay dividends, which young firms never do.
While most of the theoretical papers cited above rely on stochastic productivity terms,
incomplete enforcement, principal-agent problems, asymmetric information, or some com-
bination, essentially the only constraints in our model are that surviving firms cannot be
insolvent, and banks only extend one-period loans. The risk of firm failure makes lending
risky, so banks charge higher interest rates when firms do not have sufficient collateral. The
importance of collateral gives rise to a key role for investment reversibility: when capital
resells at a higher price, less of it is needed in order to be able to repay a loan in the event
of firm failure.
There are a handful of theoretical studies at the nexus of finance, irreversibility, and the
firm’s life cycle. Holt (2003) is similar to our study in many respects, but firms are not
able to borrow and investment is fully irreversible. Caggese (2007) allows firms to undertake
two kinds of investment – fully reversible and fully irreversible – so there is no ‘index of
reversibility’ whose effect can be studied. Shibata and Nishihara (2018) develop a model that
is closely related to ours, but do not focus on the firm’s life cycle, and place an upper limit on
debt issuance. This chapter, as far as we are aware, presents the only model that considers
the firm’s life cycle under financial and liquidity constraints, with a parameter encoding
investment reversibility whose economic effect can be studied both for an individual firm and
in the aggregate.
The rest of the chapter is arranged as follows. Section 1.2 sets up the firm’s optimal in-
vestment problem, while Section 1.3 solves it. Numerical modelling of the firm’s life cycle and
aggregate outcomes, such as the relationship between investment reversibility and corporate
cash balances, is undertaken in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Model setup
We consider an individual firm’s investment decision. The firm invests in project-specific
capital using internal liquid wealth – comprising retained profits – or loans from the banking
sector, or some combination of the two. Our distinction between capital and liquid funds relies
on imperfect substitutability between man-made productive inputs and financial assets. We
assume that liquid wealth can be converted costlessly into physical capital, but the reverse is
not true, and the discount at which capital can be liquidated is our notion of the reversibility
of investment. Besides the behaviour of the firm, we also consider the behaviour of a risk-
neutral banking sector in setting the interest rate charged on loans when the firm finances
investment wholly or partly with borrowed funds.
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1.2.1 The firm
Time is discrete and indexed by t. The firm produces yt units of output at date t by means
of kt units of project-specific physical capital, according to
yt = ϕtf (kt)
where ϕt > 0 is a productivity parameter and f : R+ −→ R+ is a C2-class production function
satisfying
f ′ (kt) ≡ ∂f (kt) /∂kt > 0 and f ′′ (kt) ≡ ∂2f (kt) /∂k2t < 0.
The strict concavity of the production function implies strictly positive operative profits when
the firm compensates physical capital at its marginal productivity. The firm purchases ∆t
units of the final consumption good and converts them into ∆t units of physical capital to
be used in its own production process. Once installed, the capital of the firm is generally not
re-convertible one-for-one into the final good or into other firms’ capital: re-conversion may
be performed only at a strictly positive cost. The productivity parameter ϕt is stochastic:
the firm is essentially a project affected by a death shock such that
ϕt =
{
ϕ̄ ≥ 1 with probability 1− δ
0 with probability δ
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is an exogenous probability of project failure that may hit the firm at any
date. After capital has been installed and used for production, if the ‘bad state’ which occurrs
with probability δ is realised at date t, the firm’s output is and will remain zero from date t
onwards. The firm has perfect information about the probability of project failure: prior to
date t, the units of output that the firm expects to sell at date t are given by
Et (yt) = (1− δ) ϕ̄f (kt) .
Investment ∆t is made immediately prior to date t ≥ 1 so that the net capital stock
available for production at date t is determined by the capital accumulation constraint
kt = (1− µ) kt−1 + ∆t, (1.1)
where kt−1 is the installed capital used in production at date t−1, and the exogenous constant
µ ∈ [0, 1] represents depreciation, that is, the fraction of the capital stock that is destroyed
or becomes obsolete during the production process. Immediately after any date t ≥ 1, the
firm has (1− µ) kt units of residual capital in any state – that is, the firm has some residual
capital regardless of whether it is suffers project failure at date t.
The firm is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint with respect to investment expenditure.
Since ∆t must be paid up front, the firm must either borrow on the credit market or have
sufficient internal liquid wealth to cover investment before production begins. Immediately
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prior to each date t, the firm has at−1 ≥ 0 units of liquid wealth on its balance sheet. At date
zero, the firm is born with zero liquid wealth and zero capital, a0 = k0 = 0. At all subsequent
dates, t ≥ 1, liquid wealth represents cumulative retained profits from the previous dates.
At date t, the firm can use at−1 units of liquid wealth to finance part of its internal capital
investment or to purchase financial assets yielding the risk-free interest rate r, which we








where st is the self-financed part of the firm’s total capital investment ∆t. Since the firm





= at−1 − aFt + bt. (1.3)
Note that the liquidity constraint is well-specified only if at−1, a
F
t−1 and st are all non-negative.
Therefore, self-financed investment cannot exceed liquid wealth,
at−1 ≥ st. (1.4)
We assume that debt-financed investment is subject to the repayment of the loan rate rbt ,
which is firm-specific and depends on how banks evaluate the risk of obtaining repayment.
The objective of the firm is to maximize the present discounted value of the dividends
paid to shareholders, including the liquidation of any residual capital in case the firm dies.
Considering a given date t at which the firm survives, the ex-post dividend that the firm





+ (1 + r) aFt︸ ︷︷ ︸
financial asset returns
+ pϕ̄f (kt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
















bt − at, (1.6)
where p is the price at which the firm can sell output – like the safe interest rate r, we
assume that this is constant and taken by the firm as given – and where the last term is
obtained by substituting ∆t = at−1 − aFt + bt from equation (1.3). Equation (1.6) says that,
absent technological failure, the dividend paid to shareholders is the residual of the revenues
from the firm’s financial assets and output sales after subtracting the repayment of the loan
and the amount of retained liquid wealth kept within the firm for the next period. We will
henceforth assume that the firm always repays its debt in case of survival, so that ψ̄St ≥ 0
holds even in the case of zero retained wealth, at = 0. This implies that loan repayments are
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subject to the upper bound





Consider now a given date t at which the firm experiences technological failure: the firm shuts
down, earns no revenues from output sales but can still re-convert the (1− µ) kt residual
units of physical capital into homogeneous final output and sell it on the market, obtaining
θF (1− µ) kt with 0 < θF < 1. Since the purchase price of new capital to be installed is
unity, the hypothesis θF < 1 captures the partial irreversibility of investment: if capital can
be uninstalled, resold and redeployed at very little cost, or easily converted to the consumption
good, so θF is nearly unity, then investment is highly reversible. If instead capital is difficult
to uninstall, or difficult to resell, or very specific to a particular project, so that θF is almost
zero, then investment is almost completely irreversible.
Differently from the case of survival, technological failure may cause insolvency towards
banks: the market value of all the firm’s liquid assets at the end of the period might be
insufficient to repay the outstanding loan. Whether the firm is solvent or (partially) insolvent
crucially depends on the resale value of installed capital: full solvency requires
(1 + r) aFt + θ





If the solvency condition in equation (1.8) is (not) satisfied, the firm will (not) be able to pay




(1 + r) aFt + θ







From equations (1.6) and (1.9), the ex-ante dividend that the firm expects immediately prior
to date t is given by (1− δ) ψ̄St + δψ̄Ft . Given the firm begins life with zero liquid wealth








maximizes the present-discounted value of expected dividends,
Ψ0 ≡

























subject to the accumulation constraint in equation (1.1) and the non-negativity constraints
implied by equations (1.3) and (1.4). The firm has perfect foresight with respect to the loan
rate rbt charged by banks.
1.2.2 The banking sector
The banking sector is perfectly competitive and risk-neutral, and faces a cost of funds equal
to the risk-free rate r. It makes loans to firms, such that each loan has an expected return of
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r. In the event of a debtor firm failing and being unable to repay its debt by liquidating its
own capital, the bank seizes the firm’s capital and undertakes the liquidation itself. Capital
thus acts as collateral, but the bank is at a disadvantage relative to the firm in liquidating
capital; it is able to liquidate capital at unit value θB with
0 < θB < θF .
The difference between the firm’s own liquidation value – that is, investment reversibility θF
– and the capital resale price θB faced by banks captures costs that arise in the event of
bankruptcy, and is very similar in spirit to the assumption made in costly state verification
models. The closer θB is to θF , the better the financial sector is at handling firm failure
and deploying capital somewhere else that is useful, so θB is essentially an index of financial
development.
The bank can be thought of as offering a ‘menu’ of loan sizes and rates from which the
firm may select. The interest rate faced by the firm depends on the amount it borrows, bt.
Recalling our previous discussion of the solvency conditions, the payoffs for the bank are
characterized as follows. If the firm survives date t, by assumption the bank is repaid in full.
If the firm dies, the bank is repaid in full if the solvency condition in equation (1.8) holds,
and receives the liquidation value otherwise. Formally, the ex-post earnings for the bank in




bt if (1 + r) a
F







bt if (1 + r) a
F
t + θ
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Since the banking sector is perfectly competitive, the lending rate will always be such that
the expected repayment from the firm is (1 + r) bt. We can thus distinguish two scenarios.
First, if the firm is able to repay its debt in the event of death – that is, if inequality (1.8)
holds – then the bank charges the safe rate, rbt = r, and the supply of loans is characterized
by
1 + rbt = 1 + r for bt ≤ aFt +
θF (1− µ) kt
1 + r
, “small loan scenario”. (1.11)
We label this case as the “small loan scenario” because it arises only when bt is sufficiently
small to be covered by the residual assets of the firm in case it shuts down. In the second
scenario, instead, the firm is not able to repay its debt in the event of death. In this case, the
loan rate charged by the bank is determined by the no-arbitrage condition over the bank’s
expected returns,






(1 + r) aFt + θ
B (1− µ) kt
]
,
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which yields




1 + r − δ (1 + r) a
F
t + θ
B (1− µ) kt
bt
)
, “large loan scenario”, (1.12)
and holds when inequality (1.8) is violated. We can interpret the right hand side of equation
(1.12) as two components: the safe rate augmented by the death factor, (1 + r) / (1− δ),
minus the marginal partial compensation offered by the firm’s residual assets in case of
death. As is intuitive, the loan rate charged by the bank is increasing in the size of the loan
bt. In particular, for given a
F
t and kt, we have
lim
bt→∞




which defines the upper bound for the loan rate charged by banks on large loans. The lower
bound is determined by the maximum loan size in the “small loan scenario”, denoted by b̄t,
determined by the solvency condition in equation (1.8) as follows,
b̄t ≡ aFt +









1− δ (1 + r) a
F
t + θ
B (1− µ) kt
(1 + r) aFt + θ
F (1− µ) kt
)
> 1 + r, (1.14)
where the strict inequality in equation (1.14) holds as long as θF > θB. Therefore, for given
aFt and kt, the supply of loans is as shown in Figure 1.1.
1.2.3 A recursive formulation of the firm’s problem
Equation (1.10) represents the firm’s expected net present value, but hints at a natural
recursive formulation of the firm’s problem. Let Vt (at−1, kt−1) be the firm’s value function:
that is, at time t, given capital and retained liquid wealth at time t− 1, Vt (at−1, kt−1) takes
the maximal possible present value of the firm’s lifetime future expected dividend stream.
Relating this to the infinite-horizon problem,
V1 (a0, k0) = max
{aFt ,st,bt,at,kt}∞t=1
Ψ0.
The firm’s Bellman equation writes this problem recursively, and takes the form








































Figure 1.1: Interest rate discontinuity
where the survival dividend ψ̄St and the failure dividend ψ̄
F
t are given by equations (1.6) and
(1.9). Explicitly, the firm’s Bellman equation is













(1 + r) aFt + θ











subject to the constraints
kt = (1− µ) kt−1 + st + bt
aFt + st = at−1
1 + rbt =
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from equations (1.1), (1.2), (1.11) and (1.12). The maximum small loan, given by equation




θF (1− µ) kt
1 + r
= aFt +
at−1 + (1− µ) kt−1
(1 + r) /θF (1− µ)− 1
,
where the second line follows from substituting in the constraints. Thus a small loan is a
loan that satisfies bt ≤ b̄t, while a large loan is a loan that satisfies bt > b̄t. It is convenient to
define net borrowing Bt, which is the difference between borrowing and financial investment.
The threshold level of net borrowing is therefore given by
B̄t ≡ b̄t − aFt
=
at−1 + (1− µ) kt−1
(1 + r) /θF (1− µ)− 1
.
Given B̄t, we can define k̄t (at−1, kt−1), the maximum possible capital that can be employed
in period t by taking out only a small loan,
k̄t (at−1, kt−1) ≡ at−1 + (1− µ) kt−1 + B̄t
= at−1 + (1− µ) kt−1 +
at−1 + (1− µ) kt−1
(1 + r) /θF (1− µ)− 1
=
at−1 + (1− µ) kt−1
1− θF (1− µ) / (1 + r)
. (1.15)
The quantity k̄t (at−1, kt−1) will be useful later. The constraints allow two control variables
to be eliminated from the Bellman equation, which becomes
Vt (at−1, kt−1) = max
(bt,at,kt){
(1− δ)




















Note that by substituting the constraints into equation (1.7), it follows that in order for the
firm to be able to repay its loan fully if it does not fail, the loan must be subject to the bound
(1 + rt) a
F










22 CHAPTER 1. IRREVERSIBILITY, FINANCE, AND THE FIRM’S LIFE CYCLE
If the firm chooses to retain maximal liquid wealth each period that it survives, so it always
chooses ψ̄St = 0, then comparing this expression to the Bellman equation makes it clear that
this is equivalent to
at ≥ 0.
That is, when at is maximal, the condition that the firm must be able to repay its loan fully
if it does not fail is equivalent to the condition that the firm must at all times have non-
negative liquid wealth. We will see later that it is never sub-optimal for the firm to choose to
retain maximal liquid wealth, and therefore the loan repayment constraint can be expressed
as at ≥ 0.
1.3 Solving the firm’s problem
1.3.1 Best capital stocks and constrained capital stocks
Before solving the firm’s problem, it will be useful to give some formal definitions.
Definition 1.1 The first-best capital stock k∗ is the capital stock whose marginal product,
in expected terms, equals the risk-free return, when the firm rather than the bank undertakes
capital liquidation in the event of firm failure (this is the first-best since θF > θB). This is
the capital stock that satisfies
(1− δ) pϕ̄f ′ (k∗) + (1− δ) (1− µ) + δθF (1− µ) = 1 + r, (1.16)
where the three terms on the LHS represent the expected marginal product of capital, the
expected value of undepreciated capital, and the expected liquidation value of capital.
Definition 1.2 The boundary-best capital stock is the maximum possible capital stock
k̄t (at−1, kt−1) that can be employed in period t by taking out only a small loan, given by
equation (1.15).
Definition 1.3 The small-loan-constrained capital stock k̄St is the maximum capital stock
that can be employed at time t given that the firm takes out a small loan and obeys the
condition at ≥ 0. Explicitly,
k̄St (at−1, kt−1) ≡ max {kt : pϕ̄f (kt) + (1 + r) (at−1 + (1− µ) kt−1 − kt) ≥ 0} . (1.17)
While k̄t is the maximum capital stock that ensures the firm is solvent if it fails, k̄
S
t is the
maximum capital stock that ensures the firm is solvent if it survives, supposing that it faces
the risk-free borrowing cost r. It could be the case that k̄St < k̄, so it convenient to define it
as a separate quantity.
Definition 1.4 The large-loan-best capital stock k∗∗ is the capital stock whose marginal prod-
uct, in expected terms, equals the risk-free return, when the bank undertakes capital liquidation
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in the event of firm failure (which occurs when the firm takes out a large loan). This is the
capital stock that satisfies
(1− δ) pϕ̄f ′ (k∗∗) + (1− δ) (1− µ) + δθB (1− µ) = 1 + r. (1.18)
Note that equation (1.18) is the same as the expression defining k∗, except that θB has
replaced θF . Therefore f ′ (k∗∗) > f ′ (k∗), so k∗∗ < k∗. We require one final definition.
Definition 1.5 The large-loan-constrained capital stock k̄Lt is the maximum capital stock that
can be employed at time t given that the firm takes out a large loan and obeys the condition
at ≥ 0. Explicitly,
k̄Lt (at−1, kt−1) ≡ max{
kt : pϕ̄f (kt) +
1 + r
1− δ
(at−1 + (1− µ) kt−1 − kt) +






Thus k̄Lt is the maximum capital stock that ensures the firm is solvent if it survives,
supposing that it takes a large loan. Below we will show that the firm always chooses one of
these five capital stocks, so long as it doesn’t enter a given period with ‘too much’ capital
(this will be made precise later).
1.3.2 First order conditions
Much of the difficulty in solving the firm’s problem comes from the discontinuity between the
small loan and the large loan regimes. Therefore we will begin by considering each of these
regimes in isolation. First we will restrict our attention to small loans. When the firm is in
the small loan regime, rbt = r, so the Bellman equation becomes
Vt (at−1, kt−1) = max
(at,kt)
{
(1− δ) (1 + r) (at−1 + (1− µ) kt−1 − kt) + pϕ̄f (kt)− at
1 + r
+ δ
(1 + r) (at−1 + (1− µ) kt−1 − kt) + θF (1− µ) kt
1 + r





Note that under these circumstances, b disappears from the problem as the borrowing rate
is the same as the safe rate. We know by Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) that the value
function is differentiable1, so long as there is some optimal solution to the firm’s investment
1Differentiability requires convexity of the technology set defining feasible combinations of (at, kt) given
(at−1, kt−1), which can be demonstrated in the interior of each of the small loan regime and large loan
regime. Note that the value function does not satisfy the requirements for differentiability in Benveniste and
Scheinkman (1979) at the boundary between taking a small loan and a large loan – inspection of Figure 1.1
suggests this intuitively, since there is a discontinuity in the interest rate at this point.
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So long as both of these first order conditions hold, it is possible to characterise the capital
stock chosen by the firm.
Lemma 1.6 When the firm takes out a small loan, if the first order conditions (equations
(1.21) and (1.22)) on the Bellman equation hold at time t and t + 1, the firm employs the
first-best capital stock k∗ at time t.
Proof. Equation (1.21) can be interpreted as indifference between retaining wealth and
paying a dividend. We can be still more specific about equation (1.22), by finding an explicit
value for ∂Vt+1 (at, kt) /∂kt. Suppose that there are differentiable optimal policy functions
2
at the point of interest,
at+1 = h (at, kt)
kt+1 = g (at, kt) .
Then we can update the Bellman equation by one period and rewrite it as
Vt+1 (at, kt) = (1− δ)
(1 + r) (at + (1− µ) kt − g (at, kt)) + pϕ̄f (g (at, kt))− h (at, kt)
1 + r
+ δ
(1 + r) (at + (1− µ) kt − g (at, kt)) + θF (1− µ) g (at, kt)
1 + r
+ (1− δ) Vt+2 (h (at, kt) , g (at, kt))
1 + r
.
Totally differentiating with respect to kt yields the envelope condition
∂Vt+1 (at, kt)
∂kt













































+ pϕ̄f ′ (g (·)) + δθ
F (1− µ)
1− δ







since by the first order conditions both terms in the square brackets in equation (1.23) are
2Araujo (1991), among others, gives some conditions under which the optimal policy functions are differen-
tiable. The setting studied here does not satisfy these requirements, but Lemma 1.8 – which does not depend
on Lemmas 1.6 or 1.7 – guarantees that at is a differentiable function of at−1 and kt−1. We simply assume
that the same is true for capital kt at the point of interest, which seems at least plausible.
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equal to zero. We can substitute this back into the first order condition to get the optimal
capital stock, implicitly defined by
(1− δ) pϕ̄f ′ (kt) + (1− δ) (1− µ) + δθF (1− µ) = 1 + r.
Note that this is precisely the first-best capital stock, kt = k
∗, as defined in equation (1.16).
Next we will restrict our attention to the large loan regime. Then the Bellman equation
becomes
V (at−1, kt−1) = max
(bt,at,kt)
{




















(1− δ) (1 + r) (at−1 + (1− µ) kt−1 − kt) + pϕ̄f (kt)− at
1 + r
+ δ
(1 + r) (at−1 + (1− µ) kt−1 − kt) + θB (1− µ) kt
1 + r




This is exactly the same as the Bellman equation in the case of small loans, except the bank’s
liquidation value of capital θB has replaced the firm’s liquidation value (i.e. reversibility
value) θF . Thus we immediately have the following result.
Lemma 1.7 When the firm takes out a large loan, if the first order conditions (equations
(1.21) and (1.22), replacing θF with θB) on the Bellman equation hold at time t and t + 1,
the firm employs the first-best capital stock k∗∗ at time t.
Note that Lemmas 1.6 and 1.7 only apply when the first order conditions hold. We will
proceed to characterise the situations when they do and do not hold, and the firm’s decision
when they do not hold. First we derive some useful results about the value function.
1.3.3 Properties of the value function and other intermediate results
First, we present and prove the result that the firm always weakly prefers to retain maximal
liquid wealth. Thus we can always set the firm’s retained liquid wealth at to be the maximal
possible level, and the firm’s problem reduces to the one-dimensional choice of kt at time t.
Lemma 1.8 The firm never has a strict incentive to pay a dividend in any given period. In
fact, in some cases, the firm has a strict incentive to retain liquid wealth.
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Proof. The firm wishes to maximise the present value of its expected lifetime dividend
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Suppose the firm has selected some (not necessarily optimal) sequence of choice variables
{at, kt, bt}∞t=1. Suppose further that at date T the firm decides to increase aT – or equivalently
decrease its dividend at date T , recalling that the dividend must still be non-negative – by
a quantity αT , which it invests in financial assets. In the event of survival, or if there is
positive wealth to pay out in the event of death, the firm pays out an additional (1 + r)αT
in its dividend at date T + 1. Suppose that the capital stock and loan amount chosen by the
firm are unchanged at all dates, and retained liquid wealth is unchanged at all dates except
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1 + r︸ ︷︷ ︸
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1 + r︸ ︷︷ ︸
old expected failure dividend, δψ̄FT+1
]
,
where the notation rb,αTT+1 reflects that the firm’s borrowing rate depends on its collateral, of
which financial wealth is a component, when it is in the large loan regime. That is, in the
large loan regime,
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(1 + r) aFT+1 + θ
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Given that kt and bt are unchanged at all dates, there are three possible situations:
(i) The quantity bT+1 is a small loan, whether or not the additional liquid wealth αT is
retained at date T . In this case, rbT+1 = r
b,αT
T+1 = r, and the failure dividends ψ̄
F
T+1 and

















[−αT + (1− δ)αT + δαT ]
= 0.
(ii) The quantity bT+1 is a large loan, whether or not the additional liquid wealth αT is
retained at date T . In this case, ψ̄FT+1 = ψ̄
F,αT



















[−αT + (1− δ)αT + δαT ]
= 0.
(iii) The quantity bT+1 is a large loan when the firm does not retain the additional liquid
wealth αT at date T , and a small loan when it does. In this case r
b,αT
T+1 = r, while
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B (1− µ) kT+1
}







+ θF (1− µ) kT+1 − (1 + r) bT+1
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− δ
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In all three cases, therefore, ΨαT0 − Ψ0 ≥ 0, and in some cases this inequality is strict.
Therefore the firm always weakly prefers to retain additional (and therefore maximal) liquid
wealth from period T to period T + 1, and hence it never has a strict incentive to pay a
dividend in period T . As T was arbitrary, it follows that the firm never has a strict incentive
to pay a dividend in any given period. Indeed, we have also seen that the firm sometimes
strictly prefers to retain liquid wealth.
Note moreover that the preceding analysis simply examines adjusting aT , while keeping
kt and bt the same at all dates. It’s possible that retaining liquid wealth allows the firm to do
even better than this, by expanding its opportunity set (that is, making new and preferable
combinations of kt and bt possible).
Corollary 1.9 The value function has the property that for all α > 0, and all at, kt ≥ 0,
Vt+1 (at + α, kt)− Vt+1 (at, kt) ≥ α.
Proof. Fix a date T . Suppose there were some combination of aT , kT and α > 0 for which
VT+1 (aT + α, kT ) < VT+1 (aT , kT ) + α.
Then the firm would strictly prefer to pay the quantity α as a dividend at date T rather than
retain it until date T + 1. This contradicts Lemma 1.8, hence it’s always true that
Vt+1 (at + α, kt)− Vt+1 (at, kt) ≥ α
as required.
Next we show that the first-best capital stock as defined in equation (1.16) is indeed the
best choice for firms that are not liquidity constrained.
Lemma 1.10 Firms that are not liquidity constrained – that is, firms that are indifferent
between paying a dividend or retaining liquid wealth, and firms that can attain either k∗ or
k∗∗ – will choose to take a small loan and employ the first-best capital stock k∗. Moreover,
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firms that are not able to employ k∗ with a small loan at date t have an incentive (possibly
strict) to retain wealth from date t− 1 to date t in order to achieve k∗ in the future.
Proof. For a firm that is indifferent between retaining liquid wealth and paying a dividend,
equation (1.21) (the first order condition on a) holds. By Lemma 1.6, if equation (1.21) holds,
the optimal capital stock in the small loan regime is characterised by k∗. By Lemma 1.7, if
equation (1.21) holds, the optimal capital stock in the large loan regime is characterised by
k∗∗. Since these are the only candidate maxima, the global maximum (that is, the optimal
choice for a firm that is indifferent between paying a dividend and retaining wealth) must be
one of the two. We can compute the expected lifetime dividend stream associated with being
permanently at k∗ in the small loan regime and at k∗∗ in the large loan regime, assuming
























































































pϕ̄f (k∗)− pϕ̄f ′ (k∗) k∗
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pϕ̄f (k∗∗)− pϕ̄f ′ (k∗∗) k∗∗
}
,
where ΨS0 corresponds to permanent adherence to the small loan regime and Ψ
L
0 corresponds





















µ (k∗ − k∗∗) .





f (kt)− f ′ (kt) kt
]
= f ′ (kt)− f ′ (kt)− f ′′ (kt) kt
= −f ′′ (kt) kt
> 0,
by assumption of the properties of f (kt). Therefore








ΨS0 −ΨL0 > 0.
Clearly therefore k∗ in the small loan regime is preferable to k∗∗ in the large loan regime.
Therefore, when k∗ is not feasible with a small loan, the firm may have a strict incentive to
retain liquid wealth in order to be able to attain k∗ with a small loan in the future.
Finally, in order to show that k∗ really is a maximum, we must show that when the firm
employs the first-best capital stock, the first order condition on a – equation (1.21) – really
does hold. Fix some date T , and assume that the firm takes a small loan and chooses kT = k
∗.
It follows from the proof of Lemma 1.8 that if retaining wealth does not change the firm’s
choice of loan regime, and does not change the choice of future capital stock, then the firm is
indifferent between retaining wealth and paying a dividend. It is shown below, in Theorem
1.19, that when the firm chooses kT = k
∗, then k∗ is more than feasible with a small loan in
period T + 1 also. Therefore the marginal unit of retained liquid wealth does not affect the
firm’s decision problem next period, so the first order condition on a holds and k∗ is truly
the optimal choice for a firm that is not liquidity constrained.
Note that by Lemma 1.8, this does not present the firm with any kind of decision problem:
the firm weakly prefers to retain liquid wealth under any circumstances, so retaining wealth
up to the point that k∗ is feasible with a small loan is ‘costless’ for the firm.
Corollary 1.11 When the firm takes a small loan at time t, the firm chooses the minimum of







Proof. Suppose the firm takes a small loan. By Lemma 1.10, the first-best capital stock k∗
is the optimal choice for a firm that is not liquidity constrained. If k∗ is not feasible, but the
firm has still chosen to take a small loan, it will get as close to this capital stock as possible,
while obeying the constraint that retained liquid wealth must be non-negative, at ≥ 0. That
is, it will choose the boundary-best capital stock k̄t if this does not violate the non-negativity
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of liquid wealth. If it does violate this constraint, the firm will choose the maximum capital
stock that does not violate the constraint, k̄St , in order to get as close as possible to the
first-best capital stock k∗.
The preceding analysis tells us how the firm behaves when it’s optimal for it to take a
small loan. By Lemma 1.10 we know that firms in the large loan regime may have a strict
incentive to retain liquid wealth in order to make k∗ feasible in the small loan regime at some
point in the future, so we cannot rely on Lemma 1.7 to characterise the firm’s behaviour when
it takes a large loan as the first order condition on a may not hold. In order to show how the
firm does choose to behave when it takes a large loan, we first derive another intermediate
result about the value function.
Lemma 1.12 The value function has the property that for all at, kt ≥ 0, and for kt + κ ≥ 0,
Vt+1 (at, kt + κ) = Vt+1 (at + (1− µ)κ, kt)
so long as (1− µ) kt ≤ k∗ and (1− µ) (kt + κ) ≤ k∗.
Proof. Fix a date T , and suppose for a contradiction that there is some combination of aT , kT
and κ for which VT+1 (aT , kT + κ) 6= VT+1 (aT + (1− µ)κ, kT ). In particular, this means that
kT+1 (aT , kT + κ) 6= kT+1 (aT + (1− µ)κ, kT ), otherwise capital and retained liquid wealth
would both be identical at time T + 1 and hence the value functions would be equal.
Suppose without loss of generality that κ > 0. Any combination of capital investment
and financial investment at time T + 1 that is feasible given (aT , kT + κ) is also feasible
given (aT + (1− µ)κ, kT ), but the reverse is not true (that is, liquid wealth can be converted
costlessly into capital but not vice versa). Specifically, for some given amount of borrowing
bT+1, the range of possible capital stocks at date T + 1 without liquidating any capital is
given bykT+1 (aT , kT + κ) ∈ [(1− µ) (kT + κ) , aT + (1− µ) (kT + κ) + bT+1]kT+1 (aT + (1− µ)κ, kT ) ∈ [(1− µ) kT , aT + (1− µ) (kT + κ) + bT+1] .
Since kT+1 (aT , kT + κ) 6= kT+1 (aT + (1− µ)κ, kT ), and since the firm’s ability to borrow at
a given interest rate is identical in both situations when installed capital is identical, it must
therefore be the case that
kT+1 (aT , kT + κ) > kT+1 (aT + (1− µ)κ, kT )
⇒ kT+1 (aT , kT + κ) ≤ (1− µ) (kT + κ) . (1.24)
Essentially, given (aT , kT + κ), the firm arrives at date T + 1 with ‘too much’ capital, and
therefore chooses either the smallest possible capital stock at date T + 1 without liquidating
capital, or indeed liquidates some capital and chooses a capital stock strictly smaller than
the stock it inherits. Since we have assumed (1− µ) (kT + κ) ≤ k∗, the firm cannot be in
the small loan regime at date T + 1: the only way the firm could have ‘too much’ capital in
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the small loan regime is to arrive at date T + 1 with more than the first best capital stock,
(1− µ) (kT + κ) > k∗, which we are explicitly ruling out. Therefore given (aT , kT + κ), the
firm will take a large loan in period T + 1. By equation (1.15), taking a large loan means
that
kT+1 (aT , kT + κ) >
aT + (1− µ) (kT + κ)
1− θF (1− µ) / (1 + r)
> aT + (1− µ) (kT + κ)
≥ (1− µ) (kT + κ) ,
so the optimally chosen capital stock is strictly greater than the capital stock the firm inherits
from date T . This contradicts equation (1.24); the firm cannot have arrived at date T + 1
with ‘too much’ capital. It follows that the original assumption that VT+1 (aT , kT + κ) 6=
VT+1 (aT + (1− µ)κ, kT ) cannot be true, and hence
VT+1 (aT , kT + κ) = VT+1 (aT + (1− µ)κ, kT ) .
Corollary 1.13 The value function has the property that for all at, kt ≥ 0, and for kt+κ ≥ 0,
at + α ≥ 0 and α+ (1− µ)κ > 0,
Vt+1 (at + α, kt + κ)− Vt+1 (at, kt) ≥ α+ (1− µ)κ
so long as (1− µ) kt ≤ k∗ and (1− µ) (kt + κ) ≤ k∗. In particular, when (1− µ) kt ≤ k∗, the
value function Vt+1 (at, kt) is strictly and monotonically increasing in at + (1− µ) kt.
Proof. By Lemma 1.12, since (1− µ) kt ≤ k∗ and (1− µ) (kt + κ) ≤ k∗,
Vt+1 (at + α, kt + κ) = Vt+1 (at + α+ (1− µ)κ, kt) .
By Corollary 1.9, therefore, since α+ (1− µ)κ > 0,
Vt+1 (at + α, kt + κ)− Vt+1 (at, kt) = Vt+1 (at + α+ (1− µ)κ, kt)− Vt+1 (at, kt)
≥ α+ (1− µ)κ.
It follows immediately that the value function Vt+1 (at, kt) is strictly and monotonically in-
creasing in at + (1− µ) kt.
By this result, when the firm does not inherit ‘too much’ capital, so (1− µ) kt ≤ k∗, the
value function can be expressed as Vt+1 (at, kt) = Vt+1 (Ωt), a function of inherited wealth,
defined as follows.
Definition 1.14 Inherited wealth that the firm carries from date t to date t+ 1 is defined as
Ωt ≡ at + (1− µ) kt. (1.25)
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By Corollary 1.13, so long as (1− µ) kt ≤ k∗, inherited wealth Ωt is the one-dimensional
state variable describing the firm’s problem.
We are now in a position to characterise the capital stock chosen by the firm in the large
loan regime even when the first order conditions do not hold.
Lemma 1.15 In the large loan regime, the firm chooses the minimum of the large-loan-best





Proof. Fix some date T , and suppose the firm takes a large loan at date T . By Lemma 1.10,
this means that k∗ is not feasible with a small loan at time T , otherwise this is what the
firm would have chosen. Therefore (1− µ) kT−1 < k̄T < k∗. By Lemma 1.8, the firm always
weakly prefers to retain maximal liquid wealth – hence the firm will not pay a dividend if it
survives date T – and since we are considering the large loan regime, the firm will not pay a
dividend if it fails. Thus





















By Corollary 1.13 it follows that VT+1 (ΩT ) is maximised when ΩT is maximised. Setting aT
equal to maximum retained wealth, we have
ΩT = aT + (1− µ) kT
= pϕ̄f (kT ) +
1 + r
1− δ
[ΩT−1 − kT ] +
δθB (1− µ) kT
1− δ
+ (1− µ) kT
⇒ ∂ΩT
∂kT






+ (1− µ) .
Setting this equal to zero yields
(1− δ) pϕ̄f ′ (kT ) + (1− δ) (1− µ) + δθB (1− µ) = 1 + r.
Note that this is precisely the large-loan-best capital stock, kT = k
∗∗, as defined in equation
(1.18). If the firm takes a large loan and has sufficient wealth, therefore, it will choose
kT = k
∗∗. However, in order for the non-negative wealth constraint to be satisfied, aT ≥ 0,





Finally, it only remains to determine when the firm chooses a large loan and when it
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so that kSt is the capital stock that the firm will choose if it takes a small loan, and k
L
t is
the capital stock that the firm will choose if it takes a large loan. Note that it’s possible for
kLt to be too small to necessitate a large loan, in which case the firm will certainly take a
small loan whatever choice of capital it makes, and will therefore certainly choose kt = k
S
t .
By definition, this happens when kLt ≤ k̄t.

























We are now able to characterise the firm’s choice between a small loan and a large loan.
Lemma 1.16 Suppose the first-best capital stock k∗ is not feasible at date t with a small
loan.
(i) Suppose that k̄t ≤ k̄St . If Dt > 0, the firm chooses a small loan and employs the capital
stock kSt at date t. If Dt < 0, the firm chooses a large loan and employs the capital
stock kLt at date t. If Dt = 0, the firm is indifferent between employing k
S
t with a small
loan and employing kLt with a large loan at date t.
(ii) Now suppose that k̄St < k̄t. The firm chooses a small loan and employs the capital stock
k̄St at date t.
Proof. Fix some date T . Take ΩT−1 as given, and assume that k
∗ is not feasible with a
small loan at date T . If the firm takes a large loan at date T , the failure dividend will be
equal to zero and we can assume that the firm will choose to retain maximum liquid wealth
in the event of survival. If the firm takes a small loan at date T , by Corollary 1.11, the firm
will employ the minimum of the boundary-best capital stock and the small-loan-constrained







(i) Suppose first that k̄T ≤ k̄ST , so that the firm chooses the boundary-best capital stock
k̄T if it takes a small loan. In this case, the failure dividend in the small loan regime
will also be equal to zero and we can also assume that the firm will choose to retain
maximum liquid wealth in the event of survival. Whether the firm takes a small loan
or a large loan, therefore, it follows that




VT+1 (ΩT ) .
By Corollary 1.13, VT+1 (ΩT ) is maximised when ΩT is maximised. Suppose the firm
takes a small loan and chooses kT = k̄T , and denote by āT the corresponding maximal
retained liquid wealth. Let Ω̄T denote the value of ΩT associated with this policy. We
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(1− µ) k̄T .
Now suppose the firm takes a large loan and chooses kT = k
L
T , and denote by a
L
T
the corresponding maximal retained liquid wealth. Let ΩLT denote the value of ΩT
associated with this policy. Then
ΩLT =a
L
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where DT is defined by equation (1.26). Then it follows that choosing k̄T with a small
loan is weakly (strictly) preferable to choosing kLT with a large loan when DT is weakly
(strictly) greater than zero, and the reverse is true when DT is weakly (strictly) less
than zero, so long as k̄t ≤ k̄ST .
(ii) Suppose instead that that k̄ST < k̄T , so that the firm chooses the small-loan-constrained
capital stock if it takes a small loan at date T . Note that in this case, DT > 0 is a
sufficient but not a necessary condition for the firm to take a small loan at date T .
DT > 0 guarantees that the future value of the firm is greater in the small loan regime
than in the large loan regime, but it understates the true benefit to the firm of taking a
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small loan, because when k̄ST < k̄T the firm will pay a strictly positive failure dividend
in the event of death.
For convenience, we will define the functions
F (kT ) ≡ pϕ̄f (kT ) + (1 + r) (ΩT−1 − kT ) (1.28)
G (kT ) ≡ pϕ̄f (kT ) +
1 + r
1− δ
(ΩT−1 − kT ) +
δθB (1− µ) kT
1− δ
,


















= 0 by equation (1.19). Then we
can write
G (kT ) = pϕ̄f (kT ) +
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Since we are assuming that the firm chooses k̄ST in the small loan regime, if this quantity





implies that DT > 0. As previously argued, this is a sufficient condition for the firm to
take a small loan at date T .
Therefore suppose k̄ST < k̄
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1 + r − θF (1− µ)
]
k̄T
⇒ k̄LT < k̄T ,
and so by definition of k̄T the firm cannot be in the large loan regime if it chooses the
large-loan-constrained capital stock k̄LT . In reality, k̄
L
T is either not feasible or suboptimal
in the small loan regime. Therefore the firm chooses the small-loan-constrained capital
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1.3.4 ‘Too much’ capital
So far the discussion has assumed that the firm does not enter any given period with ‘too
much’ capital – that is, with more than the first-best capital stock. Indeed, the firm would
never have an incentive to do this; when the exogenous parameters are time-invariant, this
would only happen if the firm is born with excessive capital. Nonetheless, this situation is
analysed for the sake of completeness.
If the firm inherits too much capital at time t, so (1− µ) kt−1 > k∗, it is clear from Lemma
1.10 that the firm will not choose to install any more capital for use at time t. This means
that the firm is certainly in the small loan regime: any money that is borrowed will simply
be invested in financial assets, and the firm will be solvent in the case of death. If the firm
decides to choose kt 6= (1− µ) kt−1, therefore, this can only be because the firm has liquidated
capital and reduced its capital stock. Since the firm is only able to liquidate capital at a value
of θF < 1, its decision problem is no longer described by the Bellman equation (1.20). Instead
the Bellman equation becomes







F [(1− µ) kt−1 − kt]
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F [(1− µ) kt−1 − kt]
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+ θF (1− µ) kt
1 + r





where the first two appearances of θF reflect the fact that when reducing its capital stock,
the firm can only trade capital for liquid wealth at a discount. The first order conditions on
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Given this definition, we can characterise the firm’s decision when it has excessive capital.
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Lemma 1.17 Take (at−1, kt−1) as given, and assume that the firm arrives at date t with
‘too much’ capital, so (1− µ) kt−1 > k∗. Then the firm chooses kt = min
{
(1− µ) kt−1, k†
}
,
where k† is defined as in equation (1.33). In all subsequent periods τ > t, the firm chooses
kτ = max {(1− µ) kτ−1, k∗}.
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that (1− µ) k0 > k∗, and we are considering the
firm’s decision from date 1 onwards. Let k1 be the optimal choice of capital at date 1. There
are two possible situations we can consider. First, suppose the optimal choice of capital at
date 1 is less than the inherited capital from date 0, so k1 < (1− µ) k0. In this case, if k0 is
increased, the firm will simply choose to liquidate the extra undepreciated capital at a value
of θF when it arrives at date 1. It follows that
∂V1 (a0, k0)
∂k0
= θF (1− µ) ,
and the firm will choose k1 to be the maximum level of capital such that ∂V1 (a0, k0) /∂k1 =
θF (1− µ). That is, the firm will liquidate capital when it arrives at date 1, up until the point
that further liquidation would be suboptimal. This quantity will be made explicit below.
Second, suppose the optimal choice of capital at date 1 is simply the inherited capital
from date 0, so k1 = (1− µ) k0. If the firm chooses not to liquidate any capital when it
arrives at date 1, it must be because the marginal benefit of doing so is no greater than
the marginal cost of doing so. Suppose that in all subsequent periods τ the firm chooses









is the number of periods for which the firm will employ the capital stock inherited from the
previous period – that is, the number of periods for which the inherited capital stock is weakly
more than the first best capital stock k∗. Since the purpose of retaining liquid wealth is to
make k∗ feasible with a small loan we can set retained liquid wealth equal to zero at each
date τ that satisfies (1− µ) kτ > k∗. In fact, the firm will only have the potential need to
retain some liquid wealth at date t0 in order to make k
∗ feasible at date t0 + 1, given that
(1− µ) kt0 < k∗. Denote by V̄ the expected lifetime dividend stream associated with this
choice of policy (as distinct from the true value function, since we have not yet demonstrated
that this policy is optimal). Expanding the Bellman equation over t0 periods, V̄ is therefore
given by

















0, (1− µ)t0−1 k0
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where a∗ is the profit associated with k∗. We assume the firm has no liquid wealth carried
over from the previous period, since it is weakly optimal for the firm to retain just enough
liquid wealth at time t0 in order to make k
∗ exactly feasible at time t0+1 with zero borrowing,
so
at0 = k
∗ − (1− µ)t0+1 k0.
Therefore the derivatives of these quantities are
∂ΨSt
∂k0

































































Given that the firm has optimally chosen k1 = (1− µ) k0, if it is optimal for the firm to choose
kτ = max {(1− µ) kτ−1, k∗} at all dates τ > 1, V̄ is the true value function. In the case of
general k0, therefore, we find the firm’s optimal capital choice as k1 = min
{
(1− µ) k0, k†
}
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= θF (1− µ) .
Next, therefore, we must show that allowing capital to depreciate naturally until the firm
reaches k∗ is indeed optimal behaviour, given that k1 = (1− µ) k0. Clearly, by Lemma 1.10,
if k∗ is larger than (1− µ) kτ−1, then k∗ is what the firm would prefer. Suppose therefore
(1− µ) kτ−1 > k∗. The firm will certainly not choose kτ > (1− µ) kτ−1, so it is only left to
determine whether the firm will choose to liquidate any capital and employ kτ < (1− µ) kτ−1.
The firm will certainly not choose to liquidate capital if
∂Vτ (0, kτ−1)
∂kτ−1
> θF (1− µ) , (1.35)
where V is the true value function, since the cost of liquidating capital in this situation is
greater than the benefit. If therefore we can show that equation (1.35) holds at all dates
τ > 1, we have shown that the firm will not choose to undertake any liquidation at any of
these dates, and it will simply allow its capital to depreciate naturally until it returns to
employing the first-best capital stock k∗. Suppose τ = 2; if we can show that equation (1.35)
holds for τ = 2, the the firm will choose k2 = (1− µ) k1 and faces a very similar decision at
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1 + r
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Let









































pϕ̄f ′ [(1− µ) k0] +R
} ,
since f ′′ < 0. Thus
∂V̄2 (0, k1)
∂k1



































pϕ̄f ′ [(1− µ) k0] +R
}]
.
Since (1− µ) k0 > k∗, it follows that f ′ [(1− µ) k0] < f ′ (k∗). By equation (1.16), therefore,

























= 1−Q− [(1− µ)−Q (1− µ)]
= (1−Q) [1− (1− µ)]
= µ (1−Q)
> 0.
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Since we have assumed that k1 = (1− µ) k0, the firm’s choice of k1 coincides for V̄ and the
true value function V . Therefore
V1 (a0, k0) = a0 +






V̄1 (a0, k0) = a0 +





V̄2 (0, k1) (1.36)
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≥ θF (1− µ) ,








= (1− µ) ∂V̄1 (a0, k0)
∂k1














= (1− µ) 1− δ
1 + r
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The first order condition in equation (1.32) gives the optimal capital stock when the firm
is above the first-best capital stock and can only liquidate capital (that is, equation (1.32)
characterises the capital stock the firm would choose if it inherits even more capital than
this). Therefore k1 must be less than or equal to the capital stock that satisfies this equation,
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and so
pϕ̄f ′ (k1) ≥





− ∂V̄2 (0, k1)
∂k1
, (1.38)
and it follows that
∂V̄1 (a0, k0)
∂k0
≥ (1− µ) 1− δ
1 + r
[














= (1− µ) 1− δ
1 + r
θF (1 + r)
1− δ
=θF (1− µ) .
Substituting this back into equation (1.37) yields
∂V2 (·)
∂k1





≥ (1−Q) θF (1− µ) +QθF (1− µ)
= θF (1− µ) ,
so the cost of liquidating capital at time 2 strictly exceeds the benefit of doing so, and the
firm will choose k2 = (1− µ) k1. It follows therefore that V̄t coincides with the true value
function Vt at all times t such that the firm inherits ‘too much’ capital, (1− µ) kt−1 > k∗, and
such that the derivative of V̄ is at least as great as the benefit of liquidating undepreciated
capital, ∂V̄t (·) /∂kt−1 ≥ θF (1− µ).






= θF (1− µ) .
If (1− µ) kT−1 > k†, then the firm will liquidate capital at time T and choose kT = k†.
Otherwise the firm will simply choose the inherited capital stock kT = (1− µ) kT−1.
By equation (1.34), k† is the quantity that satisfies
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1.3.5 The firm’s behaviour and dynamics
We now have all the necessary results to describe the firm’s behaviour.
Theorem 1.18 (The firm’s behaviour) Take (at−1, kt−1) as given. Suppose that the firm







≥ k∗ – that is, if the first-best capital stock is feasible with a small loan








< k∗ – that is, if the first-best capital stock is not feasible with a small
loan – then:
(a) If k̄t (Ωt−1) ≤ k̄St (Ωt−1):
(1) If Dt > 0, where Dt is defined as in equation (1.26), the firm still takes a
small loan and chooses the boundary-best capital stock kt = k̄t (Ωt−1).
(2) If Dt < 0, the firm takes a large loan and chooses the optimal large loan capital







(3) If Dt = 0, the firm is indifferent between choosing kt = k̄t (Ωt−1) with a small






with a large loan.
(b) If k̄St (Ωt−1) < k̄t (Ωt−1), then the firm takes a small loan and chooses the small-
loan-constrained capital stock kt = k̄
S
t (Ωt−1).
Now suppose (1− µ) kt−1 > k∗.
(iii) The firm takes a small loan and chooses kt = min
{
(1− µ) kt−1, k†
}
.
Moreover, the firm always weakly prefers to retain maximal liquid wealth from date t to date
t+ 1.
Proof. Suppose (1− µ) kt−1 ≤ k∗.







≥ k∗, by Lemma 1.10, the firm takes a small loan and chooses the









(a) If k̄t ≤ k̄St :
1) If Dt > 0, by Lemma 1.16, the firm chooses a small loan and the boundary-best
capital stock kt = k̄t (Ωt−1).
2) If Dt < 0, by Lemma 1.16, the firm takes a large loan and chooses the capital







3) If Dt = 0, by Lemma 1.16, the firm is indifferent between choosing kt =








(b) If k̄St (Ωt−1) < k̄t (Ωt−1), by Lemma 1.16 the firm takes a small loan and chooses
the small-loan-constrained capital stock kt = k̄
S
t (Ωt−1).
Now suppose (1− µ) kt−1 > k∗.
(iii) By Lemma 1.17, the firm takes a small loan and chooses kt = min
{
(1− µ) kt−1, k†
}
.
By Lemma 1.8, the firm always weakly prefers to retain maximal liquid wealth from date t
to date t+ 1.
Next we have a result concerning the dynamics of the firm’s capital-loan choice.
Theorem 1.19 Suppose (1− µ) kt−1 ≤ k∗. If the firm survives from date t to date t + 1,
then
Ωt > (1 + r) Ωt−1.
It follows that, so long as the firm survives and there is a strictly positive interest rate r > 0,
it will in finite time end up taking a small loan and employing the first-best capital stock k∗.
Proof. Fix a time T , and take ΩT−1 as given. Suppose (1− µ) kT−1 ≤ k∗. We can consider
two situations:

























1 + r − (1− δ) (1− µ)− δθB (1− µ)
]
1− δ
≥ pϕ̄f ′ (k∗∗)−
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> (1 + r) ΩT−1.



























1 + r − (1− δ) (1− µ)− δθF (1− µ)
]
1− δ
≥ pϕ̄f ′ (k∗)−
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Letting aST be maximal retained wealth associated with employing k
S
T at time T ,
ΩT =a
S















[(1− δ) (1 + r)− (1− δ) (1− µ)] kST
1− δ











+ (1 + r) ΩT−1
> (1 + r) ΩT−1.
In each case, ΩT > (1 + r) ΩT−1. So long as the firm survives from date T to date T + 1,
therefore, inherited wealth Ω grows by more than the interest rate. With positive growth,
bounded below at a value strictly greater than unity (so long as there is a strictly positive
interest rate), this means Ω will be large enough in finite time for the firm to be able to
employ the first-best capital stock k∗ with a small loan.
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1.3.6 The transversality condition
In order to ensure that Theorem 1.18 does indeed describe an optimal policy for the firm,
it is sufficient to show that this policy obeys a transversality condition (see e.g. Theorem











where ψt+1/ (1 + r) is the value at date t of the dividend that the firm pays at date t + 1
(that is, its instantaneous utility function) and, by Corollary 1.13 and equation (1.25), Ωt
is the state variable3. The expectation is taken at time 0; that is, the expectation is taken
without knowing the date at which the firm will fail, and in particular is not conditional on
the firm having survived to time t − 1. Equation (1.40) guarantees that the firm does not
expect to ‘leave money on the table’: in the limit as t→∞, the additional dividend that the
firm is able to pay is, in expected discounted terms, zero.
Lemma 1.20 The policy path described in Theorem 1.18 satisfies the transversality condition
in equation (1.40), and thus describes an optimal policy path.
Proof. First, note that the firm does not pay a dividend if it survives, so dψSt+1/dΩt = 0.








(1 + r) Ωt +
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Since we are considering this derivative as t → ∞, by Theorem 1.19 – except for an initial
finite number of periods – we are considering the situation when kt = k
∗. In particular,
this also means that the firm is in a small loan environment, so will pay a strictly positive







(1 + r) Ωt +
[




= 1 + r.







= δ (1− δ)t Ωt,
since the firm survives (with probability 1 − δ) for t periods and fails (with probability δ)
3Note that Ωt = at + (1− µ) kt is the state variable for the firm’s problem only if the firm has not
overaccumulated capital, which it will not unless it is born with more than the first-best capital stock. Even
in this case, the capital stock will depreciate and will settle at the first-best capital stock in finite time, so in
the limit as t→∞ the state variable is guaranteed to be the one-dimensional variable Ωt whatever the firm’s
initial capital stock.
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Table 1.1: Comparative statics for an individual firm
Parameter
Capital Stock θF θB δ µ ϕ̄ p r
k∗ + · − − + + −
k̄t + · · − · · −
k̄St · · · − + + −
k∗∗ · + − − + + −
k̄Lt · + − − + + −
Classifying the effect of the exogenous parameters on the firm’s deci-
sion quantities, for given Ωt−1. The symbol + means that the capital
stock moves with the parameter, − means that the capital stock moves
against the parameter, while · means that the capital stock is not af-
fected by the parameter. The effects on k̄Lt hold when k̄
L
t > k̄t – that
is, when the employment of k̄Lt necessitates a large loan.









This condition is satisfied so long as the growth rate of Ωt tends to something strictly less
than (1 + r) / (1− δ) as t→∞. By equation (1.39), when k = k∗,
Ωt+1 = pϕ̄f (k
∗)− [(1− δ) (1 + r)− (1− δ) (1− µ)] k
∗
1− δ
+ (1 + r) Ωt















since Theorem 1.19 shows that Ωt is unbounded as t grows. It follows therefore that the firm
obeys the transversality condition in equation (1.40), and Theorem 1.18 does indeed describe
an optimal policy for the firm.
1.3.7 Comparative statics for an individual firm
The parameters specifying the environment faced by the firm, and therefore potential capital
stocks, are
parameters: θF , θB, δ, µ, ϕ̄, p, r,
while the potential choices of capital are
capital stocks: k∗, k̄t (Ωt−1) , k̄
S
t (Ωt−1) , k
∗∗, k̄Lt (Ωt−1)
1.4. NUMERICAL MODELLING 49
Table 1.2: Modelling choices
Parameter Value Description
β 0.7 output elasticity of capital
ϕ̄ 10 productivity
p 1 price of output
µ 0.05 per-period depreciation
δ 0.1 per-period death risk
r 0.02 interest rate
θB 0.1 bank’s liquidation value of capital
Modelling choices for numerical simulation. As it will be allowed to
vary in the following simulations, no value has been specified for the
resale value of capital θF .
assuming that the firm does not inherit more than the first-best capital stock at date t, so
(1− µ) kt−1 ≤ k∗. Table 1.1 classifies the effect that each parameter has on each capital
stock, taking inherited wealth Ωt−1 as given. The results are mostly straightforward to show,
but the derivation for the effect of δ on the large-loan-constrained capital stock k̄Lt (Ωt−1)
is provided in Appendix A.1. Inspection of Table 1.1 makes clear that increases in θF , θB,
p and ϕ are ‘good’ for the firm – that is, they allow the firm to employ more capital given
(at−1, kt−1) – while δ, µ and r are ‘bad’ for the firm. This makes intuitive sense: it seems
reasonable that increasing the resale value of capital, the price of output, and productivity
should all be positive for the firm, while increasing the death risk, depreciation and the
interest rate will all increase costs for the firm.
1.4 Numerical modelling of the firm’s life cycle and compar-
ative statics
Theorem 1.18 gives us a complete description of the firm’s behaviour over its life cycle.
Therefore we can turn to numerical modelling to understand how shocks to parameters affect
the equilibrium character of the firm. Table 1.2 details the parameter and function choices
made for numerical simulation. In particular, the production function is a Cobb-Douglas
function with capital as the only input, f (k) = kβ, and an elasticity parameter of β = 0.7.
Simulations of the firm’s life cycle were conducted with the values θF = 0.2 and θF = 0.8,
to compare a situation in which investment is relatively reversible with a situation in which
investment is relatively irreversible, and the results are presented in Figure 1.2. Intuitively,
when θF is smaller, firms grow more slowly and reach a smaller size at maturity, in terms
both of accumulated capital and of revenue. When θF = 0.8 firms reach maturity after
around 24 periods of operation; at this point, they have reached their terminal size, that
is, the quantity of capital employed and revenue are constant from this point until the firm
fails. At maturity, the firm starts to carry positive balances of liquid wealth because it is no
longer liquidity constrained, and does not need to spend all liquid wealth on further capital
accumulation. When θF = 0.2, maturation only takes around 14 periods, and the size of the
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Figure 1.2: The firm’s life cycle with two different resale values of capital
Simulations of the firm’s life cycle with θF = 0.2 (the solid black line) and θF = 0.8 (the dotted red
line). When the resale value of capital is lower, growth in capital and revenue are slower, firms achieve
a lower terminal size – that is, mature firms are smaller when θF is smaller – and firms of any age
are worth less when they fail. Moreover, when θF is smaller, while long-established firms carry smaller
balances of liquid wealth, medium-age firms carry larger balances of liquid wealth.
firm when it reaches maturity is rather smaller. Clearly, when θF is smaller, a given firm’s
failure dividend (the value of the firm when it fails) is less at any age than when θF is larger.
Perhaps most interestingly, when θF is smaller, firms reach maturity and start accumu-
lating liquid wealth at a younger age. Thus medium-age firms actually carry larger cash
balances when the resale value of capital is lower. It’s clear from Figure 1.2 that the very
oldest firms would indeed carry larger cash balances when θF is larger – if both lines in the
top right panel of Figure 1.2 were extended, they would clearly cross at some point – but this
suggests that the aggregate effect of θF on firms’ cash balances economy-wide is ambiguous.
Figure 1.3 presents average results across all firms. Due to the exogenous death risk, there
must be (1− δ) times as many firms that survive to be τ+1 periods old as there are firms that
survive to be τ periods old. This eventual tapering off among old firms allows calculations
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θF = 0.2 θF = 0.8
Figure 1.3: The average firm with two different resale values of capital
Simulations of average firm characteristics with θF = 0.2 (the solid grey bars) and θF = 0.8 (the
hatched red bars), with the values for θF = 0.2 normalised to unity. Most of the quantities shown
are greater for a higher value of θF , but not uniformly greater. A smaller value of θF leads to
increased cash stocks and reduced borrowing, particularly relative to revenues and capital stocks.
to be made of average characteristics at a snapshot in time4. Suppose we freeze time at
date T , and suppose we assume there is a continuum of firms of unit measure: there must
be δ firms that are in their first period of production, δ (1− δ) in their second, δ (1− δ)2 in
their third, and so on. Summing across all firms’ capital stocks, given the different densities
of firms of different ages, gives the average capital stock. We also calculate average liquid
wealth balances, average revenues and average failure dividends (bearing in mind that only
the proportion δ of firms of any given age will fail). Finally, we also calculate the entry value
of a firm (that is, the expected discounted lifetime dividend stream of a firm that is born the
following period with no liquid wealth or capital, V0 (0)).
These quantities are normalised to unity for the case when θF = 0.2, and presented as
relative quantities for θF = 0.8. Note that four of the five values are higher for the higher
value of θF , but they are not uniformly greater. Note also that average liquid wealth is
marginally lower for θF = 0.8 than for θF = 0.2. More particularly, a reduction in θF implies
that firms’ cash balances will increase significantly relative to revenue, and increase even more
relative to capital stocks.
Sensitivity analysis is conducted in Appendix A.2, using the same approach as in this
section but varying each of the other parameters one at a time.
The model developed in this chapter is a partial equilibrium model, so does not take
4For mature firms, liquid wealth grows at a rate that tends towards 1 + r per period, and there are 1− δ
as many firms surviving each subsequent period. Therefore in order for the average characteristics to be
well-defined (finite), we require (1 + r) (1− δ) < 1.
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account of price effects, much less productivity growth. We must therefore be sceptical when
interpreting the absolute difference in, for example, capital or liquid wealth for the two values
of θF shown in Figure 1.3. We cannot conclude with confidence that capital employed really
does increase in absolute terms when θF increases. Nonetheless, if we take the ratio of
capital, liquid wealth, failure dividends and entry values to revenue – which is the same as
nominal output, given we have a continuum of firms of unit measure – then this gives us
values as a share of the economy, which are amenable to more meaningful interpretation and
comparison5. Therefore we consider the relationship between the resale value of capital θF
and average capital, liquid wealth, failure dividends and the firm’s entry value, each expressed
as a share (multiple) of revenue.
Figure 1.4 shows the results of these simulations. Capital per revenue and borrowing per
revenue are clearly increasing with θF , while liquid wealth per revenue is clearly decreasing
with θF . This suggests that a decline in the resale value of capital ought to lead to greater
aggregate liquid wealth on firms’ balance sheets, along with less capital and hence lower
investment, and also less borrowing, relative to GDP. This is consistent with the stylised
facts discussed earlier.
Firms’ entry value and dividends paid relative to GDP both increase with θF in most
of the range considered, but at low levels of investment reversibility, a further decrease in
reversibility causes these ratios to increase. The effect on entry values and dividends are
therefore ambiguous. Moreover, the sensitivity analysis shown in Figures A.9, A.10, A.11,
A.12 and A.13 show that the effect of θF on failure dividends, in particular, is very sensitive
to parameter values, not just in magnitude but in direction. Therefore we cannot be confident
in predicting any particular effect of investment reversibility on dividends.
1.5 Conclusions
We developed a partial equilibrium model of a representative firm’s optimal investment pro-
gramme across its life cycle, when there is a positive, exogenous risk of firm failure in any
given period, when firms face a cash-in-advance constraint on investment expenditure, and
when banks can only extend one-period loans. We find that surviving firms strictly prefer
to retain all liquid wealth when young and growing, and accumulate capital gradually, even
though they do not face convex adjustment costs. Young firms rely on credit markets, but
mature firms are able to self-finance all desired investment.
By conducting numerical analysis, we find that aggregated across a continuum of firms,
investment reversibility is positively associated with capital stocks and borrowing, and neg-
atively associated with liquid wealth retained by firms, expressed as a share (multiple) of
revenue. Thus, in particular, an increasing reliance on intangible capital leads to greater
5The sensitivity analysis conducted in Appendix A.2 shows that doubling the firm’s productivity from
ϕ = 10 to ϕ = 20 does not make much difference at all to any of the panels in Figure 1.4. Since price p
only occurs as a multiplier on the production function, as does productivity ϕ, the same would hold for price
changes. Therefore even though we have developed a partial equilibrium model, when taking quantities as a
share (multiple) of revenue, the effects are similar to those we would find in a general equilibrium analysis.
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Figure 1.4: Average firm characteristics divided by revenue, plotted against θF
Simulations of average firm characteristics divided by average firm revenue, plotted against the resale
value of capital θF . Capital k and borrowing b increase uniformly as a share (multiple) of revenue with
θF , while liquid wealth a decreases uniformly. The average failure dividend and the firm’s entry value
both increase as a share (multiple) of revenue with θF in most of the range shown, but appear to have
a quadratic form and are minimised around θF = 0.33 and θF = 0.25 respectively.
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cash stocks on corporate balance sheets and reduced debt, as found by Falato et al. (2013).
Sensitivity analysis confirms these results hold for a wide array of parameter choices.
Chapter 2
Investment Irreversibility and
Structural Change in General
Equilibrium
Abstract
This chapter develops a general equilibrium model of an economy in which the degree of investment
irreversibility affects the relative sizes of the manufacturing and services sectors. In a benchmark
one-sector model, output per worker and the wage rate are increasing in investment reversibility,
and simulations show that taxing households to subsidise capital liquidation – thereby increasing
the reversibility of investment from firms’ perspective – can be welfare-enhancing. In the two-sector
model investment reversibility affects the structural composition of the economy. The direction of this
effect depends on consumer preferences: when consumers consider manufactured goods and services
to be ‘more complements than substitutes’, the share of services in the economy is increasing with
investment reversibility. Regardless of consumer preferences, subsidising capital liquidation increases
the manufacturing shares of labour and output. Such subsidies, even when they are welfare-enhancing,
may therefore be perceived as a de facto fillip to the manufacturing sector.
2.1 Introduction
There is an extensive body of work studying the effects of investment irreversibility on indi-
vidual firms’ capital formation decisions and on aggregate economic performance, but com-
paratively little attention has been paid to the relationship between irreversibility and the
structural composition of the economy. In advanced economies like the United States, two
striking trends in recent decades have been an increasing reliance on intangible capital (Cor-
rado et al., 2009; Corrado and Hulten, 2010) and a secular shift away from manufacturing
towards services1 (Herrendorf et al., 2014). Is there any relationship between the two?
In this chapter, we develop a general equilibrium model in which individual firms face
a degree of irreversibility in their investments; that is, capital can only be liquidated at a
1See Chapter 3 for a more empirically-founded discussion of this trend in the United States.
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discount to its purchase price, where we parametrise the precise level of reversibility and
study its effect on competitive equilibrium outcomes. The model suggests that in the long
run increased reversibility causes increased output, wages and consumption. Decreasing
reversibility leads to decreased corporate borrowing and increased corporate saving, consistent
with empirical evidence (Falato et al., 2013). It also causes a reduction in the number of firms
in the market, consistent with an observed reduction in the number of listed firms2 in the
United States (Doidge et al., 2018). The effect of reversibility on structural composition – the
balance between services and manufacturing – depends on households’ preferences. We also
consider government subsidies of capital liquidation, finding that at low levels of underlying
investment reversibility, such subsidies can be welfare-enhancing. However, these subsidies
cause an increase in the size of the manufacturing sector, so may be perceived as a boondoggle
for manufacturers even when they are welfare-enhancing.
While early examinations of a firm’s optimal investment programme in the neoclassical
framework, such as Jorgenson (1963), assumed perfect reversibility of investment – that
is, capital can be liquidated at its purchase price, so the installation of capital does not
constitute a sunk cost – a later body of work considered the more realistic situation in which
investment is either fully irreversible or only reversible at a cost3 (e.g. Bertola and Caballero,
1994; Abel and Eberly, 1996, 1999). A number of studies have embedded such micro-level
irreversibility into a general equilibrium model, as we do in this chapter. Bernanke (1983)
suggests that irreversibility can give rise to investment cycles; for example, at the beginnings
of recessions whose duration and severity are not yet know, investors may hold off making
investments against a time when the future is clearer. This model emphasises the ‘option
value’ of not investing: when the economic environment is uncertain, taking irreversible action
precludes the possibility of taking some other action at a later date, so there is an option value
associated with not taking that irreversible action. In a later contribution, Veracierto (2002)
advances a model in which, despite having significant implications for individual plants or
firms, irreversibility has no major effect on the aggregate business cycle. This helps justify our
simple stochastic environment in which there are only firm-level shocks, rather than aggregate
shocks, since we are primarily interested in long-run outcomes rather than the business cycle.
Further emphasising the importance of general equilibrium modelling, Faig (2001) high-
lights the difference between the effects of investment irreversibility on individual markets and
economy-wide, and suggests that irreversibility – despite effectvely being an additional cost
to capital accumulation – can under certain circumstances spur capital creation. Hugonnier
et al. (2005) consider irreversible investment in the framework of the aforementioned option
value of waiting to invest. When risk aversion is introduced, and this framework is extended to
general equilibrium with endogenous consumption, the option value of waiting is diminished,
with implications for the pattern of investment.
Focussing on asset prices and investment thresholds, Kogan (2001) models a two-sector
2This prediction must be intepreted with some caution. Doidge et al. (2018) suggest that the fall in the
number of listed firms is because public markets are not well-suited to financing small firms with a large
proportion of intangible capital, not necessarily that such firms don’t exist.
3See Chapter 1 for a deeper discussion of this literature.
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economy – the ‘sector of interest’ and ‘everything else’ – in the presence of irreversibility.
Notably, “[u]nlike in standard partial-equilibrium models of irreversible investment, the link
between aggregate uncertainty and investment in general equilibrium is ambiguous and de-
pends on households preferences” (Kogan, 2001, p. 227-228). This prefigures the importance
in our model of household preferences in determining the response of structural composition
to investment reversibility.
Sim (2007) develops a general equilibrium model in which the magnitude of the ‘hangover
effect’ associated with investment irreversibility (not being able to liquidate over-accumulated
capital, which would tend to increase capital stocks) and the ‘user cost effect’ (the strictly
positive option value of waiting to invest, which would tend to decrease capital stocks) are
compared, finding that for a wide variety of parameters, the user cost effect dominates the
hangover effect. This lends support to our simple setup in which there is no uncertainty
about the aggregate economic environment – the only stochastic element of our model is the
exogenous probability each period of any individual firm permanently failing – and so there
is no real hangover effect. A firm only ever has too much capital if it fails and thus requires
zero capital, and in this case capital is liquidated and the firm wound up.
Firms in our model, while identical technologically, are heterogeneous in terms of size, age,
wealth, collateral and so on. This heterogeneity is important for some of our results about the
effect of reversibility on corporate savings4. There is an extensive literature concerned with
heterogeneous firms in the field of international economics, attempting to explain observed
differences between exporting and non-exporting firms, and the consequent effects on the
macroeconomy (see e.g. Helpman et al., 2004; Ghironi and Melitz, 2005; Bernard et al., 2007;
Melitz and Redding, 2014). In an interesting paper, Manova (2013) considers the interaction
between credit constraints and firm heterogeneity. In some respects, this is similar to our
setup: firms face upfront costs associated with exporting, just as in our model firms face
upfront costs associated with investment, and thus rely on credit markets. In common with
most of the literature however, firms in Manova (2013) differ in terms of their productivity,
which is not the case in our model.
A handful of models have considered investment irreversibility in the presence of techno-
logically heterogeneous firms. Gala (2007) employs irreversible investment in the presence
of productivity shocks and heterogeneous firms to generate a realistic cross-section of stock
returns, and assesses the performance of asset pricing models at explaining data thus gener-
ated. In contrast to our own findings, Jamet (2004) constructs a general equilibrium model
in which irreversibility increases the long-run aggregate capital stock in the economy. Firm
heterogeneity generates a non-spike distribution of firms in the steady state when there is
investment irreversibility, even without firm entry and exit, since the model admits historical
dependence. By inducing entry and exit, we are able to generate a non-spike distribution of
firm sizes in equilibrium even with technologically homogeneous firms.
In the two-sector version of our model, we show that investment reversibility modestly
affects the structural composition of the economy. Herrendorf et al. (2014) present some
4See Section 1.4 for more discussion of firm-level effects of reversibility on corporate savings.
58 CHAPTER 2. INVESTMENT IRREVERSIBILITY AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE
stylised facts associated with structural change, notably that in advanced economies, man-
ufacturing is secularly decreasing and services secularly increasing over time as a share of
output, consumption and employment. At least two theoretical paradigms exist to explain
this phenomenon. Kongsamut et al. (2001) embed consumer preferences in a Stone-Geary
utility function, and thus increasing wealth leads to a different desired mix of products. Con-
versely, Ngai and Pissarides (2007) show that under certain assumptions, labour will flow
towards sectors with relatively slow productivity growth, and relative price changes will be
such that nominal output and consumption shares will increase in the backward sector. Even
within the supply-side story, there has been very little consideration of the effect of invest-
ment irreversibility on the structural composition of the economy. We find that decreasing
investment reversibility – due, for example, to an increasing reliance on intangible capital – in
fact decreases the share of services in the economy when consumer preferences are relatively
inelastic. Nonetheless, this effect is rather small, so it may be happening concurrently with
unequal technological progress in different sectors, and the technological progress dominates.
The effect of investment irreversibility on aggregate output is rather greater: if these changes
were happening concurrently, therefore, the shift to intangible capital could help explain
secularly low growth rates in the advanced world in recent decades.
We also consider the welfare and structural composition implications of subsidies for cap-
ital liquidation, which would increase the reversibility of investment from firms’ perspective.
De Long and Summers (1991) suggest that the social return to equipment installation is
greater than the private return, since equipment investment is associated with productivity
growth, implying that equipment subsidies are a desirable policy. While productivity is a
fixed, separate parameter in our model – so if the productivity spillovers story is correct, we
are underestimating the benefit of subsidies – we nonetheless find that capital liquidation
subsidies can be welfare-enhancing.
A number of empirical studies provide evidence of the effects of capital subsidies con-
sistent with our model. Harris (1991) examines the effect of factor subsidies in Northern
Irish industry, finding that capital subsidies caused manufacturing output to increase, as we
find. This paper also suggests that capital subsidies caused manufacturing employment to
decrease, which is the opposite of the prediction we make: however, unlike our model, Harris
(1991) relies on a partial equilibrium model in which capital subsidies cause manufacturers
to substitute away from labour to capital. Our general equilibrium setting, in which labour is
supplied inelastically, precludes the possibility of all sectors substituting away from labour,
and we find that in fact capital subsidies cause labour to flow to manufacturing from services.
Bergström (2000) examines the effect of capital subsidies in Sweden on the performance
of firms, concluding that subsidies can accelerate firm growth, but have little effect on firm
productivity. Similarly, considering the effect of regional capital subsidies in Greece on firm
performance, Tzelepis and Skuras (2004) find that subsidies are positively associated with
firm growth. Harris and Trainor (2005) study the effect of capital subsidies for manufacturing
firms in Northern Ireland and conclude that real gross manufacturing output would have been
7-10% lower in the absence of grants. All of these findings are broadly consistent with our
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model. Additionally, Harris and Trainor (2005) find some evidence for the proposition that
capital subsidies increase total factor productivity; while this effect is not present in our
model, if true, this only strengthens our assertion that capital subsidies can sometimes be
welfare-enhancing.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 develops a baseline one-sector
general equilibrium model, studies the effects of investment reversibility on this economy, and
undertakes welfare and policy analysis. Section 2.3 does the same for the two-sector model,
additionally considering the effect of investment reversibility on the balance between services
and manufacturing in the economy. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 A one-sector general equilibrium model
2.2.1 Model setup
In this model, we consider the firms introduced in Chapter 1 to be intermediate firms, pro-
ducing an intermediate good that is used alongside labour in the production of the final
consumption good. The model operates as follows. Time is discrete, and in each period a
homogeneous intermediate good is produced using project-specific capital; then a homoge-
neous final good is produced using labour and the intermediate good. Final output can be
consumed, saved as liquid wealth, or converted costlessly into project-specific capital, but
capital can only be liquidated at a discount. We take the final good as the numeraire in this
economy and fix its price to unity.
There is a continuum of identical households of fixed measure L, each of which is endowed
with a unit of labour at each period in time. Households supply labour inelastically to the
final sector, which is perfectly competitive and exhibits constant returns to scale, so that
inputs are compensated according to their marginal product. At date t, the final sector
employs all labour and all intermediate output produced at time t.
There is an infinite supply of potential intermediate firms, each of which comes into
existence upon the payment of a fixed entry cost. Intermediate firms operate exactly as
described in Chapter 1, taking project-specific capital as their only input, and relying in
some situations on credit from the banking sector; the intermediate sector is also competitive,
but firms exhibit decreasing returns to scale, so are able to make profits. The equilibrium
condition for firm entry is that the firm’s expected discounted lifetime dividend stream – that
is, the firm’s value function on entry – must equal the entry cost.
The banking sector takes deposits from households and lends to intermediate firms to fund
capital purchases when the firms do not have sufficient liquid wealth to fund themselves, and
to fund startup costs for firms. Once a bank has funded a firm’s startup costs, it owns all
shares in the firm. The banking sector is risk-neutral, and therefore requires an expected
return of the risk-free rate rt on any asset it holds at time t. A simple assumption that
households face transaction costs not faced by banks gives rise to financial intermediaries.
Assets held by banks are loans to the intermediate sector and shares in intermediate firms,
while liabilities are deposits held by households and firms.
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Each period is divided into three subperiods, and the timing is as follows:
Subperiod 1. The banking sector uses deposits from households and firms to finance
startup costs for new intermediate firms, and to make loans to interme-
diate firms in order to fund capital purchases
Subperiod 2. Production takes place in the intermediate sector
Subperiod 3. Simultaneously, the following happen: the final sector purchases all in-
termediate output, produces final output, and pays a wage to house-
holds; intermediate firms pay back their loans to the financial sector,
where they are able; failed intermediate firms’ capital is liquidated, and
failure dividends are paid to their shareholders (the banking sector); in-
terest is paid on households’ and firms’ deposits with the banking sector;
households consume their chosen quantity of final output; households’
savings and firms’ retained liquid wealth are deposited in the banking
sector.
We turn now to a more detailed consideration of each sector.
2.2.2 The banking sector
The perfectly competitive banking sector takes deposits from households and firms with excess
liquid wealth, and uses them to fund the entry cost of startups and to make loans to young
firms so that they can install capital. Banks fund startups and own firms directly; banks
therefore act as a risk-pooling intermediary for savers in the economy, so that households
and individual firms can access the safe rate of return, while bearing no idiosyncratic risk
associated with individual holdings in their portfolios. This could be justified by assuming
that banks have informational advantages in funding firms, or can exploit economies of scale,
or by assuming that individual savers are risk-averse. We note that there is no possibility for
arbitrage: as described in Chapter 1 banks only make loans at time t that have an expected
return of rt, which is the prevailing safe rate at time t. It is clear to see that, by construction,
the expected return on holding a share in a firm is also rt, since the value function of any
firm is given by
Vt (Ωt−1) =






where ψS and ψF are the survival and failure dividends respectively. Thus (1 + rt)Vt is ex-
actly equal to the expected dividend plus the new expected share value (that is, the principal
plus the expected capital gain).
The banking sector has both assets and liabilities. Assets comprise the loan portfolio and
ownership of firms, while liabilities are deposits from households and from firms with retained
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liquid wealth. In any period t, the banking sector’s net worth is therefore V Bt , where









where Nt is the number of intermediate firms at time t, barred quantities are averages across
all intermediate firms, L is the (fixed) number of households, and φt is the quantity of deposits
held in the banking sector at time t by each household. Since we assume that the banking
sector makes zero profits, imposing the condition that it came into existence with zero net
worth, this implies that V Bt = 0 at all times t. Thus
Lφt = Nt
(
b̄t + V̄t − āt
)
. (2.1)
We also note the law of motion for the value of the banking sector’s firm ownership,
Nt+1V̄t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
aggregate firm value at time t+ 1
= (1 + rt)NtV̄t︸ ︷︷ ︸
return on firm ownership at time t
− Ntψ̄Ft+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
aggregate failure dividends
+ (Nt+1 − (1− δ)Nt) e︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of new firms
,
where e is the entry cost for new firms5 and ψ̄F is the average failure dividend. Thus in the
steady state6, where quantities are constant and so not time-dependent,
NV̄ = (1 + r)NV̄ −Nψ̄F + δNe


















which will be useful later, since all of the quantities on the RHS of equation (2.2) are quantities
that we can calculate numerically in the steady state. Next, we consider the final sector.
2.2.3 The final production sector
The final output sector is perfectly competitive, and produces output Yt at time t by use of
labour Lt and intermediate output It. Aggregate final output is given by
Yt ≡ Iγt L
1−γ
t , (2.3)
where Lt is aggregate labour and γ ∈ (0, 1) is an elasticity parameter. Many of the results
derived below would flow through for any competitive CRS production technology in the final
5As discussed further in Section 2.2.4.1, the equilibrium entry condition is that firms’ value on entry is
equal to the entry cost.
6For a precise definition of equilibrium and the steady state in this economy, see Section 2.2.6.
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sector, but we assume a concrete Cobb-Douglas functional form for convenience. The price




wt = (1− γ) Γγt ,
where Γ is the quantity of intermediate good per worker,
Γt ≡ It/Lt.
Thus the price of intermediate output is clearly decreasing in Γ, while the wage rate is















Thus we immediately have the following result.
Lemma 2.1 Intermediate output per worker Γ, final output per worker Y/L, and the wage
rate w are all in one-to-one correspondence with – and decreasing in – the price of interme-
diate output p.
Proof. The result follows immediately from equations (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5).
Lemma 2.1 will be useful to us, because when characterising the steady state, the price
of intermediate output will be determined by considering an individual firm’s problem, and
we can then use this result to specify Γ, Y/L and w. Indeed, we now proceed to derive some
useful results about the intermediate sector.
2.2.4 The intermediate production sector
Intermediate firms are modelled exactly as firms in Chapter 1. We have fully characterised
those firms’ behaviour when the parameters that are exogenous to the firm, such as the
interest rate and price of intermediate output, are fixed – which is indeed the case in the
steady state – so we can lift these results wholesale when characterising the steady state
of this economy. Intermediate firms take final output, convert it costlessly into project-
specific capital, and use this capital to produce the intermediate good, which is used in the
production of the final good. Intermediate firms are all technologically identical, and they
produce a homogeneous intermediate good, but they differ in terms of age and size: some
firms die and new firms are born at every date. More mature firms have built up more capital
and internal liquid wealth, produce more output, and are less reliant on the financial sector
to fund their operations.
In Chapter 1 we only required the intermediate firms’ production function to obey the
usual Inada conditions. For simplicity, and consistency with the final sector, we will here
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assume it takes Cobb-Douglas form,
f (k) = kβ,
with β ∈ (0, 1), where k is project-specific capital employed by that firm. Thus an interme-





ϕ̄ > 0 with probability 1− δ0 with probability δ.
The possibility of firm failure means loans extended by the financial sector are risky, and
capital functions as collateral. If the firm is able to repay its loan in the event of failure, it
liquidates its own capital at the price θF ∈ (0, 1). If the firm is unable to repay its loan in
the event of failure, the bank seizes the firm’s capital and undertakes the liquidation itself




. Thus θF , which will be a key parameter of interest when we turn
to numerical modelling, indexes the ‘reversibility of investment’. Intermediate firms produce
a homogeneous intermediate good: at time t, there is a continuum of intermediate firms of





where yj,t is firm j’s output at time t.
2.2.4.1 Firm entry
At any time t, we assume that there is an infinite pool of potential startup firms which can
become operational upon payment of a fixed entry cost e. Firms are born with zero liquid
wealth and zero capital. In equilibrium, the cost of entry will equal the present value of the
expected lifetime dividend stream. That is, the equilibrium condition for a firm entering the
marketplace at time t is
V0 ≡ Vt (0) = e.
The firm pays the cost e at time t and begins production at time t+ 1.
2.2.4.2 Determining the price of intermediate output
In order to show that the interest rate in the steady state must determine the price of
intermediate output, we first derive some useful results.
Lemma 2.2 Holding other parameters and the price of intermediate output constant, an
intermediate firm’s value function on entry is continuous, differentiable, strictly monotone
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and decreasing in the interest rate r, and in particular,
dV0
dr
< −(1− δ) e
(1 + r)2
. (2.6)
Proof. Consider an intermediate firm. We will proceed by backward induction: first we will
show that equation (2.6) holds for all mature firms, and then we will show that if it holds at
date t+ 1, it must also hold at date t.
Fix some date T and ΩT−1, and suppose that the firm employed the first-best capital
stock k∗ at time T −1, so that in particular the firm can continue to employ k∗ for as long as












pϕ̄f (k∗)− pϕ̄f ′ (k∗) k∗
]
+ C (ΩT−1) ,
where C is some constant based on inherited wealth ΩT−1. Note that k
∗ is implicitly defined
by




so by the Implicit Function Theorem we can take the differential dk∗/dr. Moreover, since










µk∗ − 1− δ
(r + δ)2
[

































µk∗ − 1− δ
(r + δ)2
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Now consider some arbitrary date t, and suppose inductively that dVt+1/dr < 0. Suppose















< − 1− δ
(1 + r)2
Vt+1 (Ωt) .
By Corollary 1.13 the value function is strictly and monotonically increasing in inherited
wealth Ω, so Vt+1 (Ωt) > V0 (0), and by the free entry condition, V0 = e where e is the firm’s




< −(1− δ) e
(1 + r)2
,
as required. Suppose instead that the firm takes a small loan at time t. The firm will not
pay a dividend if it survives, but it may pay a dividend if it fails. By equation (1.20) the
value function is
Vt (Ωt−1) = δΩt−1 −
δ
[









































































By the proof of Theorem 1.19,
dΩt
dkt
= pϕ̄f ′ (kt)−
(1− δ) (1 + r)− (1− δ) (1− µ)
1− δ








































7Strictly speaking, this condition only follows from Corollary 1.13 if we can show that V is a differentiable
function of Ω. This is straightforward to show so long as the policy functions are differentiable; as in Chapter
1, we simply assume this to be the case.





















≤ −(1− δ) e
(1 + r)2
as required.
Next we show that V0 is increasing in p.
Lemma 2.3 Holding other parameters constant, an intermediate firm’s value function on
entry is continuous, differentiable, strictly monotone and increasing in the price of interme-
diate output p. Moreover, V0 = 0 when p = 0, and limp→∞ V0 =∞.
Proof. The proof follows a similar structure to the proof of Lemma 2.2. Again, we will
proceed by backward induction.
Fix some date T and ΩT−1, and suppose that the firm employed the first-best capital
stock k∗ at time T −1, so that in particular the firm can continue to employ k∗ for as long as












pϕ̄f (k∗)− pϕ̄f ′ (k∗) k∗
]
+ C (ΩT−1) ,




















































ϕ̄f (k∗)− ϕ̄f ′ (k∗) k∗
]
>0.
Now consider some arbitrary date t, and suppose inductively that dVt+1/dp > 0. Suppose
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as required. Suppose instead that the firm takes a small loan at time t. Then
Vt (Ωt−1) = δΩt−1 −
δ
[
























If kt = k

































where the reasoning is the same as in the proof of Lemma 2.2, but the inequality is strict
because we are supposing kt < k
∗. As required, again, we have dVt/dp > 0. Since Vt is
differentiable, it follows immediately that it is continuous.
Clearly if p = 0 then V0 = 0, because there is no benefit to firms in producing output and
optimal behaviour is not to produce anything at all8. Suppose therefore that p > 0. Since
firms are born with zero capital and zero liquid wealth, they must take a large loan in their
first period of operation. Now consider the firm’s behaviour in its second period of operation.
It has inherited some quantity of wealth Ω1. It may or may not be optimal to do so, but
the firm is certainly able to take a small loan in its second period of operation, and make its
operations small enough that it is able to pay a strictly positive dividend immediately after






. Then it is able to
pay the dividend
ψ̄S2 = pϕ̄f (k2)− (1 + r) k2 > 0.
Clearly as p→∞, also ψ̄S2 →∞, keeping k2 fixed (and indeed the firm might be able to do

















it is also the case that V0 →∞ as p→∞.
Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 will be enough to guarantee a steady-state relationship between r
8Strictly, we also want to ensure that limp→0 V0 = 0, to ensure that the value function is right continuous
at zero. With reference to the proof of Lemma 1.10, we note that V0 < Ψ
S
0 , and that since f (k
∗)− f ′ (k∗) k∗
is increasing in k∗ which is increasing in p, it follows that that limp→0 Ψ
S
0 = 0. Since V0 is bounded below by
zero, the result follows immediately.
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and p, but we defer this discussion to Section 2.2.6 once we have formally defined the steady
state. Before saying something about the equilibrium of this economy, however, we must
finally consider households.
2.2.5 Households
There is a continuum of identical households of fixed measure L, each of which is endowed with
a unit of labour at each date. Labour is supplied inelastically to the final sector, attracting








ln (cτ ) ,
where ρ > 0 is the subjective discount rate and c is per-household consumption. Households
deposit savings in banks, earning the return rt on financial assets φt held at time t. The
household’s wealth constraint is therefore
φt+1 = (1 + rt)φt + wt − ct. (2.7)








ln (ct)− λt [φt+1 − (1 + rt)φt − wt + ct]
}
,





(1 + ρ)t ct
− λt = 0
⇒ λt =
1




= −λt−1 + (1 + rt)λt = 0
⇒ λt−1 = (1 + rt)λt.






(1 + ρ)t ct
= 0. (2.8)
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Dynamic analysis of this economy is difficult, as discussed further in Section 2.2.9, so we
limit ourselves below to steady states and comparative statics of steady states: all that
is important about the household’s problem therefore is that r = ρ when consumption is
invariant, as implied by equation (2.9). As with the final sector’s production technology, we
could have assumed a generic form for households’ utility function, and it would only affect
the transition of the economy; we simply assume the concrete functional form proposed here
for convenience.
2.2.6 Characterising the steady state and comparative statics
Definition 2.4 We define an equilibrium as a sequence of prices and quantities
{rt, pt, wt, Yt, ct}∞t=−∞
such that banks, intermediate firms and the final sector maximise profits, households maximise
utility, and at each date the markets for labour, for the intermediate good and for final output
clear.
Since there is only one final production sector, which exhibits constant returns to scale and
is perfectly competitive, market clearing for labour and the intermediate good simply means
that those inputs are compensated according to their marginal product. Market clearing for
the final good means that consumption demand plus investment demand is equal to final
output plus liquidated capital at each date, given the fixed unit price of the final good and
the prevailing interest rate.
Definition 2.5 We define a steady state in this economy to be an equilibrium such that prices
and quantities are invariant over time.
Note that we use ‘the steady state’ to refer to the nontrivial steady state – that is, we
ignore the trivial steady state in which production and consumption are permanently zero.
We have a straightforward first result about what the steady state looks like.
Lemma 2.6 In the steady state, if it exists, the interest rate equals households’ subjective
discount rate, r = ρ.
Proof. The result follows immediately from equation (2.9) when ct+1 = ct = c and rt+1 = r
are time-invariant.
We can also pin down consumption in the steady state.
Lemma 2.7 In the steady state, if it exists, consumption is given by







+ ψ̄F − δe
]
N/L.
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Proof. The result follows immediately from equations (2.2) and (2.7) when ct+1 = ct = c,
φt+1 = φt = φ, wt = w and rt = r = ρ are time-invariant.
Next, we show that p and r are co-determined in the steady state. It proves convenient for
the statement and proof of Lemma 2.8 to consider r to be a function of p in the appropriate
domain, but we might equally consider p to be a function of r, as we do in the proof of Lemma
2.9.
Lemma 2.8 Suppose V0 = e where e > 0 is some fixed entry cost. Taking all other param-
eters as given, the steady-state price of intermediate output p is a function of the steady-
state interest rate r. Consider the inverse r (p) of this function. Then r (p) is continu-
ous, differentiable, strictly monotone and increasing in p. Moreover, limp→0 r (p) < 0 and
limp→∞ r (p) =∞.
Proof. By Lemma 2.6, the steady-state interest rate r is determined by households’ discount
rate. It is not strictly true therefore that r is a ‘function’ of the steady-state price of inter-
mediate output p, but with some abuse of terminology we will consider this to be the case,
as it will be convenient to consider the mapping r (p) that is the inverse of the function p (r).
Considering r as a function of p, therefore, it follows immediately from Lemmas 2.2 and
2.3 that dr/dp > 0, and since r is a differentiable function of p, it must also be a continuous
function of p.




since the relationship between r and p is implicitly defined by the restriction V0 = e, and
we know by Lemma 2.2 that V0 is decreasing in r for any given p. However, this is clearly
a contradiction: we also know by Lemma 2.3 that V0 is a continuous function of p for any
given r, and clearly when p = 0 the firm derives no benefit from producing output, so V0 = 0




and it follows that limp→0 r < 0.
Next we wish to show that limp→∞ r = ∞. Suppose for a contradiction that limp→∞ =
r̃ <∞. By Lemma 2.2, considering V0 as a function of p and r,
e = V0 (p, r) ≡ V0 [p, r (p)] ≥ V0 (p, r̃) ,
since r is an implicit function of p. Thus
e ≥ lim
p→∞
V0 (p, r̃) .
However, this contradicts Lemma 2.3, which shows that limp→∞ V0 =∞ for any given value
of r. Thus limp→∞ r =∞ as required.
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Lemma 2.8 can be thought of as a kind of supply curve: although it is a relationship
between two prices, rather than a price and a quantity, it codifies the relationship between
those two prices that is required by the entry condition on the supply side of the economy.
Thus the steady-state interest rate – which is pinned down by households’ discount rate – also
determines the steady-state price of intermediate output, which in turn allows the calculation
of all other quantities in the steady state.
We therefore have all the ingredients needed to characterise the steady state of this econ-
omy. First however, we must show that the steady state exists.
Lemma 2.9 The steady state exists and is uniquely determined.
Proof. By Lemma 2.6, the interest rate in the steady state – if it exists – is determined by
the households’ subjective discount rate; in p-r space, therefore, Lemma 2.6 describes a flat
quasi-demand curve that must be satisfied in the steady state. Lemma 2.8 describes a upward-
sloping quasi-supply curve in p-r space. Moreover, we know that this quasi-demand curve
implies a strictly positive price p for any r ≥ 0, and is unbounded. These two curves must
therefore intersect, and jointly characterise the only permissible nontrivial steady state. By
Lemma 2.1 and equations (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5), the price of intermediate output determines
the wage rate, intermediate output per worker, and final output per worker. Lemma 2.7
determines consumption in the steady state, which – since it is constant – clearly satisfies the
transversality condition in equation (2.8). Finally, given an individual firm’s output – which
is determined by p and r, in addition to the exogenous parameters – the number of firms can
be calculated as aggregate intermediate output divided by per-firm intermediate output.
Note that even in the steady state, intermediate firms are dying and being born each
period. While individual firms are born and die, however, the distribution is invariant. Since
a representative share δ of all firms fail in each period, in the steady state there must be
1 − δ times as many firms in their (T + 1)-th period of operation as there are firms in their
T -th period of operation. Thus in the steady state there are Nδ firms in their first period of
operation, Nδ (1− δ) in their second period of operation, Nδ (1− δ)2 in their third period
of operation, and so on; summing across all firm ages, there is a mass N of firms overall.
Thus the distribution of firms, and hence the quantity of intermediate output produced, is
invariant in the steady state even though individual firms change over time.
It is difficult to derive aggregate quantities analytically, precisely because there is a con-
tinuum of firms of different ages and sizes. Nonetheless, it is possible to find these quantities
numerically. Before turning to numerical methods, however, we will derive some analytical
results about the steady state of this economy, and in particular the effect of investment
reversibility θF . In order to say something about the aggregate effect of θF , we first examine
its effect on individual intermediate firms.
Lemma 2.10 Holding other parameters and the price of intermediate output constant, an
intermediate firm’s value function on entry is continuous, differentiable, strictly monotone
and increasing in the firm’s liquidation value of capital θF .
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Proof. Once again, the proof proceeds by backwards induction, like the proofs of Lemmas
2.2 and 2.3. Fix some date T and ΩT−1, and suppose that the firm employed the first-best
capital stock k∗ at time T − 1, so that in particular the firm can continue to employ k∗ for













pϕ̄f (k∗)− pϕ̄f ′ (k∗) k∗
]
+ C (ΩT−1) ,

















since δ < 1 and f ′′ > 0. Now consider some arbitrary date t, and suppose inductively that
dVt+1/dθ
F > 0. Suppose the firm takes a large loan at time t. Then since the firm will not













as required. Suppose instead that the firm takes a small loan at time t. Then
Vt (Ωt−1) = δΩt−1 −
δ
[



























If kt = k
∗, then as already shown, dVt/dθ
F > 0. Suppose therefore that kt 6= k∗. There are
two possibilities. First suppose that kt = k̄
S
t . By Table 1.1, dk̄
S
t /dθ
F = 0, so equation (2.10)
clearly shows that dVt/dθ
F > 0. Finally suppose that kt = k̄t. Then
k̄t =
Ωt−1





(1 + r) [1− θF (1− µ) / (1 + r)]2
=
(1− µ) k̄
1 + r − θF (1− µ)
,
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In any case, it follows that dVt/dθ
F > 0, and hence dV0/dθ
F > 0 as required.
Corollary 2.11 Taking all other parameters as given, the steady-state price of intermediate
output p is in one-to-one correspondence with – and decreasing in – investment reversibility
θF .
Proof. The result follows immediately from Lemmas 2.3 and 2.10.
Corollary 2.11 shows that an increase in investment reversibility θF will cause the steady
state price of intermediate output p to decrease, by which we immediately have the following
result about comparative statics.
Corollary 2.12 The steady-state values of intermediate output per worker Γ, final output per
worker Y/L, and the wage rate w are all in one-to-one correspondence with – and increasing
in – investment reversibility θF .
Proof. The result follows immediately from Lemma 2.1 and Corollary 2.11.
Corollary 2.12 describes qualitatively the relationship between the firm’s liquidation value
of capital θF and aggregate quantities. Intuitively, the lower is θF – perhaps because capital
is less tangible – the lower will be output per worker and the wage rate. In order to calculate
the magnitude of these effects directly, we turn now to numerical modelling.
2.2.7 Numerical modelling
We now consider the quantitative effect of θF on the economy by turning to numerical mod-
elling. Table 2.1 details the parameter choices made for the following numerical modelling
exercises. Figure 2.1 plots the results of the numerical modelling exercise. Consistent with
Corollary 2.12, aggregate (final) output is increasing with investment reversibility θF , as are
aggregate consumption, aggregate capital, and the number of intermediate firms. Corporate
borrowing increases with θF , while corporate savings decrease with θF .
This is broadly consistent with stylised empirical evidence. Our results suggest that a
decrease in investment reversibility, for example a reduction in capital tangibility, would tend
to: put downward pressure on output, which could help explain slow growth in recent years;
increase net corporate savings, as has been observed; and lead to fewer firms, increasing
market concentration.
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Table 2.1: One-sector modelling choices
Parameter Value Description
β 0.7 intermediate sector output elasticity of capital
ϕ̄ 10 intermediate sector productivity
µ 0.05 intermediate sector per-period depreciation
δ 0.1 intermediate sector per-period death risk
ρ 0.02 households’ subjective discount rate
θB 0.1 banks’ liquidation value of capital
e 100 intermediate firms’ entry cost
γ 0.3 final sector output elasticity of intermediate goods
L 1 labour supply / number of households
Modelling choices for numerical simulation of the one-sector model. As it will
be allowed to vary in the following simulations, no value has been specified for
the resale value of capital θF .
The numerical modelling sensitivity analysis undertaken in Appendix B.1 shows that these
broad effects hold for a wide variety of parameter choices.
In order to assess the relationship between investment reversibility and structural change,
however, we need to model two final output sectors. This is the approach we take in Section
2.3.
2.2.8 Welfare and policy implications
Suppose now that there is a government in this economy, which is able to levy a per-period
lump sum tax on households and use that money to subsidise firms’ capital liquidation. That
is, we now suppose that firms can liquidate capital at a value of
θF = θ̄F + σ,
where σ is a subsidy provided by the government and θ̄F is the underlying reversibility of




where we define KS as the aggregate quantity of capital that firms in the small loan regime
are employing, so that δKS is the quantity of liquidated capital that is being subsidised, and
where T is the lump sum tax levied on each household. We allow σ and T to be positive
or negative, so that it’s possible for the government to tax capital liquidation and subsidise
households, and we suppose that θF ∈ (0, 1) as before9. Either a tax or a subsidy could
be implemented by altering the tax code, for example: capital liquidation could be taxed
directly, or it could be made tax deductible, or made to qualify for tax credits.
9If we allowed θF > 1 there would be an arbitrage possibility for firms: they would have an incentive to
purchase and immediately resell capital, which is not a situation we wish to allow. We also suppose that
θF > 0, otherwise firms would have an incentive simply to abandon unwanted capital rather than liquidate it.
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Figure 2.1: The effect of investment reversibility θF on one-sector general equilibrium
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
Aggregate output is increasing with θF , consistent with Corollary 2.12, as are aggregate consumption,
aggregate capital, and the number of intermediate firms. Corporate borrowing increases with θF , while
corporate savings decrease with θF .
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As far as firms are concerned, the liquidation value of capital is simply θF , so the inter-
mediate sector of the economy behaves exactly as previously modelled. However, modifying
Lemma 2.7, in the steady state households are now consuming
c = w + ρφ− T
= w + ρφ− σδKS . (2.11)
We assume that the government’s budget constraint holds with equality in the steady state,
since if it did not the government would be stockpiling wealth indefinitely, which is clearly
not welfare-maximising. Taking θF as fixed, two different underlying reversibility values θ̄F1




2 , so that
σ1 > σ2. Given that θ
F determines the wage and household savings, w+ ρφ will be the same
in both of these situations, but σδKS will increase with σ. Consumption therefore increases
with θ̄F and will be higher for the θ̄F2 case than for the θ̄
F
1 case. Thus we have the following
result.
Lemma 2.13 Taking θF as fixed, steady state consumption is a strictly increasing linear
function of θ̄F .
Proof. The result follows immediately from equation (2.11), given that w + ρφ and δKS
depend only on θF and not on σ.
Households’ utility is a function only of consumption, and in the steady state consumption
is the same in all periods, so steady state welfare is increasing in steady state consumption.
Thus, by Lemma 2.13, it’s always better to have higher underlying investment reversibility θ̄F
than to achieve the same level of θF with a lower underlying level of investment reversibility
that is boosted using subsidies. Nonetheless, given some value of θ̄F , it may still be possible
to increase welfare by subsiding (or indeed taxing) capital liquidation; we must therefore






















since dθF /dσ = 1 given fixed θ̄F . The sign of this differential is ambiguous: we know by
Lemma 2.12 that dw/dθF > 0, and clearly −δKS < 0. Note however that the only term that
depends on σ and not merely θF is the final term; so long as KS is increasing in θF , therefore
– which numerical modelling suggests is the case – then for a given level of θF , it follows that
dc/dσ is decreasing in σ.
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to changes in the level of subsidy
suggests that, in general, welfare forms an inverted ‘U’ shape when plotted against the subsidy.
If dc/dσ is decreasing in σ for a given level of θF , then this means in practice that the peak
of the inverted ‘U’ shape will occur at a lower level of θF when θ̄F is lower. For example, if
θ̄F = 0.3, welfare might be maximised if the government were to offer a subsidy of σ = 0.2
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Figure 2.2: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
one-sector model
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. ‘Net
Utility’ is calculated as the difference in the instantaneous utility function ln (c) relative to the case of
zero subsidy or tax.
so that θF = 0.5; but it does not follow that if θ̄F = 0.7, then welfare would be maximised
or even increase if the government imposed a tax of σ = −0.2 so that, once again, θF = 0.5.
We cannot say much more analytically about the effects of government intervention, but
Figure 2.2 shows numerical modelling of the welfare effects of subsidies and taxes when
θ̄F = 0.3 – so underlying reversibility is relatively low – and when θ̄F = 0.7 – so underlying
reversibility is relatively high – given the parameters laid out in Table 2.1. This modelling
suggests that when the underlying reversibility of investment is low, the government could
increase welfare by subsidising capital liquidation up to a certain point and paying for it with
a tax on households. It also suggests that the government is less likely to be able to increase
welfare by taxing capital liquidation and transferring the proceeds to households when the
underlying reversibility of investment is high.
The sensitivity analysis conducted in Appendix B.2 suggest that this general pattern
holds for a wide variety of parameter choices; indeed, even when underlying reversibility is
relatively high, the government may still be able to increase welfare by subsidising capital
liquidation10. The sensitivity analysis also reinforces that the precise level of subsidy or tax
that maximises welfare depends importantly on the values of all parameters, including the
underlying reversibility of investment θ̄F .
10When underlying reversibility θ̄F is sufficiently high, taxing capital liquidation can in principle be welfare-
enhancing. Nonetheless, this situation does not arise very often: most combinations of parameters we tested
showed that capital subsidies were still more likely than taxes to be welfare-enhancing, even when underlying
reversibility is relatively high.
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2.2.9 Dynamics of the model
We can write down the laws of motion for consumption and capital. Consumption follows
the Euler condition derived in equation (2.9), while capital changes according to
Kt = (1− δ) (1− µ)Kt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸




F + (1− ζt−1) θB
]
(1− µ)Kt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
liquidated capital among failed firms
+ Yt−1 − Lct−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
final output minus aggregate consumption
,
where K is aggregate capital and ζt ∈ [0, 1) is the share of firms at time t which take a small
loan and liquidate their capital at the rate θF if they fail, while the remaining 1− ζt share of
firms take a large loan and the bank liquidates their capital at the rate θB if they fail. Thus







1− δ + δ
[
ζt−1θ
F + (1− ζt−1) θB
]}
(1− µ)Kt−1 + Yt−1 − Lct−1.
In the standard neoclassical framework the evolution of these two variables would be sufficient
to conduct a dynamical analysis of the system, but it is more difficult in this case. There
are couple of issues: first, it is not straightforward to say anything analytically about ζ, or
its endogenous evolution. Second, and more problematically, although intermediate firms are
assumed all to be identical technologically, they are heterogeneous in age and size, and thus
their marginal product of capital differs. Capital alone does not fully characterise the econ-
omy; the distribution of capital is also crucial. We cannot therefore model the intermediate
sector as a representative firm, and the interest rate is not simply the marginal product of
capital, because there is no single marginal product of capital in the intermediate sector.
Thus the state variable that characterises this economy must be multi-dimensional –
aggregate capital alone is inadequate – and the dynamics of the model are not amenable to
the usual straightforward analysis. While this is an interesting direction for potential future
research, we cannot at present say much about the dynamic properties of this model, and
must content ourselves with an analysis of comparative statics. The same is true of the
two-sector model to which we now turn our attention.
2.3 A two-sector general equilibrium model
In order to study the effect of investment reversibility on structural change, we will extend
the model from Section 2.2 to a two-sector setting. Intermediate firms and the banking sector
are identical to those previously described, but we will need to revisit the household and final
production sector.
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2.3.1 Two final production sectors
We now assume that there are two perfectly competitive final production sectors, manufac-












where 1 > γM > γS > 0 so that manufacturing production is more capital intensive (strictly
speaking, more intensive in intermediate inputs, which themselves are produced with capital)
than services production. The market-clearing conditions are IM,t + IS,t = It, where It is
aggregate intermediate output, and LM,t+LS,t = L. We assume that the manufactured good
is the numeraire, with price fixed to unity, and that it can be converted costlessly into capital
for the intermediate sector. Services can only be consumed in the period they are produced,
and the price of services, denoted by pS , is determined in the competitive market. Aggregate
output, in terms of manufactured goods, is therefore
Yt ≡ YM,t + pS,tYS,t.















where ΓM is the intermediate input-labour ratio in the manufacturing sector, and pI is the













The wage rate is also equalised across both sectors, so that
wt = (1− γM ) ΓγMM,t
= pS,t (1− γS) ΓγSS,t.
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Since ΓM is in one-to-one correspondence with pI , in turn so is w,




















































which is clearly decreasing in pI , since γM > γS .
2.3.2 Households
There are now two types of consumption open to the household, of manufactured goods and
of services, which must be reflected in the household’s utility function. We suppose at time








ν (cM,τ , cS,τ ) ,
where cM and cS denote consumption of manufactured goods and services respectively, and
where









where ε > 0 is an elasticity parameter and ωM , ωS > 0 are constant weighting parameters.
Aggregate consumption ct, in terms of manufactured goods, is given by
ct = cM,t + pS,tcS,t,
and the household’s wealth constraint is now
φt+1 = (1 + rt)φt + wt − cM,t − pS,tcS,t
= (1 + rt)φt + wt − ct.
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ν (cM,t, cS,t)− λt [φt+1 − (1 + rt)φt − wt + cM,t + pS,tcS,t]
}
.















− pS,tλt = 0
⇒ λt =
νS,t
(1 + ρ)t pS,t
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Dynamic efficiency once again dictates that
∂L
∂φt
= −λt−1 + (1 + rt)λt = 0
⇒ λt−1 = (1 + rt)λt.






(1 + ρ)t ct
= 0.

















so again, when consumption is invariant, r = ρ.
2.3.3 Characterising the steady state and comparative statics
Similarly to the one-sector model, we define an equilibrium and the steady state in this
economy as follows.
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Definition 2.14 We define an equilibrium as a sequence of prices and quantities
{rt, pI,t, pS,t, wt, YM,t, YS,t, LM,t, LS,t, ct}∞t=−∞
such that banks, intermediate firms and both final sectors maximise profits, households max-
imise utility, and at each date the markets for labour, for the intermediate good and for final
output clear.
Since we now have two sectors employing labour and the intermediate good, we need
the additional requirement that wages and compensation for the intermediate good must be
equilibrated across both final production sectors at any date. Otherwise, market clearing is
defined in much the same way as in the one-sector model.
Definition 2.15 We define a steady state in this economy to be an equilibrium such that
prices and quantities are invariant over time.
Again, we use ‘the steady state’ to refer to the nontrivial steady state. All that is left to
do in order to characterise the steady state of this economy is to determine the labour shares
in each final production sector. Individual intermediate firms are entirely characterised by
the supply-side exogenous parameters – it is the number of firms that adjusts in order to
ensure general equilibrium with households – so we can in particular determine average firm
characteristics. Let ȳ be the average intermediate output produced by individual intermediate
firms. Then aggregate intermediate output in the steady state is given by
I = IM + IS
= ΓMLM + ΓSLS
= ΓML+ (ΓS − ΓM )LS





ΓML+ (ΓS − ΓM )LS
ȳ
.
Thus by equation (2.2) and the household’s wealth constraint, steady-state consumption is
given by
















+ ψ̄F − δe
] ΓML+ (ΓS − ΓM )LS
Lȳ
. (2.19)
The only quantity on the RHS of this expression that cannot yet be determined is LS ; we
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therefore require another expression relating c and LS . By equation (2.16),


























S LS , (2.20)
























+ ψ̄F − δe
]
(ΓS − ΓM ) /Lȳ
. (2.21)
The steady state values of intermediate output, final output in each sector and in aggregate,
and consumption can all now be calculated using LS . By equation (2.18), it is clear that
Lemma 2.6 holds in the two-sector model just as it does in the one-sector model. Existence
of the steady state follows by an argument very similar to that in Lemma 2.9 combined with
equation (2.21). Further, we can say something about how θF affects this economy in the
steady state.
Corollary 2.16 The steady-state price of services pS is in one-to-one correspondence with
– and increasing in – investment reversibility θF .
Proof. The result follows immediately from Corollary 2.11 and equation (2.15).
Corollary 2.17 In the steady state, the ratio of consumption expenditure on services to con-
sumption expenditure on manufacturing is in one-to-one correspondence with θF . Moreover,
it is increasing in θF if ε < 1, while it is decreasing in θF if ε > 1.
Proof. The result follows immediately from Corollary 2.16 and equation (2.16).
Corollary 2.17 makes it clear that the division of consumption between services and man-
ufacturing, and its response to changes in θF , depend crucially on the value of ε: if ε < 1,
then (price-adjusted) services consumption increases relative to manufacturing consumption
as θF increases, but if ε > 1 then the reverse is true. When we conduct numerical modelling
exercises, therefore, we will consider values of ε that are both greater than and less than
unity, since they have very different implications for structural change.
Note that it is possible for other indicators of structural change to behave differently. If
ε is sufficiently close to one, and if γM and γS are sufficiently close to each other, it would be
possible for the services consumption share to increase with θF while the services labour share
decreases with θF , or vice versa, or for the labour or output shares to have non-monotonic
relationships with θF .
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Table 2.2: Two-sector modelling choices
Parameter Value Description
γM 0.7 manufacturing sector output elasticity of intermediate goods
γS 0.3 services sector output elasticity of intermediate goods
ωM 0.5 manufacturing weight in households’ utility function
ωS 0.5 services weight in households’ utility function
Modelling choices for numerical simulation of the two-sector model, where they differ
from the one-sector model values detailed in Table 2.1. As it will be allowed to vary
in the following simulations, no value has been specified for the resale value of capital
θF . Similarly, no value has been specified for ε, as we will run simulations with
different values.
2.3.4 Numerical modelling
Where relevant, parameter choices are all as they were for the one-sector model, as detailed
in Table 2.1. Now there are two final production sectors, however, we need a few more
parameters, which are detailed in Table 2.2. As seen in Corollary 2.17, the relationship
between investment reversibility and structural change depends importantly on the value of
ε. We therefore present two sets of numerical results: those for ε = 0.5, and those for ε = 2.
Figure 2.3 shows the numerical modelling results when ε = 0.5, so services and manufac-
turing are ‘more complements than substitutes’11. In this case, aggregate (final) output and
aggregate consumption are increasing in θF , as in the one-sector model. The price of services
is also increasing in θF , as we showed would be the case in Corollary 2.16. When ε = 0.5, the
share of labour employed in the services sector is increasing in θF , as are the share of output
and consumption accounted for by the services sector. Thus θF has a significant effect not
only on aggregate output and consumption, but also on the balance between services and
manufacturing in the economy.
Figure 2.4 shows the numerical modelling results when ε = 2, so services and manufac-
turing are ‘more substitutes than complements’. Again, aggregate (final) output, aggregate
consumption and the price of services are all increasing in θF . However, the labour, con-
sumption and output shares accounted for by services are all now decreasing in θF . Thus
consumer preferences play a crucial determining role in the relationship between investment
reversibility and structural change.
Interestingly, in both cases, the effect on structural change is rather small. From the
largest to the smallest modelled value of θF , the labour share in services only changes by a
few percentage points. There appears to be a much stronger effect on aggregate output and
consumption than there is on the balance of the economy between services and manufacturing.
While decreasing investment reversibility due to the increasing intangibility of capital may
have had an effect on structural change, therefore, these results suggest that they cannot
11Note that as ε→ 0, the utility function approaches the Leontief (perfect complements) function; as ε→ 1
the utility function approaches the Cobb-Douglas function; and as ε→∞ the utility function approaches the
linear, perfect substitutes function. Thus in some sense, when ε < 1 services and manufacturing are ‘more
complements than substitutes’, and when ε > 1, they are ‘more substitutes than complements’.
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Figure 2.3: The effect of investment reversibility θF on two-sector general equilibrium, with
ε = 0.5
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
Aggregate output and aggregate consumption are increasing with θF , as is the price of services. When
ε = 0.5, the share of labour employed in the services sector is increasing with θF , as are the share of
output and consumption accounted for by the services sector.
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Figure 2.4: The effect of investment reversibility θF on two-sector general equilibrium, with
ε = 2
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
Aggregate output and aggregate consumption are increasing with θF , as is the price of services. When
ε = 2, the share of labour employed in the services sector is decreasing with θF , as are the share of
output and consumption accounted for by the services sector.
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explain the much larger structural change that has been observed in advanced economies
over the last few decades.
The numerical modelling sensitivity analysis undertaken in Appendix B.3 shows that these
broad effects hold for a wide variety of parameter choices.
2.3.5 Welfare and policy implications
Suppose now, as in Section 2.2.8, that there is a government, which is able to subsidise or
tax firms’ capital liquidation and tax or subsidise households to balance its budget. Again,
we assume that
θF = θ̄F + σ,
where θ̄F is the underlying reversibility of investment and σ is the liquidation subsidy paid
by the government. As before, we assume that θF ∈ (0, 1). Individual intermediate firms
simply face a liquidation value of capital equal to θF , but since the tax or subsidy can only
be paid in the manufactured good, there is an implication for the structural composition
of this economy that makes the analysis more complex than in the one-sector case. The




Therefore steady state consumption is now equal to
c = w + ρφ− T
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)] ΓML+ (ΓS − ΓM )LS
Lȳ
,
where, as before, KS denotes aggregate capital employed in the small loan regime, and









































(ΓS − ΓM ) /Lȳ
. (2.22)
In this equation, everything except σ is either constant or depends only on θF . Thus we have
the following result.
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Lemma 2.18 Taking θF as fixed, the steady-state quantity of labour employed in the services
sector is a strictly increasing function of θ̄F .
Proof. The result follows immediately from equation (2.22), since the numerator is decreas-
ing and the denominator increasing in σ, and when θF is fixed dθ̄F /dσ = −1.
Lemma 2.18 says that an economy with a certain underlying level of investment reversibil-
ity and no taxes or subsidies on capital liquidation will employ more labour in the services
sector than an economy with a lower underlying level of investment reversibility that ‘catches
up’ with subsidies on capital liquidation. Thus in some sense, economies with a low level of
investment reversibility might be thought to be subsidising the manufacturing sector when
they are subsidising capital liquidation, since manufacturing is the more capital-intensive
sector.
We can also say something about the response of consumption shares of manufacturing
and services to subsidies in this economy.
Lemma 2.19 Taking θ̄F as fixed, the steady-state ratio of consumption expenditure on ser-
vices to consumption expenditure on manufacturing is in one-to-one correspondence with σ.
Moreover, it is increasing in σ if ε < 1, while it is decreasing in σ if ε > 1.
Proof. When θ̄F is fixed, dθF /dσ = 1. Given that the firm’s problem depends only on θF
and not θ̄F or σ, the result follows immediately from Corollary 2.17.
Thus we know how consumption shares will respond to increased capital liquidation sub-
sidies, at least directionally, but it is not straightforward to say much more analytically about
the effect of government intervention in the two-sector case. Nonetheless, we can undertake
numerical modelling of comparative statics to assess the welfare effects of subsidies and taxes
subsidies and taxes when θ̄F = 0.3 – so underlying reversibility is relatively low – and when
θ̄F = 0.7 – so underlying reversibility is relatively high – given the parameters laid out in
Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The results are presented in Figure 2.5 for the case when ε = 0.5 and in
Figure 2.6 for the case when ε = 2. As in the one-sector case, this modelling suggests that
when the underlying reversibility of investment is low, the government could increase welfare
by subsidising capital liquidation and paying for it with a tax on households. It also suggests
that the government is less likely to be able to increase welfare by taxing capital liquidation
and transferring the proceeds to households when the underlying reversibility of investment is
high. The cases for ε = 0.5 and ε = 2 are very similar in their policy prescriptions. The sen-
sitivity analysis conducted in Appendix B.4 shows that the same broad conclusions hold for
a wide variety of parameter values: at very low levels of underlying investment reversibility,
welfare can often be increased by subsidising capital liquidation, but only rarely can welfare
be increased by taxing capital liquidation when the underlying reversibility of investment is
very high.
We can also examine the effect of liquidation subsidies and taxes on the steady state
structural composition of the economy. Figure 2.7 shows the effect of government intervention
on the balance between services and manufacturing when ε = 0.5, and Figure 2.8 shows the
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Figure 2.5: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
two-sector model, with ε = 0.5
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. ‘Net
Utility’ is calculated as the difference in the instantaneous utility function ν (cM , cS) relative to the case
of zero subsidy or tax.



































Figure 2.6: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
two-sector model, with ε = 2
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. ‘Net
Utility’ is calculated as the difference in the instantaneous utility function ν (cM , cS) relative to the case
of zero subsidy or tax.
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effect when ε = 2. As with the effect of θF when there is are no subsidies or taxes, the
response to σ of the services share of consumption depends crucially on ε: for ε = 0.5 the
services share of consumption is increasing with σ, while for ε = 2 it is decreasing with σ.
However, in both cases the services share of labour and of output are decreasing with σ. Thus
it could be that in an economy with low levels of underlying investment reversibility, a welfare-
enhancing capital liquidation subsidy may look de facto like a fillip for the manufacturing
industry, with an increase in both manufacturing employment and the manufacturing share of
output. Sensitivity analysis conducted in Appendix B.4 shows that this relationship between
structural composition and capital liquidation subsidies or taxes holds for a wide array of
parameter choices.
2.4 Conclusions
We developed a general equilibrium model of an economy in which individual firms face a
degree of micro-level investment irreversibility. We find, using a combination of analytical
and numerical methods, that a reduction in investment reversibility – perhaps due to a
greater reliance on intangible capital – is in the long run associated with: reduced output,
wages, consumption and aggregate capital; fewer firms in operation; and reduced corporate
borrowing and increased corporate saving. In a two-sector model, we find that reduced
investment reversibility reduces the price of services relative to manufactured goods, but has
an ambiguous effect on the share of employment, output and consumption accounted for by
each sector. The direction of these effects depends on consumer preferences.
The model predicts that capital liquidation subsidies can be welfare-enhancing. While
it’s more intuitive to expect this effect when the underlying reversibility of investment is
low, we find that subsidies are often welfare-enhancing even when the underlying reversibility
of investment is relatively high. While the effect on consumption shares of such subsidies
depends on consumer preferences, the effects on output and employment shares do not:
subsidies increase the manufacturing share of both output and employment. Thus such
subsidies may be interpreted as a de facto boon to the manufacturing sector, even when they
are welfare-enhancing.
Sensitivity analysis suggests that these effects hold for a wide variety of parameter choices.
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Figure 2.7: Structural composition implications of capital liquidation subsidies and taxes,
with ε = 0.5
Numerical modelling of the change in the balance between services and manufacturing in response
to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left panels show the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5.
The right panels show the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and
liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1.
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Figure 2.8: Structural composition implications of capital liquidation subsidies and taxes,
with ε = 2
Numerical modelling of the change in the balance between services and manufacturing in response
to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left panels show the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5.
The right panels show the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and
liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1.
Chapter 3
Finance and Structural Change:
Theory and Evidence From a
Pooled Synthetic Controls Study
Abstract
We examine the effect of bank branching deregulation in the United States, which occurred state-
by-state from the 1970s to the 1990s, on structural change in individual states. We find that bank
branching deregulation accelerates the structural change that was already underway: services account
for a greater share of the economy than they would have in the absence of deregulation. These results
are consistent with the model we develop of structural change in response to a positive financial shock,
which also explains existing empirical results. Our estimation strategy is a pooled ridge augmented
synthetic controls study. Synthetic counterfactuals are constructed for individual deregulation events,
then pooled to increase their statistical power.
3.1 Introduction
Does finance affect structural change? There is a large literature linking finance and growth,
which is known to go hand-in-hand with the evolving structure of the economy – as developed
economies get richer, manufacturing shrinks as a share of the economy, while services grow
(Herrendorf et al., 2014) – but comparatively little attention has been paid to the direct
relationship between finance and structural change.
In this chapter, we examine the effect of bank branching deregulation in the United States
on the structure of individual states’ economies. Prior to the 1970s, most states had unit
banking restrictions that were relaxed state-by-state in a quasi-random order until the mid-
1990s. Most banks in most states were limited to a single branch, until bank branching
deregulation allowed for expansion, typically by merger and acquisition (M&A) in the first
instance, and later by de novo branching. Using a pooled ridge augmented synthetic controls
∗This chapter is the result of joint work with Corrado Di Maria.
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study, we find that bank branching deregulation accelerates the structural change that was
already underway: states that deregulate end up with a significantly higher share of services
and lower share of manufacturing in the economy than they would have done in the absence
of deregulation.
Our contribution is three-fold. First, we develop an infinite-horizon general equilibrium
model of finance and structural change that is consistent with existing empirical evidence
and predicts accelerated structural change in response to financial development. Second, we
add to the nascent field of pooled synthetic controls studies and ridge augmented synthetic
controls studies for policy evaluation, and in particular we propose a simple statistical test
that is suggestive of the overall pre-treatment goodness of fit in such a pooled study. Third,
we show empirically that bank branching deregulation did in fact cause faster structural
change towards services and away from manufacturing than would have occurred without
deregulation, drawing a direct line from finance to structural change, consistent with our
theory.
There is a long history of thought linking finance to the real economy, stretching at least as
far back as Schumpeter (1911), who argued that finance had a vital role to play in promoting
economic growth by allocating society’s savings, screening projects and monitoring managers.
Since then a large theoretical and empirical literature has arisen on the finance-growth nexus1.
Over the past three decades, in particular, the evidence that finance causally affects growth
has become much stronger, and our results build on this edifice.
In an early contribution, King and Levine (1993) show using cross-country panel data
that financial development is strongly associated with – and predictive of – growth in real
per capita output. Levine et al. (2000) improve upon this work by using instrumental variables
and generalised method-of-moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimators to demonstrate that
output growth appears to be caused by financial development. In the long run, Beck et al.
(2000) find that this growth effect is primarily a result of total factor productivity (TFP)
growth, rather than capital accumulation. However, later work suggests that this may vary
by the stage of economic development, with finance primarily promoting capital accumulation
in less developed economies and TFP growth in more developed economies (Rioja and Valev,
2004b). Indeed, Rioja and Valev (2004a) find that the effect of finance on growth may also
vary based on the level of financial development in an economy.
Since we are examining the relationship between finance and structural change, we are
interested in the effect of financial development on different sectors of the economy and on
different kinds of firms. Carreira and Silva (2010) present some stylised facts pertaining to
firms’ financial constraints: among them, that smaller and younger firms are more finan-
cially constrained; and that financial liberalisation appears to ease these constraints. In a
famous paper, Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that industries with greater reliance on ex-
ternal finance grow faster in more financially developed economies. However, for reasons of
data availability, they restrict their analysis to industries within the manufacturing sector.
Chakraborty and Mallick (2012) find using U.S. survey data that manufacturing firms have a
1For a more comprehensive survey of the theoretical and empirical literature to that date, see Levine (2005).
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larger proportional gap between actual debt and desired debt than services firms, suggesting
manufacturing firms are more credit constrained. This is perhaps intuitive, since manufac-
turing firms will typically require far more physical capital and therefore have higher fixed
startup costs than services firms.
Causal identification of the effect of financial development is difficult. One approach is to
examine the effects of a plausibly exogenous shock to the financial sector. To this end, sev-
eral papers have studied the effects of bank branching deregulation, as we do in this study.
Krozsner and Strahan (1999) find that the timing of bank branching deregulation can be
explained by a combination of new technologies in banking, such as ATMs and telephone
banking, and the private interests of banks in any given state, which suggests that deregula-
tion is othorgonal to many outcome variables of interest. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) find
that deregulation leads to significantly higher output growth, although employing a differ-
ent methodology, Huang (2008) casts doubt on these results. Using the same episode, Beck
et al. (2010) find that bank branching deregulation reduces income inequality. Jerzmanowski
(2017) shows that bank branching deregulation affects economic growth through a mixture
of physical capital accumulation and TFP growth, while finding no effect on human capital.
In particular, the effect of deregulation on manufacturing works by increasing TFP growth
rather than accelerating capital accumulation.
By contrast, there has been very little work on the effect of bank branching deregulation
– or indeed financial development more broadly – on structural change. Herrendorf et al.
(2014) present some stylised facts of structural change. Expressed as a share of the economy,
whether in terms of employment or value-added, for both currently rich and currently poor
countries, the following stylised facts appear to hold: the richer an economy in terms of GDP
per capita, the smaller the share of agriculture; the richer an economy, the greater the share
of services; and the richer an economy, the greater the share of manufacturing, up to a certain
point – thereafter, manufacturing decreases as a country becomes richer, forming an inverted
‘U’ shape.
There are two broad theories of the drivers of structural change. The first suggests that
structural change is a largely demand-driven phenomenon. This is exemplified by Kongsamut
et al. (2001), who embed the machinery required to generate structural change in a Stone-
Geary utility function. Intuitively, there is a subsistence level of agricultural goods required
in the economy, but as the economy develops, consumers do not derive as much utility from
endlessly more food, and preferences shift into consuming more manufactured goods and then
services.
The second theory, as described by Ngai and Pissarides (2007), is a supply-driven shift.
In this model, there are exogenous and varying rates of TFP growth across different sectors.
If consumers consider goods produced in different sectors to be complements, then labour
must flow to the slow-growing sectors in order to maximise utility. Supposing, for example,
that TFP growth in services has been slow, while in manufacturing it has been fast – and
the estimates in Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) suggest that productivity growth in services
between 1958 and 1996 may actually have been negative, while TFP growth in the industrial
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machinery and equipment sector, for example, was rather high – then we would expect to
see a smaller share of labour in manufacturing over time, and a larger share in services. This
is consistent with the broad sweep of the data. We develop a model based on Ngai and
Pissarides (2007) in Section 3.3, adding a role for financial intermediation, in order to study
the effect of finance on structural change.
Among the few papers to theorise an explicit link between finance and structural change,
Buera et al. (2011) model a two-sector economy which is subject to financial frictions. Man-
ufacturing firms are large in scale and have relatively large financing needs, while services
firms are small in scale and have relatively small financing needs. Thus financial frictions
disproportionately disadvantage manufacturing firms, leading to relatively low TFP growth
in manufacturing and relatively high prices for manufactured goods relative to services, both
of which are empirical regularities.
Acharya et al. (2011) examine a very similar question to the question posed in this chapter,
also studying the effect of bank branching deregulation in the United States, but approach it
by way of portfolio analysis. They use industry-level average growth rates and covariances to
construct a benchmark portfolio that an investor restricted to any given U.S. state would wish
to hold, then show that post-deregulation, convergence of the aggregate economy towards
that benchmark portfolio accelerates. Implicit in this approach, however, is the idea that
converging towards the tangency portfolio cannot change the tangency portfolio; everything
is reallocation, and nothing is technology. One contribution of our study is that our causal
inference is valid even without making this assumption. Manganelli and Popov (2015) conduct
a similar portfolio reallocation-type investigation on an international scale.
Examining an economy at a much earlier stage of development, Heblich and Trew (2019)
show that greater access to banks caused a faster rate of industrialisation in England and
Wales over the period 1817-1881. This is a useful point of comparison to our results: while we
find that finance particularly stimulates services, they find that it promotes industrial sectors.
This is further evidence that the role finance has to play depends crucially on the state of
economic development, as found by Rioja and Valev (2004a). While more work is needed
to establish this definitively, it appears that finance may ‘grease the wheels’ of structural
change, and accelerate whatever shift predominates in any given economy at any given time.
Finally, this chapter relates to the literature on the synthetic control method (SCM),
which is at the heart of our main estimation strategy. The SCM was introduced by Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) to study the effect of terrorism on the Basque Country. They construct a
synthetic Basque Country as the convex combination of other Spanish regions that minimises
a measure of distance between actual and synthetic outcomes prior to the onset of terrorism,
and see how the actual and synthetic Basque Countries diverge after the onset of terrorism.
If the synthetic Basque Country is a good fit for the real Basque Country in all respects
except the onset of terrorism, then any difference between the two after ‘treatment’ – in this
case, the onset of terrorism – can be interpreted as the causal effect of that treatment. The
same method has been used to assess the efficacy of a tobacco control policies in California
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(Abadie et al., 2010) and the economic effect of German reintegration in 1990 (Abadie et al.,
2015). Statistical inference is performed using placebo tests.
These instances of the SCM each consider a single case study. Dube and Zipperer (2015)
extend this idea by using a mean percentile rank test to pool multiple synthetic control
studies. This is the approach we take later in the chapter, with particular attention paid to
the validity of such pooling exercises.
The synthetic control method is preferable to some more traditional policy evaluation
methods in several respects. First, the SCM is specification-free. Second, the treatment need
not be exogenous: we find in Section 3.5.1 that the timing of bank branching deregulation is
likely to be related to the ex ante structural composition of the economy, which undermines
the causal interpretation of the difference-in-differences regressions. However, so long as
there is a ‘good fit’ when creating a synthetic counterpart for each treated unit, this is not a
problem for the SCM. While not something that can be tested directly, we propose a simple
statistical test for the overall ‘goodness of fit’ relative to placebo deregulations that provides
some indication of the validity of pooling several studies. In order to alleviate concerns with
the goodness of fit, we improve pre-treatment fit by employing the ridge augmented synthetic
control method (ridge ASCM) (Ben-Michael et al., 2019).
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 lays out the stylised facts of
structural change, describes bank branching deregulation in the United States, and presents
suggestive evidence linking the two. Section 3.3 develops a model of structural change and
its interaction with finance that is consistent with the suggestive evidence previously found.
Section 3.4 outlines the data used for our empirical investigation, and Section 3.5 estimates
the effects of bank branching deregulation on structural change, using first difference-in-
differences regressions and then pooled synthetic controls studies, both standard and ridge
augmented. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Framework
3.2.1 Structural change in the United States
The United States has been secularly shifting away from manufacturing and towards services
for several decades. Figure 3.1 shows the gradual increase in services employment and out-
put, and the gradual decrease in manufacturing employment and output, with the output
trajectories more volatile than the employment trajectories2. The grey lines represent in-
dividual U.S. states and the District of Columbia (D.C.), while the red lines represent the
(unweighted) average across all states.
The United States is not alone in this: it is a stylised fact that in sufficiently rich
economies, increases in GDP per capita coincide with decreases in the manufacturing share of
employment and output, and with increases in the services share of employment and output
(Herrendorf et al., 2014, p. 861). Figure 3.1 makes clear that the United States had, by 1970,
become sufficiently rich that the manufacturing share of both employment and output were
2For a description of the data used to construct these graphs, see Section 3.4.
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Figure 3.1: Secular shifts in structural composition
Long-term trends in the sectoral composition of U.S. states and D.C. The grey lines represent individual
U.S. states and D.C., while the red lines represent the (unweighted) average across all states.
in decline. This has important implications for the external validity of our results; in this
respect, the United States was already a rich country during the period under study, and so
any effects of finance on structural composition that we are able to identify may not be so
instructive in understanding financial development in less rich economies.
There are two major theories underlying this process: demand-driven change (Kongsamut
et al., 2001) and supply-driven change (Ngai and Pissarides, 2007). There is some evidence
for the supply-driven story: in the model presented by Ngai and Pissarides (2007), and the
model presented below, changes in sectoral composition are a result of different growth rates
in sector-level productivity. In the presence of relatively inelastic consumer preferences across
different types of goods or services, sectors with slower productivity growth must compensate
by employing a larger share of labour. Moreover, sectors with faster productivity growth can
produce goods more cheaply, so relative prices change. This is consistent with the stylised
facts in the United States: Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) find that TFP growth in services
firms in the latter part of the 20th century may actually have been negative, which might
explain ever-increasing shares of employment in services.
There is a wealth of evidence suggesting that greater financial development is linked to
higher GDP per capita, but very little work linking financial conditions to the structural
composition of the economy. By studying a positive shock to financial development, we can
assess the effects on structural composition.
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3.2.2 Bank branching deregulation
At the beginning of the 1970s, most states in the U.S. had unit banking restrictions. Generally
a bank consisted of a single branch, and most banks were prohibited from expansion within
states by any means. Apart from a few historical exceptions, banks were further prohibited
from crossing state lines by the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956. Banks therefore were typically small enterprises.
From the 1970s until the mid-1990s, individual states relaxed restrictions on bank branch-
ing. Most states allowed bank branching by merger and acquisition (M&A) in the first
instance, then shortly afterwards allowed expansion by de novo branching. This process
culminated in the passage of the federal Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Effi-
ciency Act in 1994, which effectively lifted any remaining bank branching restrictions across
the United States. Following the literature, we take as the date of deregulation the year in
which bank branching was first permitted by M&A3.
Krozsner and Strahan (1999, pp. 1460-1461) identify three reasons for bank branching
deregulation beginning in the 1970s in particular. First, ATMs became more prevalent and al-
lowed some banking services to be accessed remotely; second, banking by mail and telephone
increased, with checkable money market funds and the Merrill Lynch Cash Management
Account; and third, general technological progress reduced the costs of transport and com-
munication. All of these advances served to weaken the geographical link between banks
and their customers. The authors also find that the timing and order of states’ deregulation
can be explained by a private interest model: they show “that deregulation occurs earlier
in states with fewer small banks, in states where small banks are financially weaker, and in
states with more small, presumably bank-dependent, firms” (Krozsner and Strahan, 1999,
p. 1438). Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) find that post-deregulation, banks’ operating costs
and loan losses decrease, and that these cost reductions are mostly passed on to borrowers
in the form of reduced interest rates. Therefore bank branching deregulation can reasonably
be taken as a positive shock to financial development.
The effects of bank branching deregulation have been studied several times. Jayaratne
and Strahan (1996) find that deregulation increased growth in real GDP per capita – although
comparing outcomes in contiguous pairs of counties across state lines, where one state dereg-
ulated and the other did not, Huang (2008) finds less support for this result. Beck et al.
(2010) find that income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, is reduced after bank
branching deregulation, primarily by increasing the incomes of those at the bottom of the
distribution.
Jerzmanowski (2017) finds that bank branching deregulation accelerates both capital ac-
cumulation and TFP growth, while having no effect on human capital growth; moreover,
increases in the rate of growth in the manufacturing sector are driven entirely by increased
TFP growth, rather than increased capital accumulation. Using a more granular decomposi-
tion of the economy into smaller sectors, Acharya et al. (2011) find that shares of output in
3More precisely, we follow previous authors in taking the year of M&A deregulation as the year in which
the process of deregulation was completed. See for instance Jayaratne and Strahan (1996, p. 646).
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the economy converge more quickly to the optimal tangency portfolio post-deregulation than
pre-deregulation.
The latter two papers suggest, implicitly or explicitly, that bank branching deregulation
is related to the structural composition of the economy. We consider the broad categories of
manufacturing and services, and examine this link more closely.
3.2.3 Suggestive evidence of a link
Figure 3.2 shows each state’s year of bank branching deregulation against its share of services
and manufacturing in employment and output in both 2016 and 1969, for states that had
not undergone bank branching deregulation by 1969. On average, states that deregulated
earlier have a higher services share and a lower manufacturing share of both employment and
output today. In näıve regressions, all four of these relationships are significant at the 5%
level. Visual inspection suggests that initial sectoral shares – that is, shares of services and
manufacturing in employment and output in 1969, prior to deregulation – are not related
to the year of deregulation, except for the manufacturing share of employment, where the
line of best fit appears to be downward-sloping. Nonetheless, in näıve regressions, none of
these relationships – not even the relationship between the year of deregulation and the
manufacturing share of employment in 1969 – are significant at the 5% level.
In combination with Krozsner and Strahan (1999), who plausibly show that the timing
and order of bank branching deregulation are explained by national technological trends and
the private interests of banks in any given state, this evidence suggests at first glance that
bank branching deregulation is essentially orthogonal to ex ante structural composition4.
Moreover, it appears that the timing of bank branching deregulation is related to ex post
structural composition. While this falls a long way short of being evidence of any particular
causality, it does suggest that there is a correlation between bank branching deregulation and
structural composition. We proceed to model this relationship formally.
3.3 A model of finance and structural change
In this section, we develop a model of structural change in response to a financial shock that is
consistent with the suggestive evidence presented above, and with wider empirical evidence.
In this model, structural change away from manufacturing and towards services, in terms of
employment and output, accelerates in response to a positive financial shock. The model is
based on Ngai and Pissarides (2007), with elements of Mehlum et al. (2016) and a learning-by-
doing externality associated with capital accumulation in the spirit of Romer (1986). Parts
of the solution follow the example of the Ramsey model in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).
4We show in Section 3.5.1 that this is in fact may be untrue: the timing of bank branching deregulation
does appear to be related to ex ante structural composition.








































































































































































































































Figure 3.2: Year of deregulation and structural composition
Scatter plots of the 2016 and 1969 services and manufacturing shares of employment and output against
the year of bank branching deregulation for each U.S. state and D.C. that had not deregulated by 1969,
with lines of best fit. On average, states that deregulated earlier have a higher services share and a lower
manufacturing share of both employment and output; in näıve regressions, the year of deregulation is a
significant predictor at the 5% level of all sectoral shares in 2016 (that is, all the solid black lines of best
fit have a slope significantly different from zero at the 5% level). There does not seem to be a strong
relationship between the year of deregulation and sectoral shares in 1969, apart from the manufacturing
share of employment; nonetheless, in näıve regressions, no sectoral share in 1969 is a significant predictor
at the 5% level of the year of deregulation (that is, none of the dotted red lines of best fit have a slope
significantly different from zero at the 5% level), even the manufacturing share of employment.
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3.3.1 Households
Time is continuous and indexed by t. Total population in the model economy is N (t) and
grows at the exogenous rate g,
Ṅ = gN.
Each household consists of an infinitely lived dynasty of unit mass at time zero, growing at
the same rate as the economy-wide population growth rate. Each household is endowed with
labour equal to its mass at each instant, which is supplied inelastically to the productive
sectors. The optimiser at time zero maximises with perfect foresight the present value of the




e−ρtν (cM , cS) dt,
where cM (t) is per-capita consumption of manufactured goods and cS (t) is per-capita con-
sumption of services, where instantaneous utility ν is given by
ν = ln (Φ (cM , cS))









and where ε, ωM , ωS > 0 and ωM + ωS = 1. Labour is divided between manufacturing and
services, where nM (t) , nS (t) denote the shares of labour employed in the manufacturing and
services sectors respectively, and where nM + nS = 1. We further assume that ε < 1, so that
consumer preferences are relatively inelastic.
We take the manufactured good as the numeraire and fix its price to unity, pM = 1. We
will allow the price of services output pS (t) to be determined in the decentralised market.
Agents work, with each agent supplying inelastically one unit of labour at each instant and
receiving the wage rate w (t). Households also earn asset income rq (t) q (t), where q is the
per-capita stock of financial assets and rq the associated rate of return. Individual savings
β (t) therefore equal the difference between total current incomes rqq + w and expenditures
on goods and services cM + pScS . The budget constraint reads
β = rqq + w − cM − pScS . (3.1)
In order to transform equation (3.1) into a dynamic wealth constraint we need to specify the
process by which savings are transformed into physical capital.
3.3.2 Financial intermediation and capital accumulation
Capital is the productive good in the economy, and financial assets owned by all households
in the economy represent ownership of physical capital. The value of the aggregate capital
3.3. A MODEL OF FINANCE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE 103
stock K (t) thus matches the value of total financial assets,
K = Nq. (3.2)
This equation is a clearing condition in the financial market, where banks operate as interme-
diaries between households and firms. On the one hand, banks act as financial intermediaries
that collect all household savings and invest them into (shares of) a ‘capital fund’ represent-
ing ownership of the stock of physical capital to be rented to firms for production purposes.
On the other hand, banks give final producers access to physical capital by setting up rental
contracts whereby firms can use K (t) units of physical capital by paying the associated rental
rate rk (t) at each instant t.
We assume that there are costs associated with financial intermediation – these could
be informational, or to do with the need for special expertise, or co-ordination problems, or
many other kinds of costs – that are lower for banks than for households, giving rise to the
need for a financial sector. We will model these costs as a wedge between rental rates and
the returns on households’ savings, which will be made explicit shortly.
The activities of the banking sector are represented by two basic relationships. First, the
savings-investment identity
Nβ = K̇ (3.3)
implies that banks transform new savings into additional physical capital available for pro-
duction purposes – that is, banks add current savings to the aforementioned capital fund.
Second, for simplicity, we model a constant marginal cost of intermediation: the total cost
to banks in any given period is proportional to the amount of capital rented by final pro-
ducers, θK, where θ is a constant parameter reflecting exogenous circumstances that make
intermediation costly5. This can be thought of as a ‘wealth depletion effect’: in general,
assuming that θ > 0 implies that financial intermediation erodes the ex post value of the
stock of assets held by households. The bank branching deregulation episode we study in the
empirical section of this chapter lowered banks’ operating costs and firms’ borrowing costs
(Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998), so can be modelled in this context as a negative shock to
the intermediation wedge parameter θ. The instantaneous cash flow of the banking sector
as a whole reads rkK − rqNq − θK. Assuming a competitive banking sector, the zero-profit
condition reads rkK = rqNq + θK. Given the aggregate constraint in equation (3.2), the
zero-profit condition implies
rk = rq + θ.
5Note that, as in the previous chapters, θ is used to denote the key parameter in the effect of which we
are interested. However, θF was used in previous chapters to denote the value at which firms could liquidate
capital: thus a higher value of θF effectively reduced the cost of capital. By contrast, in this chapter, a higher
value of θ effectively increases the cost of capital for firms by imposing a larger premium over the return
earned on savings by households. Financial development is therefore modelled here as a reduction in θ.
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Time-differentiating equation (3.2), and using the savings-investment identity (3.3), we obtain
K̇ = Ṅq +Nq̇ = gNq +Nq̇ = Nβ.
Using this to eliminate savings β from equation (3.1) yields the law of motion of financial
assets per capita,
q̇ = (rq − g) q + w − cM − pScS . (3.4)
We are now able to write the law of motion for aggregate capital,
K̇ = rkK +Nw − [NcM + pSNcS ]− θK
⇒ k̇ = rkk + w − [cM + pScS ]− (θ + g) k, (3.5)
where k = K/N is capital per capita, and where the term in square brackets is consumption
spending on goods and services.
3.3.3 Production sectors
The production functions in the manufacturing and services sectors, FM and FS respec-
tively, are Cobb-Douglas and are identical except for a difference in productivity, with a unit
continuum of identical firms in each sector, so that















where nM,j = NM,j/N and kM,j = KM,j/NM,j are the labour share and capital-labour ratio
in firm j respectively. Similarly,
FS (nSNkS , nSN) = ASnSNk
α
S .
We assume that AS is constant and set it equal to unity









where η > 0, which is not internalised by manufacturing firms. In order to work with a
conventional neoclassical growth model, we assume that α+ η < 1. We include this learning-
by-doing spillover in order to generate straightforwardly the post-deregulation acceleration in
6This fits with the stylised facts in Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), who find that TFP growth has been about
zero in many services industries in the United States in the later 20th century, while finding that it has been
positive and substantial in many manufacturing industries.
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manufacturing TFP growth found by Jerzmanowski (2017), but the stylised facts of structural
change are consistent with other mechanisms, such as exogenous technology gaps or different
input factor intensities across sectors.
3.3.4 Solving the model
Firms wish to maximise their profits,
πM (t) = AMnMNk
α
M − wnMN − rknMNkM
πS (t) = pSnSNk
α
S − wnSN − rknSNkS ,
with respect to labour Ni = niN and capital Ki = niNki in each sector i. Taking the first



































K = pS · αkα−1S (3.7)
w = pSF
S
N = pS · (1− α) kαS .


















This clearly implies that the capital-labour ratio is the same in each sector, kS = kM = k,
and that the price of services output is given by pS = AM = A0k
η. It follows that
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In order to derive the efficiency conditions, we define the current-value Hamiltonian for house-
holds facing the wealth constraint in equation (3.4),
H = ν + λq (t) [(rq − g) q + w − cM − pScS ] ,
with choice variables cM and cS , and state variable q. The first order optimality conditions
for the choice variables yield
∂H
∂cM
= 0 ⇒ νM = λq
∂H
∂cS
= 0 ⇒ νS = pSλq,
yielding the static efficiency conditions
νS
νM







For q, we get the dynamic efficiency condition
∂H
∂q
= ρλq − λ̇q
⇒ − ν̇M
νM
= rq − (ρ+ g)
= rk − (θ + ρ+ g)
= αA0k
α+η−1 − (θ + ρ+ g) . (3.9)
















≡ xS , (3.10)
which is the ratio of consumption expenditure on services to consumption expenditure on
manufactured goods. We will define xM ≡ 1, the ratio of consumption expenditure on
manufactured goods to itself, and will let
X ≡ xM + xS = 1 + xS .
Further define
c ≡ pScS + cM ,
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which is total per capita consumption expenditure. Clearly c = cMX. We can therefore















since all services output is consumed, and where per-capita output in terms of manufactured
















































− cM + pScS
k
+ rk − (θ + g)
= (1− α)A0kα+η−1 − c/k + αA0kα+η−1 − (θ + g)
= A0k
α+η−1 − c/k − (θ + g) . (3.15)










α+η−1 − c/k − (θ + g)
]
. (3.16)
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and it follows that since Φ is homogeneous of degree one,
Φ = ΦMcM + ΦScS

















α+η−1 − (θ + ρ+ g) . (3.17)
This differential equation and the law of motion for capital in equation (3.15) together define









α+η−1 − c/k − (θ + g)
]
. (3.18)














































α+η−1 − c/k − (θ + g)
]
, (3.19)
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so output shares are the same as labour shares. Define the consumption-capital ratio and its
growth rate as






We are now in a position to collect some results. See Appendix C.1 for proofs of all results.
Lemma 3.1 The steady state quantities of per-capita capital , per-capita consumption and






































(θ + ρ+ g) + ρ.
Thus a positive shock to financial development, parametrised as a negative shock to the invest-
ment wedge variable θ, increases the steady-state levels of per-capita capital and per-capita
consumption, and decreases the steady-state consumption-capital ratio.
We study the stability properties of this economy by considering the eigenvalues of the
2 × 2 system of differential equations governing the dynamics of the economy, linearised
around the steady state. By equations (3.15) and (3.17) we have that
k̇ = A0k
α+η − c− (θ + g) k
ċ = αA0k
α+η−1c− (θ + ρ+ g) c.
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Then the eigenvalues λ of this matrix satisfy the characteristic polynomial of this matrix
evaluated at the steady state. That is, they satisfy
p (J) ≡ |J− λI|(k,c)=(kSS ,cSS) = 0, (3.21)
where I is the 2× 2 identity matrix. Considering each derivative in turn, we have
k̇kSS = (α+ η)A0k
α+η−1




(θ + ρ+ g) + ρ
k̇cSS = −1
ċkSS = α (α+ η − 1)A0k
α+η−2
SS cSS










SS − (θ + ρ+ g)
= 0,







and so on. The characteristic polynomial in equation (3.21) is therefore






k̇kSS ċcSS − k̇cSS ċkSS
)
= λ2 − k̇kSSλ+ ċkSS .
The coefficient on λ2 is positive, while the coefficient on λ and the constant term are negative,
so p (J) has two real roots, one positive and negative. Thus the economy in this model exhibits
saddle path stability. Call the negative eigenvalue λ−. Then the eigenvector associated with











Figure 3.3 plots this linearisation about the steady state, including the stable arm, with
parameters given in Table 3.1 and financial intermediation wedge parameter θ = 0.05.
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Table 3.1: Modelling choices
Parameter Value Description
A0 1 productivity parameter
α 0.7 capital elasticity of output
η 0.1 capital elasticity of productivity
ρ 0.01 households’ discount rate
g 0.05 population growth rate
Modelling choices for numerical simulation. As it will be allowed to vary
in the following simulations, no value has been given for the financial














Figure 3.3: The saddle path
The stable arm, or saddle path, in the economy, linearised around the steady
state, with financial intermediation wedge parameter θ = 0.05. The black
lines represent invariant capital and consumption, k̇ = 0 and ċ = 0 respec-
tively, while the red line is the linear approximation of the stable arm of this
economy.





Figure 3.4: The consumption-capital ratio along the saddle path
With a little work, we can also say something about the exact stable dynamics of this
economy.
Lemma 3.2 Suppose the economy is growing, so that k < kSS, k̇ > 0 and ċ > 0. Along the
saddle path, the consumption-capital ratio z is decreasing towards the steady state level zSS.
That is, while k < kSS, z > zSS and γz < 0. Thus the consumption-capital ratio along the
saddle path looks something like Figure 3.4.
We can also say something about the effects of a shock to θ. Simulation of a modest
reduction in θ, from 0.05 to 0.04, show potentially large effects on long-run consumption.
Figure 3.5 shows the effects on the steady state of the economy after such a negative shock
to θ, with a nearly 49% increase in long-run consumption. Moreover, it is possible to make
some analytical statements about the effects of a negative shock to θ.
Lemma 3.3 Suppose the economy is growing, so that k < kSS, k̇ > 0 and ċ > 0, and suppose
there is a negative shock to θ. Then there is also a negative shock to per-capita consumption
c. Such a shock looks something like Figure 3.6.
Given the results we have derived so far, we can make some statements about the effect
of financial development on economic growth and overall consumption.
Theorem 3.4 Capital intensity, manufacturing productivity, per-capita output and per-






















α+η−1 − (θ + ρ+ g) .















Figure 3.5: The economy given a negative shock to θ
The economy before and after a positive financial shock (a negative shock to
θ). The dashed black lines show the economy when θ = 0.05, and the solid
red lines when θ = 0.04, holding all other parameters constant. The shock











Figure 3.6: The consumption-capital ratio along the saddle path given a negative shock to θ





Figure 3.7: The consumption-output ratio along the saddle path
Suppose the economy is growing, so that k < kSS, k̇ > 0 and ċ > 0. A positive shock to
financial development, parametrised as a negative shock to the investment wedge variable θ,
increases all of these growth rates, since it leaves per-capita capital k unchanged and causes a
negative shock to c/k, by Lemma 3.3. It also causes a negative shock to the level of per-capita
consumption c.
Next we can say something about the consumption-output ratio. Define the consumption-
output ratio and its growth rate as






Lemma 3.5 Suppose the economy is growing, so that k < kSS, k̇ > 0 and ċ > 0. Along the
saddle path, consumption-output ratio ζ is increasing towards the steady state level ζSS. That
is, while k < kSS, ζ < ζSS and γζ > 0. Thus the consumption-output ratio along the saddle
path looks something like Figure 3.7.
We require a final intermediate result before considering structural change in this economy.
Lemma 3.6 Suppose the economy is growing, so that k < kSS, k̇ > 0 and ċ > 0, and suppose
there is a negative shock to θ. Then there is also a negative level shock to the consumption-
output ratio c/y, but a weakly positive shock to its growth rate.
Finally, we can characterise structural change in this economy, and its interaction with
financial development.
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3.3.5 Model predictions: structural change in response to a financial shock
Theorem 3.7 The labour shares nS and nM , in the services and manufacturing industries



























where ζ = c/y is the consumption-output ratio. Suppose the economy is growing, so that
k < kSS, k̇ > 0 and ċ > 0. This economy exhibits structural change: services employment is
increasing and manufacturing employment decreasing over time.
A positive shock to financial development, parametrised as a negative shock to the invest-
ment wedge variable θ:
(i) causes aggregate per-capita output growth ẏ/y and capital growth k̇/k to accelerate
(ii) causes a negative level shock to the services labour share nS and a positive level shock
to the manufacturing labour share nM , but accelerates the growth rate ṅS/nS
(iii) increases the long-run level of nS and decreases the long-run level of nM
(iv) increases the manufacturing productivity growth rate ȦM/AM
(v) increases the growth rate of capital in the services sector, K̇S/KS, but has an ambiguous
effect on the growth rate of capital in the manufacturing sector, K̇M/KM .
The output share is equal to the labour share in each sector, so output shares follow the same
structural dynamics as labour shares and exhibit the same responses to financial shocks.
The model is therefore consistent with existing empirical evidence. Jayaratne and Strahan
(1996) find that bank branching deregulation accelerated growth, as predicted by the model.
Jerzmanowski (2017) finds that deregulation caused an acceleration in TFP growth in the
manufacturing sector and an acceleration in aggregate capital accumulation, but that it did
not cause an acceleration in capital accumulation in the manufacturing sector, all of which
is also consistent with the model. Furthermore, the model predicts that bank branching
deregulation will, over a sufficiently long time horizon, accelerate structural change towards
services and away from manufacturing, both by affecting the transitional dynamics and by
affecting the long-run shares of labour and output accounted for by each sector. We will
proceed to estimate this proposition empirically.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 BEA data
Herrendorf et al. (2014) suggest three measures of structural change: changes over time in
relative sectoral shares in each of employment, output (value added), and consumption. Data
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on sectoral shares of consumption by U.S. state and year do not appear to exist prior to the
1990s, which is too late to be of use in studying bank branching deregulation. However, the
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides industry-level employment data by U.S.
state and year from 1969-2000 (aggregated using SIC code) and from 2001-2016 (aggregated
using NAICS code). This allows the calculation of sectoral shares of employment. The BEA
also provides industry-level output data by U.S. state and year from 1963-1996 (aggregated
using SIC code) and from 1997-2017 (aggregated using NAICS code). According to the BEA’s
official methodology notes, “[n]o matter how a GDP by state component is estimated, it is
always adjusted to be consistent with BEA’s definition of value added” (U.S. Department of
Commerce and Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2017, p. iii). This data therefore allows the
calculation of sectoral shares of value added, as proposed by Herrendorf et al. (2014).
Where a particular state-year-industry combination has not been provided – typically
in order to avoid the disclosure of confidential information – we have interpolated linearly
between the nearest available entries. However, the numbers involved are typically small.
For example, employment in mining in D.C. is redacted in the years 1998-2000, so in calcu-
lating aggregate employment numbers for the manufacturing sector in D.C. in those years,
interpolated figures are used for mining employment. The number of employees in mining in
DC in 1997 is only 309, however, so it seems reasonable to assume that this will not skew
the results significantly. Indeed, where data is redacted to avoid the disclosure of confidential
information, almost by definition the numbers are likely to be small.
There is a discontinuity in the data when the aggregation method switches from aggrega-
tion by SIC code to NAICS code, and the BEA cautions against combining the two datasets
to form a unified dataset spanning from the 1960s to the present. However, there are several
reasons why this is not likely to be a major concern for this exercise. First, we are largely
interested in shares of output or employment, so changes in absolute values are not impor-
tant unless they are systematically different from one sector to another7. Second, since we
are aggregating into four major sectors, unless there are large changes in sector assignment
between the two methodologies, small-scale differences in methodology will not be signifi-
cant. Third, while the difference-in-differences regressions span both datasets, the synthetic
controls study does not in fact use any data from after 1996 (there were no deregulations late
enough, with enough states left as members of the donor pool, for this situation to arise).
For completeness, we also report the difference-in-differences results obtained using only the
data aggregated using SIC code in Appendix C.4.
3.4.2 IPUMS USA data
Control data was taken from the University of Minnesota’s IPUMS USA database (Ruggles
et al., 2019). This database collates and harmonises U.S. census microdata. Three control
variables were constructed at the state-year level: the average years of education of state
7The SIC output data is presented in chained 1997 U.S. dollars, while the NAICS output data is presented
in chained 2012 U.S. dollars. Conversion from one to the other would therefore be necessary if we were to
report absolute values spanning the two datasets. However, this issue does not arise in the results presented
below.
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residents, the average age of state residents, and the proportion of state residents who are
black. Where a particular state-year combination doesn’t appear in the data, the value is
constructed by linearly interpolating between the latest observation for that state prior to the
year of interest, and the earliest observation for that state subsequent to the year of interest.
We have collected data from all three sources across a span of 55 years from 1963 to
2017, for 50 states and D.C., so that variables with an observation for every year have
55×51 = 2, 805 observations. However, employment data in particular is only available from
1969 to 2016, so many of the results below are calculated using data that is from 1969 and
more recent. Table 3.2 reports descriptive statistics for the data.
3.4.3 Date of deregulation
The year of bank branching deregulation in each state is taken from Amel (1993), Jayaratne
and Strahan (1996), Krozsner and Strahan (1999), and Beck et al. (2010). Following this
literature, we take the year of deregulation to be the year that a state allowed bank branching
by merger and acquisition (M&A). Appendix C.3 lists the year of deregulation for each state.
3.5 Empirical results
3.5.1 Difference-in-differences regressions
A standard method of assessing the effect of a staggered treatment is to fit difference-in-
differences regressions. This type of regression has been used to assess the effects of bank
branching deregulation on output growth (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996) and inequality as
measured by the Gini coefficient (Beck et al., 2010), among others. Our model predicts that
the effect of financial deregulation on structural change includes a growth effect, so we need
to allow the effect of deregulation on sectoral shares to grow or diminish over time. We
therefore estimate the following specification,




2Xt + εst, (3.22)
where Yst is the outcome variable of interest in state s in year t, Dst is a treatment dummy
that is equal to 1 once a state has deregulated and equal to 0 otherwise, Tst is equal to
the number of years since deregulation (it takes a negative value prior to deregulation),
Xs is a vector of state dummies accounting for state fixed effects, Xt is a vector of time
dummies accounting for time fixed effects, and εst is an error term. This specification allows
us to account for unobserved, time-invariant state effects by including state dummies, and
for unobserved nationwide shocks by including time dummies. The estimated value of β1
indicates the level effect caused by deregulation, while the estimated value of β3 indicates
whether the effect of deregulation is changing over time.
We estimate the effect of deregulation on four outcome variables: services share of em-
ployment, services share of output, manufacturing share of employment, and manufacturing
share of output. We do not estimate the effect of bank branching deregulation on agriculture,
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as it accounts for such a small share of most state economies over the period in question. We
also do not estimate the effect of bank branching deregulation on the government share of
the economy; while this may yield interesting results, almost by definition any effect cannot
be argued to be a clean consequence of market forces at work in the financial sector.
Table 3.3 reports the results of the regressions8. As in Beck et al. (2010), standard errors
are clustered at the state level (that is, at the level of the treatment unit), accounting for
the fact that the error term may exhibit serial correlation within states. Consistent with
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and Beck et al. (2010), the year of deregulation is excluded,
as are Delaware and South Dakota, which have long been major centres for the credit card
industry. Not all of the coefficients on the deregulation dummy are significant, suggesting that
the effect of deregulation on structural composition does not operate solely – or even primarily
– by having an instantaneous, permanent level effect on the outcome variables. Conversely, all
the coefficients on ‘Dereg.*Time’ are highly significant, suggesting that deregulation causes
the share of services to increase over time, in both employment and output, while having the
opposite effect on manufacturing, consistent with the theory in Section 3.3.
These results are apparently very strong, and certainly suggest that structural change
accelerates post-deregulation. However, the fact that the coefficients on ‘Time’ are significant
in Table 3.3 raises concerns about the validity of a causal interpretation of the effect of bank
branching deregulation. Difference-in-difference regressions rely on a number of assumptions,
notably the assumption of exogenous treatment: assignment to treatment should not be
correlated with the outcome variable, conditional on observables. Significant coefficients on
‘Time’ suggest that pre-deregulation structural composition is correlated with the number
of years until deregulation, raising concerns about the exogeneity of treatment. In order to
alleviate these concerns, we turn to the synthetic control method, which allows us to relax
the exogeneity requirement somewhat.
3.5.2 Pooled synthetic controls
3.5.2.1 Synthetic controls
The synthetic control method (SCM) is a recent development in case study analysis. When
a treatment takes place in only one or a small number of units, it is not generally possible to
use traditional techniques to estimate the treatment effect. Without being able to identify
a plausible counterfactual had the unit not been treated – which becomes much easier when
there are large numbers of treated and untreated units that are similar in characteristics – it
is impossible to identify the treatment effect. Even when only one unit is treated, however,
the SCM provides a rigorous, quantitative framework for constructing a counterfactual.
For a treated unit, the SCM constructs a ‘synthetic’ treated unit as a convex combination
of untreated control units, in order to minimise the distance between the real unit and the
8These regressions use the full span of BEA data available. However, as noted in Section 3.4, there is a
change in methodology when the BEA switches from aggregation using SIC code to aggregation using NAICS
code. For completeness, the results in Table 3.3 are replicated in Table C.4 in Appendix C.4 using only
SIC-based data. None of the results are contradictory.
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Deregulation −0.234∗ 0.076 0.065 −0.811∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.201) (0.185) (0.245)
Time −0.110∗ 1.294∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗ −1.518∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.113) (0.077) (0.141)
Dereg.*Time 0.249∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ −0.360∗∗∗ −0.407∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024)
Constant 40.399∗∗∗ 66.346∗∗∗ 40.627∗∗∗ 8.841∗∗∗
(0.935) (2.196) (1.217) (2.725)
Observations 1,833 2,106 1,833 2,106
R2 0.972 0.925 0.874 0.856
Adjusted R2 0.971 0.922 0.868 0.849
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Difference-in-differences OLS estimates of the effect of bank branching deregulation on struc-
tural composition, accounting for year and state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at
the state level in parentheses. ‘Deregulation’ is a dummy that is equal to 1 when a state has
deregulated, and equal to 0 otherwise. ‘Time’ is the time in years since deregulation (this
variable takes a negative value prior to deregulation). The year of deregulation is excluded
for each state. States that deregulated prior to 1963 are excluded (Alaska, Arizona, Califor-
nia, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Idaho, Maryland, Nevada, North Carolina, Rhode
Island, South Carolina and South Dakota).
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synthetic unit prior to treatment. Subject to some assumptions, divergence between the real
unit and the treated unit post-treatment can be interpreted as the causal effect of treatment.
The SCM was introduced by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) in order to study the eco-
nomic effects of terrorism in the Basque Country. Since it is impossible to observe the Basque
Country in the absence of terrorism over the period of interest, a synthetic Basque Country
is constructed as a convex combination of other Spanish regions. ‘Treatment’ in this case is
the onset of violence.
When constructing the synthetic Basque Country, weights are given to each of the other
Spanish regions – known collectively as the donor pool – in order to minimise the gap between
the real and synthetic Basque Countries in the period prior to treatment for the outcome
variable of interest, in this case GDP per capita. Formally, following the notation and ex-
position in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), let W = (w2, ..., wJ+1)
′ be a (J × 1) vector of
weights on the J regions in the donor pool – where we reserve the index 1 for the treated
region, the Basque Country – such that the weights are non-negative and sum to unity. Let
X1 be a (K × 1) vector of predictor variables for GDP per capita in the Basque Country,
and X0 be a (K × J) matrix containing the same K variables for each of the J regions in
the donor pool. Let V be a diagonal (K ×K) matrix with non-negative entries. Given V,
the optimal weight vector W∗ (V) is chosen to minimise
(X1 −X0W)′V (X1 −X0W) .
The optimal matrix V∗ is chosen to minimise the root mean squared error (RMSE) in GDP
per capita between the real and synthetic Basque Countries in the pretreatment period. V∗
can be thought of as a weighting of the importance of the K different predictor variables.
The SCM has a number of desirable properties relative to the traditional difference-in-
differences estimator. While the fixed effects model can control for time-invariant unobserved
unit-specific characteristics, the synthetic controls estimator “allows the effects of confounding
unobserved characteristics to vary with time” (Abadie et al., 2010, p. 495). Moreover,
“treatment and control states need not follow parallel trends, conditional on observables”
(Dube and Zipperer, 2015, p. 8). Importantly, the SCM does not impose a functional form
on the effect of deregulation, and so avoids many of the pitfalls associated with misspecified
difference-in-difference regressions. Unlike with traditional regressions, an analyst using the
SCM can be completely agnostic about both the direction and the character of any treatment
effect under study. This ensures that we will not infer an incorrect effect because of functional
misspecification: the data speak for themselves – although this does mean that it will be
harder to distinguish between the level and growth effects predicted by the model in Section
3.3. Finally, we can relax the necessity for treatment exogeneity: given a good synthetic
control, the difference between the treated unit and the synthetic control is treatment alone,
and the counterfactual is valid even when treatment is endogenous. Thus while the difference-
in-differences estimates derived above may not be valid, in principle, estimates derived using
the SCM can be.
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The SCM is however subject to some assumptions. First, the treated unit is assumed to
be in the convex hull of the donor pool, so that a good fit for the treated unit is assumed to
exist. If this assumption holds, then even when assignment to treatment is non-random and
correlated with unobservable confounders, causal inference is valid. While it’s not possible
to test directly the existence of a good synthetic control, we go some way towards addressing
this concern with a statistical validity test that is described below. Second, validity requires
“that outcomes of the untreated units are not affected by the intervention implemented
in the treated unit” (Abadie et al., 2010, pp. 494-495). Since we are focussed on intra-
state bank branching deregulation, it seems plausible to assume that there is very little
effect of deregulation in one state on outcomes in any other. Indeed, Huang (2008) studies
the effects of intra-state branching deregulation by examining pairs of contiguous counties
across state lines, one of which belonged to a state that deregulated and the other of which
belonged to a state that did not deregulate for at least three years subsequently. In order
to test indirectly for cross-border spillover effects, deregulated counties are also compared
to ‘hinterland’ counties that are not contiguous with any deregulated county, and no major
difference is found to the contiguous case (Huang, 2008, pp. 701-702). This suggests that
spillover effects are not a major concern.
We use synthetic controls to study the effect of bank branching deregulation on the same
four outcome variables as we studied with difference-in-differences regressions: services share
of employment, services share of output, manufacturing share of employment, and manufac-
turing share of output. The predictors we use to construct our X0 vector and X1 matrix are
the state’s population, total employment, total output, GDP per capita, GDP growth, em-
ployment rate, average years of education, proportion of residents who are black, and average
age. We use these predictors because there is reason to believe that socio-demographic and
economic variables such as these are good predictors of long-term growth potential (Sala-i-
Martin et al., 2004), and we know that growth goes hand-in-hand with structural change.
Each of these predictors is used for the full pretreatment span of time, from 1969 to the year
prior to deregulation. As is common practice, we also use two observations, in 1969 and the
year prior to deregulation, of each of the four outcome variables. These predictors are all
calculated from BEA data, except for the average years of education, proportion of residents
who are black, and average age, which are calculated from IPUMS USA data.
3.5.2.2 Statistical inference and pooling
Statistical inference when using the SCM is typically done by running placebo tests – either
across time, by assigning the treatment date to some time when treatment did not actually
occur, or across units, by assigning as the treated unit a member of the donor pool (Abadie
et al., 2010). If the treatment does indeed have an effect, one would expect to see a greater
deviation between the real and synthetic treated units after treatment in the genuine, non-
placebo case than when running placebo tests. If some measure of deviation, say the post-
treatment RMSE, is at the tail of the placebo distribution then we can have some confidence
that the effect is statistically significant.
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This method relies on having a reasonably large number of units in the donor pool, or a
reasonably large time span across which to run placebo tests. In the case of bank branching
deregulation, this presents a challenge. For example, there are only 9 deregulation events for
which there are at least 3 other states in the donor pool, if we impose the requirements that
there be at least 5 years of pre-treatment data to generate the synthetic treatment unit, and
at least 10 years of post-treatment data in order to allow the treatment some time to take
effect. If a deregulated state has only 3 other states in the donor pool, then even in principle
a placebo test across units could only achieve a 40% significance level9.
In order to enhance the statistical power of such placebo tests, we will pool different
deregulation events and consider their joint statistical significance. Following an idea used
by Dube and Zipperer (2015) to estimate the effect of minimum wage increases, we will
calculate the mean percentile rank of the estimated treatment effect relative to the placebo
tests. Under the null hypothesis of uniform distribution, this statistic has a distribution
that can be calculated exactly even for small samples. Section 3.5.2.3 describes in detail the
method used for constructing this distribution and calculating p-values.
3.5.2.3 Model selection and p-value calculation
When choosing the specification for constructing synthetic control units, there are competing
imperatives. Clearly the longer the pre-treatment span of time, the better10, as this improves
the fit of the synthetic control unit. The longer the post-treatment span of time, the better,
as this gives more time for the treatment to take effect and be discernible: the difference-
in-differences regressions are suggestive of the fact that treatment may have an increasingly
large effect over time. Finally, for each deregulation event, the more states in the donor pool,
the better, as this increases the chance that a good synthetic control unit can be constructed.
However, tightening these restrictions has the effect of reducing the number of deregulation
events that can be used, which reduces their joint statistical power.
In order to get a good balance of all these requirements, our specification is to require
that each treated state has at least 5 years of pre-treatment data, and a donor pool of at
least 3 states that do not deregulate for at least 10 years after the treated state deregulates.
We judge that this should balance the need for enough deregulation events to pool with the
likelihood of a reasonably good fit and enough time to see gradual effects take hold. This
specification gives us 9 deregulation events to study11. Tightening any of these requirements
results in fewer deregulation events available for study, which reduces the statistical power
of the pooled study.
In order to get some estimate of the size of the effect of deregulation, we will focus on
the value of the outcome variable at the end of the specified post-treatment period. For
instance, in our baseline specification, when assessing the effect of deregulation on the share
9See Section 3.5.2.3 for a detailed description of the calculation of p-values.
10Data for all the variables of interest are only available from 1969, as described in Section 3.4, so for
example a state that deregulated in 1975 would only have 6 years of pre-treatment data available.
11The bank branching deregulation events captured in this specification are those in Alabama, Connecticut,
Maine, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah and Virginia.
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Figure 3.8: Ohio placebo test
Placebo test of the effect of bank branching deregulation on the services
share of output in Ohio. The synthetic Ohio in this case is optimally cal-
culated as 9% Kentucky, 34% Missouri and 57% Wisconsin. Deregulation
took place in 1979 in Ohio. The red line represents the gap between the
real Ohio and the synthetic Ohio, while the black lines represent the gaps
between real but untreated states in Ohio’s donor pool and their synthetic
counterparts.
of services employment in the economy, we will focus on the gap between the share of services
employment in the treated state and the share of services employment in the synthetic state,
10 years after deregulation occurs. We calculate two key values: first, the mean gap across
all of the deregulation events; and second, a p-value associated with the mean percentile rank
across all of the deregulation events.
The p-value is calculated as follows. Suppose there are N deregulation events under
study and a specified post-treatment span of T years. For each i ∈ [1, N ], suppose there
are Ni − 1 states in the donor pool. Including the treated state and the placebo studies,
therefore, there are Ni values for the gap in the outcome variable (real value minus synthetic
value) T years after deregulation. Any placebo deregulations that have a mean squared
prediction error (MSPE) prior to deregulation greater than 5 times that of the treated state
are removed from consideration, to exclude comparisons with states that do not have a well-
fitting synthetic counterpart. Suppose this leaves ni − 1 ‘valid’ placebo tests, so that for
each treated state there are now ni values for the gap in the outcome variable T years after
deregulation. Suppose the treated state is at rank ji out of those ni values, so there are ji−1
placebo states that have a smaller gap and ni−ji placebo states that have a larger gap. Then





This has the property of being symmetrical – that is, a treated state that has exactly as many
placebo values above it as below it would generate a percentile rank of 0.5.
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As an example, Figure 3.8 shows a placebo test of the effect of deregulation on the services
share of employment in Ohio. The synthetic Ohio in this case is optimally calculated as 9%
Kentucky, 34% Missouri and 57% Wisconsin. Since the effect on Ohio (the red line) is greater
10 years after deregulation than it is for any of the placebo states, and since there are 6 states








Once percentile ranks have been calculated for each individual deregulation event, the









Under the null hypothesis that each πi is uniformly distributed – that is, under the null
hypothesis that there is in fact no treatment effect – the exact distribution of π̄ can be
simulated using Monte Carlo methods12. For each i ∈ [1, N ], we take a random draw of









We repeat this five million times to construct an exact distribution for π̂. The distribution
of π̂ allows us to assign p-values to the true value π̄. If, for example, π̄ is at either the 2.5th
or the 97.5th percentile of the distribution of π̂, we assign to π̄ a p-value of 5%.
Note that the p-value does not directly relate to the estimated size of the effect. Instead,
it is derived from the extremity of the genuine results in relation to placebo results. Thus
we cannot construct a confidence interval around the point estimates reported in Section
3.5.2.5. Instead, we report a point estimate and report the p-value associated with there
being some non-zero effect. In that sense, the point estimates are best thought of as giving
some indication of the size and direction of the effect, rather than any precise value.
3.5.2.4 Validity test
There is a danger in pooling multiple synthetic control studies that the pooling is invalid;
that is, we must guard against the possibility that the apparent effect of deregulation 10 years
after the event is statistically different from zero only because the SCM studies we pooled
12The distribution we have calculated also assumes that, under the null hypothesis, the individual percentile
ranks πi are independent. Since the states in the donor pool have some overlap – the states that deregulate
latest appear in the donor pool for multiple deregulation events – this assumption may not be correct. Dube
and Zipperer (2015) address this concern by randomly permuting the state assignment in the whole dataset
and conducting the entire exercise again as a placebo. They iterate this one million times and derive a
distribution which allows statistical inference. However, as they note, this is computationally expensive –
given that the computation for Section 3.5.2.5 of this chapter takes several hours, it would not be feasible to
replicate this methodology – and they find little difference from the assumption of independence, concluding
that“accounting for donor overlap has little impact on the estimated critical values, justifying our use of the
mean of independent uniform distributions” (Dube and Zipperer, 2015, p. 15).
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were systematically bad fits. For example, if we find that deregulation has a significantly
positive effect on the services share of employment, we want to ensure this is not because
there was a significant gap between the real states and their synthetic counterparts even prior
to deregulation.
We propose therefore a simple statistical test of the validity of the pooling. We repeat the
percentile rank test described above, but instead of using the percentile ranks from estimate
of the gap 10 years after deregulation, we use percentile ranks based on the RMSE between
the real state and its synthetic counterpart prior to treatment. The null hypothesis of this
test is that the mean percentile rank generated from the RMSE is equal to 0.5. The test
will therefore detect a situation in which the treated states are systematically harder to fit
with synthetic counterparts than the placebo states, and will indicate that we should not
rely on the results generated from pooling those studies13. Note that this test does not
guarantee that any given synthetic control study generates a good fit; it does however give
us some confidence that if the treated and placebo states end up behaving differently after
deregulation, it’s not because they were already behaving differently prior to deregulation.
3.5.2.5 Pooled synthetic controls results
Table 3.4 shows the results of the pooled synthetic controls study. 10 years after deregulation,
states have a significantly higher services share of both employment and output than they
would have done if they did not deregulate. This accords with the suggestive evidence from
the difference-in-differences regressions in Section 3.5.1, and more particularly, matches the
predictions made by the model in Section 3.3. Deregulation appears to have a statistically
significant negative effect on the manufacturing share of output, also as predicted, and we
find a negative point estimate for the effect of deregulation on the manufacturing share of
employment, which is significant just below the 5% level. However, neither of the results
pertaining to manufacturing pass the validity test. Our results suggest that bank branching
deregulation causes a statistically significant increase in the share of output and employment
accounted for by services, but that we are not able to fit the treated states’ manufacturing
shares using states that have not yet deregulated, so we cannot confidently say anything
about the effect of bank branching deregulation on manufacturing.
In order to deal with the poor pre-treatment fit for manufacturing shares, we turn to
augmented synthetic controls.
3.5.2.6 Ridge augmented synthetic controls
Ben-Michael et al. (2019) propose the augmented synthetic control method as an extension
of the SCM to settings where a good pre-treatment fit is not feasible. The traditional SCM
requires the treated unit to lie within the convex hull of the donor pool; that is, it restricts the
13The two-sided test will also detect a situation in which the treated states are systematically easier to fit
with synthetic counterparts than the placebo states. While an argument could be made for considering only
the one-sided version of this test, the placebo results are also invalid if the placebo fits are poor. We therefore
use the two-sided version of the test.
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Table 3.4: Pooled synthetic control results







Services share of employment (%) 1.958 0.698 0.009*** 0.333
Services share of output (%) 1.798 0.674 0.030** 0.785
Manufacturing share of employment (%) −1.299 0.342 0.054* 0.003***
Manufacturing share of output (%) −2.484 0.300 0.015** 0.017**
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Results from a pooled synthetic controls study requiring a minimum of 3 states in the donor pool,
a minimum of 5 years of pre-treatment data, and 10 years of post-treatment data. ‘Mean Gap’
is the mean gap between the treated state and the synthetic state 10 years after deregulation
across the 9 deregulation events fitting the specification. ‘Mean Percentile Rank’ is calculated
as in equation (3.23), 10 years after deregulation. ‘p-Value’ indicates how statistically different
‘Mean Percentile Rank’ is from 0.5. The null hypothesis is that ‘Mean Percentile Rank’ is equal
to 0.5, and thus that deregulation has no effect. ‘Validity p-Value’ indicates how statistically
different the mean percentile rank of the RMSE prior to deregulation is from 0.5. The null
hypothesis is that the mean percentile rank of the RMSE is equal to 0.5, and thus that the
treated states have synthetic counterparts that are just as good as those of the placebo states,
in which case the pooling is valid.
weight vector W to non-negative entries. The augmented SCM allows extrapolation outside
this convex hull by permitting negative weights on donor units.
The following exposition closely mirrors the basic outline presented in Ben-Michael et al.
(2019). Formally, as before, let W = (w2, ..., wJ+1)
′ be a (J × 1) vector of weights on the J
units in the donor pool, such that the weights are still non-negative and sum to unity. We
will index by 1 the treated unit, while the units in the donor pool are indexed from 2 to J+1.
Let X1 be a (T0 × 1) vector of observations of the outcome variable for the treated unit in
the T0 periods prior to treatment
14, and X0 be the (T0 × J) matrix containing the outcome
variable for the J donor units in the same T0 periods. Then the optimal SCM weight vector
WSCM is chosen to minimise




where ξ is a function that penalises the dispersion of the weights wi. However, when the
weights are constrained to be non-negative, as they are here, “the particular choice of dis-
persion penalty does not play a central role” (Ben-Michael et al., 2019, p. 5), so we do not
dwell on the choice of ξ.
The weights WSCM are the baseline SCM weights, essentially chosen by optimising pre-
treatment fit and restricting weights to be non-negative, that we will augment by fitting an
outcome model. Suppose for simplicity of exposition that there is only one post-treatment
period, and let Yi be the outcome in unit i in the period after unit 1 is treated, in the absence
of treatment (this is the observed outcome for all units in the donor pool, and the untreated
counterfactual we wish to estimate for unit 1). Let Yi = m (Xi) + εi be a working outcome
14Note that, in the traditional SCM, the fit is based on K predictor variables (which may or may not include
pre-treatment observations of the outcome variable). Here, the fit is solely based on minimising the distance
between the real and synthetic treated units prior to treatment.
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model, where m is some function, Xi is the (T0 × 1) vector of pre-treatment outcomes in unit
i, and εi is an independent error term with zero expectation. Then we can write down the
bias of the SCM estimator based on the weights WSCM,
bias = Y1 −
J+2∑
i=2
wSCMi Yi = m (X1)−
J+2∑
i=2








Given an estimator m̂ for m, we therefore have an estimator for the bias of the SCM estimator,
b̂ias = m̂ (X1)−
J+2∑
i=2
wSCMi m̂ (Xi) ,











= m̂ (X1) +
J+2∑
i=2
wSCMi (Yi − m̂ (Xi)) .
All that remains to fit such an estimator therefore is to choose a function to employ as the
estimator m̂. Ben-Michael et al. (2019) focus primarily on a ridge-regularised linear model,



















given a penalty hyper-parameter χr that determines how sensitive we are to deviations from












The choice of χr is important: as χr → ∞, the ridge-augmented estimator converges to the
original SCM estimator; as χr → 0, by contrast, pre-treatment fit becomes perfect but only
at the expense of potentially significant extrapolation outside the convex hull of the donor
pool, which could exacerbate errors in the post-treatment estimate. In practice, a ‘leave one
out’ cross-validation approach to the selection of χr is proposed, in which χr is chosen to
minimise the mean squared error between the true pre-treatment outcomes in the treated unit
and estimates of those outcomes based on the ridge augmented synthetic control estimator
(Ben-Michael et al., 2019, p. 13).
The ridge-augmented synthetic control estimator has a number of interesting properties,
elucidated in the original paper. First, it is a weighting estimator which allows for potentially
negative weights on donor units, but which penalises deviation from the baseline SCM esti-
mator, so limits extrapolation bias and over-fitting to noise. Second, ridge augmented SCM
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(ridge ASCM) improves the pre-treatment fit of a synthetic control relative to traditional
SCM, suggesting we may have more luck in finding good fits for pre-treatment manufactur-
ing shares than we did in the results reported in Table 3.4. Finally, the authors show using
simulation studies that there are estimation gains from using ridge ASCM relative to SCM
alone. These properties make it a useful method to adopt, given the poor pre-treatment
fits for the manufacturing shares of the economy found in Section 3.5.2.5, since we will get a
better fit, with potentially more accurate results, while minimising unnecessary extrapolation
outside the convex hull of the donor states. We therefore turn now to implementing ridge
ASCM to study the effects of bank branching deregulation on structural composition.
3.5.2.7 Pooled ridge ASCM results
Given the ridge ASCM, we can conduct a pooled study based on individual synthetic controls,
conducted exactly as in Section 3.5.2.5. The results of this pooled study are presented in
Table 3.5. We find that bank branching deregulation caused a significantly increased services
share of employment, and a significantly reduced manufacturing share of both employment
and output, 10 years after deregulation. While we find a positive point estimate for the
effect of deregulation on the services share of output, the mean percentile rank is not quite
significant, with a p-value of around 13%. Ridge ASCM has substantially improved the pre-
treatment fit relative to SCM alone: all of the validity p-values have increased, and we do
not come close to rejecting the null hypothesis – that the treated states are fit as well as
the placebo studies – for any of the outcome variables. The point estimates found for the
effect on services are very similar to those found with traditional SCM, but the magnitude of
the effects on the manufacturing shares are substantially increased with ridge ASCM. This
suggests that, while we could not find good fits for the manufacturing shares using traditional
synthetic controls, the bad fits were actually working to decrease rather than increase the
apparent effect of deregulation.
We therefore find that bank branching deregulation has a significant effect on structural
change, accelerating the secular shift that was already underway towards services and away
from manufacturing, as our theory predicted in Section 3.3. The United States from the 1970s
to the 1990s was relatively economically developed, so it is unclear whether these results
would hold in the context of a less developed economy; indeed, Heblich and Trew (2019) find
that finance increases manufacturing employment in an industrialising economy. Looking at
the same bank branching deregulation episode as we consider in this chapter, other work has
shown that manufacturing firms achieve faster TFP growth post-deregulation (Jerzmanowski,
2017), consistent with our model. This mechanism may only work in relatively industrialised
economies, when manufacturing firms have accumulated sufficient capital but would like to
invest more in R&D, for example. Nonetheless, our results show a significant effect of bank
branching deregulation on those states in the pooled synthetic controls study.
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Table 3.5: Pooled ridge ASCM results







Services share of employment (%) 2.081 0.738 0.003*** 0.865
Services share of output (%) 1.807 0.628 0.130 0.821
Manufacturing share of employment (%) −2.297 0.304 0.018** 0.635
Manufacturing share of output (%) −3.566 0.231 0.001*** 0.737
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Results from a pooled ridge ASCM study requiring a minimum of 3 states in the donor pool, a
minimum of 5 years of pre-treatment data, and 10 years of post-treatment data. ‘Mean Gap’
is the mean gap between the treated state and the synthetic state 10 years after deregulation
across the 9 deregulation events fitting the specification. ‘Mean Percentile Rank’ is calculated
as in equation (3.23), 10 years after deregulation. ‘p-Value’ indicates how statistically different
‘Mean Percentile Rank’ is from 0.5. The null hypothesis is that ‘Mean Percentile Rank’ is equal
to 0.5, and thus that deregulation has no effect. ‘Validity p-Value’ indicates how statistically
different the mean percentile rank of the RMSE prior to deregulation is from 0.5. The null
hypothesis is that the mean percentile rank of the RMSE is equal to 0.5, and thus that the
treated states have synthetic counterparts that are just as good as those of the placebo states,
in which case the pooling is valid.
3.6 Conclusions
Existing evidence shows that bank branching deregulation accelerates output growth (Ja-
yaratne and Strahan, 1996) and accelerates TFP growth in the manufacturing sector (Jerz-
manowski, 2017). We construct an infinite-horizon general equilibrium model in which a
positive financial shock causes faster output growth and faster TFP growth in manufactur-
ing; in our model, such a shock also accelerates structural change, leading to a greater share
of services and a smaller share of manufacturing in the economy.
We proceed to assess the effect on structural change of state-by-state bank branching
deregulation in the United States, initially using difference-in-differences regressions. We
find that deregulation increases services over time as a share of the economy, and decreases
manufacturing. To alleviate concerns with endogeneity of treatment, we employ a more
robust estimation strategy by exploiting the synthetic control method (SCM). The SCM is
specification-free, and does not rely on exogeneity of treatment for valid inference. We follow
Dube and Zipperer (2015) in pooling the results across several synthetic control case studies
in order to increase their statistical power, determining statistical significance with reference
to the mean percentile rank, whose distribution is known exactly under the null hypothesis of
uniform distribution of individual percentile ranks. We also propose a simple statistical test
of the validity of pooling multiple synthetic controls studies. To improve the pre-treatment
fit of the synthetic controls, we further employ the ridge augmented synthetic control method
(ridge ASCM). We find that bank branching deregulation significantly increases the share of
services and decreases the share of manufacturing in the economy 10 years after deregulation,
consistent with our theoretical predictions.
Conclusions
This thesis aimed to determine whether there is a link between structural change and both
investment irreversibility, such as an increase in the use of intangible capital, and financial
development in advanced economies. First, a partial equilibrium model was developed of a
firm’s life cycle and optimal investment programme. Consistent with stylised empirical facts,
this model predicts that firms should rely on external finance and retain all revenue when
young, before reaching maturity and becoming less reliant on external finance; that capital is
accumulated gradually, despite there being no adjustment costs; and that increasing invest-
ment irreversibility is associated with less corporate borrowing and more corporate saving
overall. The novel approach of studying the firm’s life cycle in the presence of an explicit
parameter encoding investment irreversibility allowed us to show that a greater reliance on
intangible capital – which is harder to liquidate than traditional capital, and investment in
which is therefore less reversible – should have not just macroeconomic but also firm-level
effects. When investment irreversibility increases, firms grow more slowly and reach maturity
at a younger age and a smaller size.
Once these firms and their optimal investment programme had been characterised, they
were embedded in a two-sector general equilibrium model. When consumers consider services
and manufactured goods to be complements, increasing investment irreversibility leads to a
greater long-run share of manufacturing in the economy, both in terms of output and employ-
ment. This effect however is rather modest, with much greater effects on aggregate output,
consumption and wages. We consider the welfare implications of investment irreversibility:
government subsidies to capital liquidation, financed by taxes on households, are found often
to increase long run consumption and therefore to be welfare-enhancing. This is true for a
wide array of parameter choices, but it is particularly true when the underlying irreversibility
of investment is high.
Finally, we predict using a general equilibrium model that financial development should
accelerate structural change towards services and away from manufacturing. In addition to
deriving novel predictions, this model also explains existing evidence that bank branching
deregulation accelerated output growth (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996), and that it acceler-
ated manufacturing TFP growth and aggregate capital accumulation, but did not accelerate
capital accumulation in the manufacturing sector (Jerzmanowski, 2017). Using a pooled ridge
augmented synthetic controls study, we show empirically that bank branching deregulation
in the United States did indeed accelerate structural change in the manner predicted.
What does this all add up to? At least in theory, both investment irreversibility and
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financial development do affect the structural composition of the economy, and in the case of
financial development this link is confirmed empirically. The research questions posed in the
introduction have therefore been answered. However, we predict in Chapter 2 that when ε < 1
increasing irreversibility should increase the size of the manufacturing sector, not the services
sector. This clearly does not accord with the broad sweep of recent experience. The predicted
effect is rather small, though, and could easily be dominated by structural change driven by
differential TFP growth rates, if the two were to be modelled simultaneously. Thus it may
still be the case that our predictions in Chapter 2 are correct: that increasing irreversibility
does increase the size of the manufacturing sector, ceteris parabus. A rigorous empirical study
would be required to test this hypothesis in the real world (see below for a more detailed
discussion of potential future work following on from this thesis).
In conducting this research, we sought to understand whether coincident trends in macroe-
conomics could have some effect on the structural composition of the economy, and to un-
derstand the channels through which any such effects might operate. On that front, we have
made significant progress: increasing investment irreversibility essentially increases the cost
of capital to firms, while increasing financial development essentially decreases its cost. It
seems natural therefore that these two phenomena should have effects that are pushing in
opposite directions, both in aggregate growth terms and in structural change terms. An ob-
vious future stream of work would be to model both of these phenomena together, and check
how closely such a model accords with real-world data.
Further work
There are a number of natural extensions to the work in this thesis. Surprisingly, the firms
in Chapter 1 essentially only ever spend a single period in the large loan regime when their
life cycle is simulated. This gives a limited role to the bank’s liquidation value of capital
θB, and indeed tweaking this variable changes very little in aggregate outcomes (as is also
the case in Chapter 2). Although finance plays an important role by limiting the amount
firms can borrow while still only paying the risk-free interest rate r, ‘financial development’
as parametrised by θB is not particularly important. While for the purposes of studying
the effects of investment irreversibility it was sufficient that the firm’s liquidation value of
capital was important, a different microfounded theory of investment which places greater
importance on the quality of the financial system and the bank’s liquidation value of capital
may therefore yield interesting results regarding the firm’s optimal investment programme.
Chapter 2 predicts that investment irreversibility will affect the structural composition of
the economy, although the direction of this effect depends on household preferences. First, an
empirical study confirming the relationship between investment irreversibility and structural
change would be instructive: is there actually a relationship at all? In which direction does it
run? In the absence of direct estimates of households’ elasticity of substitution between goods
and services produced in different sectors – which may exist, but which we have been unable
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to find – an estimate of the direction of the effect of increasing irreversibility on structural
change may also provide indirect evidence of household preferences.
The inclusion in Chapter 2 of a continuum of firms that are heterogeneous in size and age
makes dynamical analysis of the economy difficult, since we cannot take the usual approach of
assuming a representative firm. A model of investment irreversibility and structural change
that does not rely on this variety of firms but produces similar stylised facts would be useful for
studying the transition of the economy. More challengingly, but perhaps more interestingly,
the ability to aggregate neatly across such a continuum would allow for dynamical analysis
without sacrificing the microfoundations of investment irreversibility currently present in the
model.
The theoretical model in Chapter 3 relies on learning-by-doing spillovers to capital ac-
cumulation in the manufacturing sector to generate differential productivity growth rates in
different sectors, which is the ultimate engine of structural change. There are other mech-
anisms that would generate structural change, however: exogenous productivity gaps as in
Ngai and Pissarides (2007), or different input factor intensities as in Chapter 2. The synthe-
sis of these mechanisms with a financial sector may generate similar predictions to those in
Theorem 3.7, and would be a relatively straightforward extension to the chapter.
A very natural project to consider would be to combine two of stories in this thesis, the
effects of investment irreversibility and productivity growth respectively on structural change.
If we assume ε < 1 in households’ utility function in Chapter 2, then decreasing investment
reversibility – for example, as a result of the employment of more intangible capital – leads
to a larger manufacturing sector and a smaller services sector, contrary to observed shifts
over time. However, this effect is rather small. Conversely, assuming that ε < 1 in Chapter
3 generates an acceleration in structural change of the kind that we see in the data, which
lends some support to the idea that services and manufactured goods really are complements
in households’ utility functions. How do we square these results? Perhaps TFP growth –
the engine of structural change in Chapter 3 – can only occur when firms move to new,
less tangible input factors. Google can only work if it runs on software, rather than heavy
machinery. Thus both stories might be true at once: the move to less tangible capital tends
to slow structural change, but not enough to cancel it out altogether. Since the effects of
investment irreversibility on aggregate output are predicted in Chapter 2 to be rather greater
than the effects on structural composition, this shift might manifest as a slowing in growth.
Perhaps therefore secular stagnation – persistently low growth in advanced economies over
recent years despite low unemployment, and the inability of monetary policy to combat it
– is a temporary, supply-side phenomenon associated with the increasing use of intangible
capital in more productive technologies.
Finally, it was stated in the introduction that this thesis was not concerned with a nor-
mative analysis of structural change. There is clearly scope to take at least one step in that
direction, however. While the general equilibrium models employed above have assumed
wage equalisation between sectors, and homogeneous households, the most cursory glance at
the real world shows this is a substantial simplification. Anecdotally, it seems that there has
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been a proliferation in low-status, low-wage, insecure employment in advanced economies’
services industries, perhaps at the expense of manufacturing jobs that were at least perceived
to be better for employees. A very näıve analysis might conclude that this is fine, so long
as output is growing. A slightly less näıve analysis might suggest that output growth is the
domain of economics, and ‘dividing the pie’ is the domain of politics, so economists shouldn’t
concern themselves with such questions. Even if this is true, economists have a role to play in
providing politicians with options and studying the effects of different policies. There might
therefore be much to learn from a model of structural change in which workers vary in their
level of human capital, and different jobs demand different types of worker. Such a model
might accord more closely with observed reality, and help policymakers understand the best
way to chart a path into an uncertain future.
Appendix A
Chapter 1 Appendices
A.1 Derivation of comparative statics for an individual firm
in Section 1.3.7
Given the definitions in equations (1.16), (1.15), (1.17) and (1.18), the effect of each parameter
on k∗, k̄t (Ωt−1), k̄
S
t (Ωt−1) and k
∗∗ is straightforward to derive, as are the effects of θB, µ, ϕ̄,
p and r on k̄Lt (Ωt−1) given the definition in equation (1.19).
Fix some date T and take ΩT−1 as given. In order to assess the effect of δ on the large-




























By the properties of f (kT ), it’s clear that G must be decreasing in kT at the point where
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[(1 + r) ΩT−1 − (1 + r) ΩT−1]
= 0,
where the final inequality follows from the fact that in order to be under consideration by
the firm, by definition, k̄LT must be a capital stock that necessitates a large loan, so given
fixed ΩT−1 it must be larger than k̄T , which is the largest capital stock possible taking only
a small loan. Therefore δ has a negative effect on k̄LT (ΩT−1).
A.2 Numerical modelling sensitivity analysis
Here we repeat the numerical simulations undertaken in Section 1.4, but varying parameters
other than θF one at a time to assess the effect of these parameters. First, Figure A.1 shows
the firm’s life cycle for θF = 0.2 and θF = 0.8, as before, but having decreased the output
elasticity of capital from β = 0.7 to β = 0.3; then Figure A.2 shows the same leaving β as
it was in the baseline specification, but increasing depreciation from µ = 0.05 to µ = 0.1;
Figure A.3 illustrates the case when the firm’s death increases risk from δ = 0.1 to δ = 0.2 in
any given period; Figure A.4 illustrates the case when interest rates increase from r = 0.02 to
r = 0.05; Figure A.5 illustrates the case when productivity increases from ϕ = 10 to ϕ = 20;
and finally Figure A.6 shows the firm’s life cycle when the bank’s liquidation value of capital
increases from θB = 0.1 to θB = 0.2.
Figure A.7 shows average firm characteristics when varying one parameter at a time from
its value in the baseline specification.
Figure A.8 shows the response of capital, liquid wealth, borrowing, failure dividends and
entry value, as a share (multiple) of revenue like in Figure 1.4, but having decreased the
output elasticity of capital from β = 0.7 to β = 0.3; then Figure A.9 shows the same when
increasing depreciation from µ = 0.05 to µ = 0.1; Figure A.10 illustrates the case when the
firm’s death increases risk from δ = 0.1 to δ = 0.2 in any given period; Figure A.11 illustrates
the case when interest rates increase from r = 0.02 to r = 0.05; Figure A.12 illustrates the
case when productivity increases from ϕ = 10 to ϕ = 20; and finally Figure A.13 illustrates
the case when the bank’s liquidation value of capital increases from θB = 0.1 to θB = 0.2.
A.2. NUMERICAL MODELLING SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 137




















































































Figure A.1: The firm’s life cycle: decrease in β
Simulations of the firm’s life cycle with θF = 0.2 (the solid black line) and θF = 0.8 (the dotted red
line). This is the same as Figure 1.2, but decreasing the output elasticity of capital from β = 0.7 to
β = 0.3.
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Figure A.2: The firm’s life cycle: increase in µ
Simulations of the firm’s life cycle with θF = 0.2 (the solid black line) and θF = 0.8 (the dotted red
line). This is the same as Figure 1.2, but increasing depreciation from µ = 0.05 to µ = 0.1.
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Figure A.3: The firm’s life cycle: increase in δ
Simulations of the firm’s life cycle with θF = 0.2 (the solid black line) and θF = 0.8 (the dotted red
line). This is the same as Figure 1.2, but increasing the firm’s per-period death risk from δ = 0.1 to
δ = 0.2.
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Figure A.4: The firm’s life cycle: increase in r
Simulations of the firm’s life cycle with θF = 0.2 (the solid black line) and θF = 0.8 (the dotted red
line). This is the same as Figure 1.2, but increasing the interest rate from r = 0.02 to r = 0.05.
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Figure A.5: The firm’s life cycle: increase in ϕ
Simulations of the firm’s life cycle with θF = 0.2 (the solid black line) and θF = 0.8 (the dotted red
line). This is the same as Figure 1.2, but increasing the firm’s productivity from ϕ = 10 to ϕ = 20.
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Figure A.6: The firm’s life cycle: increase in θB
Simulations of the firm’s life cycle with θF = 0.2 (the solid black line) and θF = 0.8 (the dotted red
line). This is the same as Figure 1.2, but increasing the bank’s liquidation value of capital from θB = 0.1
to θB = 0.2.
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Figure A.7: The average firm: sensitivity analysis
Simulations of average firm characteristics with θF = 0.2 (the solid grey bars) and θF = 0.8 (the
hatched red bars), with the values for θF = 0.2 normalised to unity. Each panel shows average firm
characteristics when a single parameter is increased relative to the baseline specification; the new value
is specified under each chart. Varying θB makes almost no difference to the firm’s behaviour, so the
bottom right panel of this figure is almost identical to the baseline specification.
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Figure A.8: Average firm characteristics divided by revenue: decrease in β
Simulations of average firm characteristics divided by average firm revenue, plotted against the resale
value of capital θF . This is the same as Figure 1.4, but decreasing the output elasticity of capital from
β = 0.7 to β = 0.3.
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Figure A.9: Average firm characteristics divided by revenue: increase in µ
Simulations of average firm characteristics divided by average firm revenue, plotted against the resale
value of capital θF . This is the same as Figure 1.4, but increasing depreciation from µ = 0.05 to µ = 0.1.
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Figure A.10: Average firm characteristics divided by revenue: increase in δ
Simulations of average firm characteristics divided by average firm revenue, plotted against the resale
value of capital θF . This is the same as Figure 1.4, but increasing the firm’s per-period death risk from
δ = 0.1 to δ = 0.2.
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Figure A.11: Average firm characteristics divided by revenue: increase in r
Simulations of average firm characteristics divided by average firm revenue, plotted against the resale
value of capital θF . This is the same as Figure 1.4, but increasing the interest rate from r = 0.02 to
r = 0.05.
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Figure A.12: Average firm characteristics divided by revenue: increase in ϕ
Simulations of average firm characteristics divided by average firm revenue, plotted against the resale
value of capital θF . This is the same as Figure 1.4, but increasing the firm’s productivity from ϕ = 10
to ϕ = 20.
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Figure A.13: Average firm characteristics divided by revenue: increase in θB
Simulations of average firm characteristics divided by average firm revenue, plotted against the resale
value of capital θF . This is the same as Figure 1.4, but increasing the bank’s liquidation value of capital
from θB = 0.1 to θB = 0.2.
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Appendix B
Chapter 2 Appendices
B.1 Numerical modelling sensitivity analysis: one-sector
model
Here we repeat the numerical simulations undertaken in Section 2.2.7, but varying parameters
other than θF one at a time to assess the effect of these parameters. These results are
presented in Figures B.1 to B.8.
B.2 Welfare sensitivity analysis: one-sector model
Here we repeat the numerical simulations of the welfare effects of government intervention
undertaken in Section 2.2.8, but varying parameters other than θF one at a time to assess
the effect of these parameters. These results are presented in Figures B.9 to B.16.
B.3 Numerical modelling sensitivity analysis: two-sector
model
Here we repeat the numerical simulations undertaken in Section 2.3.4, but varying parameters
other than θF one at a time to assess the effect of these parameters. First, we conduct
sensitivity analysis of the two sector economy when ε = 0.5, so that services and manufactured
goods are ‘more complements than substitutes’ in households’ utility function. These results
are presented in Figures B.17 to B.24. Then we do the same when ε = 2, so that services and
manufactured goods are ‘more substitutes than complements’ in households’ utility function.
These results are presented in Figures B.25 to B.32.
B.4 Welfare sensitivity analysis: two-sector model
Here we repeat the numerical simulations of the welfare effects of government intervention
undertaken in Section 2.3.5, but varying parameters other than θF one at a time to assess
the effect of these parameters. First, we conduct sensitivity analysis of welfare effects in
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Figure B.1: The effect of investment reversibility θF on one-sector general equilibrium:
increase in ρ
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.1, but with an increase in households’ subjective discount rate from ρ = 0.02
to ρ = 0.05.
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Figure B.2: The effect of investment reversibility θF on one-sector general equilibrium:
decrease in β
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.1, but with a decrease in intermediate firms’ output elasticity of capital
from β = 0.7 to β = 0.3.
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Figure B.3: The effect of investment reversibility θF on one-sector general equilibrium:
increase in ϕ̄
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.1, but with an increase in intermediate firms’ productivity from ϕ̄ = 10 to
ϕ̄ = 20.
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Figure B.4: The effect of investment reversibility θF on one-sector general equilibrium:
increase in µ
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.1, but with an increase in capital depreciation from µ = 0.05 to µ = 0.1.
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Figure B.5: The effect of investment reversibility θF on one-sector general equilibrium:
increase in δ
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.1, but with an increase in intermediate firms’ death risk from δ = 0.1 to
δ = 0.2.
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Figure B.6: The effect of investment reversibility θF on one-sector general equilibrium:
increase in θB
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.1, but with an increase in the bank’s liquidation value of capital from
θB = 0.1 to θB = 0.2.
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Figure B.7: The effect of investment reversibility θF on one-sector general equilibrium:
increase in γ
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.1, but with an increase in the final sector’s output elasticity of intermediate
goods from γ = 0.3 to γ = 0.7.
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Figure B.8: The effect of investment reversibility θF on one-sector general equilibrium:
increase in e
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.1, but with an increase in intermediate firms’ entry cost from e = 100 to
e = 200.
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Figure B.9: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
one-sector model: increase in ρ
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is
the same as Figure 2.2, but with an increase in households’ subjective discount rate from ρ = 0.02 to
ρ = 0.05.

































Figure B.10: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
one-sector model: decrease in β
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This
is the same as Figure 2.2, but with a decrease in intermediate firms’ output elasticity of capital from
β = 0.7 to β = 0.3.
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Figure B.11: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
one-sector model: increase in ϕ
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is
the same as Figure 2.2, but with an increase in intermediate firms’ productivity from ϕ̄ = 10 to ϕ̄ = 20.



































Figure B.12: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
one-sector model: increase in µ
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is
the same as Figure 2.2, but with an increase in capital depreciation from µ = 0.05 to µ = 0.1.
162 APPENDIX B. CHAPTER 2 APPENDICES































Figure B.13: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
one-sector model: increase in δ
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is
the same as Figure 2.2, but with an increase in intermediate firms’ death risk from δ = 0.1 to δ = 0.2.

































Figure B.14: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
one-sector model: increase in θB
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is
the same as Figure 2.2, but with an increase in the bank’s liquidation value of capital from θB = 0.1 to
θB = 0.2.
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Figure B.15: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
one-sector model: increase in γ
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is
the same as Figure 2.2, but with an increase in the final sector’s output elasticity of intermediate goods
from γ = 0.3 to γ = 0.7.




































Figure B.16: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
one-sector model: increase in e
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is
the same as Figure 2.2, but with an increase in intermediate firms’ entry cost from e = 100 to e = 200.
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Figure B.17: The effect of investment reversibility θF on two-sector general equilibrium,
with ε = 0.5: increase in ρ
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.3, but with an increase in households’ subjective discount rate from ρ = 0.02
to ρ = 0.05.
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Figure B.18: The effect of investment reversibility θF on two-sector general equilibrium,
with ε = 0.5: decrease in β
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.3, but with a decrease in intermediate firms’ output elasticity of capital
from β = 0.7 to β = 0.3.
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Figure B.19: The effect of investment reversibility θF on two-sector general equilibrium,
with ε = 0.5: increase in ϕ̄
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.3, but with an increase in intermediate firms’ productivity from ϕ̄ = 10 to
ϕ̄ = 20.
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Figure B.20: The effect of investment reversibility θF on two-sector general equilibrium,
with ε = 0.5: increase in µ
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.3, but with an increase in capital depreciation from µ = 0.05 to µ = 0.1.
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Figure B.21: The effect of investment reversibility θF on two-sector general equilibrium,
with ε = 0.5: increase in δ
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.3, but with an increase in intermediate firms’ death risk from δ = 0.1 to
δ = 0.2.
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Figure B.22: The effect of investment reversibility θF on two-sector general equilibrium,
with ε = 0.5: increase in θB
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.3, but with an increase in the bank’s liquidation value of capital from
θB = 0.1 to θB = 0.2.
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Figure B.23: The effect of investment reversibility θF on two-sector general equilibrium,
with ε = 0.5: decrease in γM and increase in γS
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.3, but with a decrease in the manufacturing sector’s output elasticity of
intermediate goods from γM = 0.7 to γ = 0.6, and an increase in the services sector’s output elasticity
of intermediate goods from γS = 0.3 to γS = 0.4.
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Figure B.24: The effect of investment reversibility θF on two-sector general equilibrium,
with ε = 0.5: increase in e
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.3, but with an increase in intermediate firms’ entry cost from e = 100 to
e = 200.
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Figure B.25: The effect of investment reversibility θF on two-sector general equilibrium,
with ε = 2: increase in ρ
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.4, but with an increase in households’ subjective discount rate from ρ = 0.02
to ρ = 0.05.
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Figure B.26: The effect of investment reversibility θF on two-sector general equilibrium,
with ε = 2: decrease in β
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.4, but with a decrease in intermediate firms’ output elasticity of capital
from β = 0.7 to β = 0.3.
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Figure B.27: The effect of investment reversibility θF on two-sector general equilibrium,
with ε = 2: increase in ϕ̄
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.4, but with an increase in intermediate firms’ productivity from ϕ̄ = 10 to
ϕ̄ = 20.
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Figure B.28: The effect of investment reversibility θF on two-sector general equilibrium,
with ε = 2: increase in µ
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.4, but with an increase in capital depreciation from µ = 0.05 to µ = 0.1.
176 APPENDIX B. CHAPTER 2 APPENDICES

























































































































Figure B.29: The effect of investment reversibility θF on two-sector general equilibrium,
with ε = 2: increase in δ
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.4, but with an increase in intermediate firms’ death risk from δ = 0.1 to
δ = 0.2.
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Figure B.30: The effect of investment reversibility θF on two-sector general equilibrium,
with ε = 2: increase in θB
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.4, but with an increase in the bank’s liquidation value of capital from
θB = 0.1 to θB = 0.2.
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Figure B.31: The effect of investment reversibility θF on two-sector general equilibrium,
with ε = 2: decrease in γM and increase in γS
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.4, but with a decrease in the manufacturing sector’s output elasticity of
intermediate goods from γM = 0.7 to γ = 0.6, and an increase in the services sector’s output elasticity
of intermediate goods from γS = 0.3 to γS = 0.4.
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Figure B.32: The effect of investment reversibility θF on two-sector general equilibrium,
with ε = 2: increase in e
Numerical modelling of the economy in general equilibrium, plotted against investment reversibility θF .
This is the same as Figure 2.4, but with an increase in intermediate firms’ entry cost from e = 100 to
e = 200.
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Figure B.33: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
two-sector model, with ε = 0.5: increase in ρ
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is
the same as Figure 2.5, but with an increase in households’ subjective discount rate from ρ = 0.02 to
ρ = 0.05.
the two sector economy when ε = 0.5, so that services and manufactured goods are ‘more
complements than substitutes’ in households’ utility function. These results are presented in
Figures B.33 to B.40. Then we do the same when ε = 2, so that services and manufactured
goods are ‘more substitutes than complements’ in households’ utility function. These results
are presented in Figures B.41 to B.48.
Next, we consider the implications of capital liquidation subsidies and taxes on the balance
between services and manufacturing. First, we conduct sensitivity analysis of structural
change effects in the two sector economy when ε = 0.5. These results are presented in
Figures B.49 to B.56. Then we do the same when ε = 2. These results are presented in
Figures B.57 to B.64.
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Figure B.34: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
two-sector model, with ε = 0.5: decrease in β
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This
is the same as Figure 2.5, but with a decrease in intermediate firms’ output elasticity of capital from
β = 0.7 to β = 0.3.

































Figure B.35: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
two-sector model, with ε = 0.5: increase in ϕ
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is
the same as Figure 2.5, but with an increase in intermediate firms’ productivity from ϕ̄ = 10 to ϕ̄ = 20.
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Figure B.36: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
two-sector model, with ε = 0.5: increase in µ
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is
the same as Figure 2.5, but with an increase in capital depreciation from µ = 0.05 to µ = 0.1.


































Figure B.37: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
two-sector model, with ε = 0.5: increase in δ
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is
the same as Figure 2.5, but with an increase in intermediate firms’ death risk from δ = 0.1 to δ = 0.2.
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Figure B.38: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
two-sector model, with ε = 0.5: increase in θB
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is
the same as Figure 2.5, but with an increase in the bank’s liquidation value of capital from θB = 0.1 to
θB = 0.2.



































Figure B.39: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
two-sector model, with ε = 0.5: decrease in γM and increase in γS
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is the
same as Figure 2.5, but with a decrease in the manufacturing sector’s output elasticity of intermediate
goods from γM = 0.7 to γ = 0.6, and an increase in the services sector’s output elasticity of intermediate
goods from γS = 0.3 to γS = 0.4.
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Figure B.40: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
two-sector model, with ε = 0.5: increase in e
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is
the same as Figure 2.5, but with an increase in intermediate firms’ entry cost from e = 100 to e = 200.
































Figure B.41: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
two-sector model, with ε = 2: increase in ρ
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is
the same as Figure 2.5, but with an increase in households’ subjective discount rate from ρ = 0.02 to
ρ = 0.05.
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Figure B.42: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
two-sector model, with ε = 2: decrease in β
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This
is the same as Figure 2.5, but with a decrease in intermediate firms’ output elasticity of capital from
β = 0.7 to β = 0.3.



































Figure B.43: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
two-sector model, with ε = 2: increase in ϕ
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is
the same as Figure 2.5, but with an increase in intermediate firms’ productivity from ϕ̄ = 10 to ϕ̄ = 20.
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Figure B.44: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
two-sector model, with ε = 2: increase in µ
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is
the same as Figure 2.5, but with an increase in capital depreciation from µ = 0.05 to µ = 0.1.




































Figure B.45: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
two-sector model, with ε = 2: increase in δ
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is
the same as Figure 2.5, but with an increase in intermediate firms’ death risk from δ = 0.1 to δ = 0.2.
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Figure B.46: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
two-sector model, with ε = 2: increase in θB
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is
the same as Figure 2.5, but with an increase in the bank’s liquidation value of capital from θB = 0.1 to
θB = 0.2.



































Figure B.47: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
two-sector model, with ε = 2: decrease in γM and increase in γS
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is the
same as Figure 2.5, but with a decrease in the manufacturing sector’s output elasticity of intermediate
goods from γM = 0.7 to γ = 0.6, and an increase in the services sector’s output elasticity of intermediate
goods from γS = 0.3 to γS = 0.4.
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Figure B.48: Welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes in the
two-sector model, with ε = 2: increase in e
Numerical modelling of welfare changes in response to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left
panel shows the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation
subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5. The right panel shows the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is
the same as Figure 2.5, but with an increase in intermediate firms’ entry cost from e = 100 to e = 200.
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Figure B.49: Structural composition implications of capital liquidation subsidies and taxes,
with ε = 0.5: increase in ρ
Numerical modelling of the change in the balance between services and manufacturing in response
to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left panels show the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5.
The right panels show the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and
liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is the same as Figure 2.7, but with an increase
in households’ subjective discount rate from ρ = 0.02 to ρ = 0.05.
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Figure B.50: Structural composition implications of capital liquidation subsidies and taxes,
with ε = 0.5: decrease in β
Numerical modelling of the change in the balance between services and manufacturing in response
to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left panels show the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5.
The right panels show the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and
liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is the same as Figure 2.7, but with a decrease
in intermediate firms’ output elasticity of capital from β = 0.7 to β = 0.3.
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Figure B.51: Structural composition implications of capital liquidation subsidies and taxes,
with ε = 0.5: increase in φ
Numerical modelling of the change in the balance between services and manufacturing in response
to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left panels show the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5.
The right panels show the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and
liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is the same as Figure 2.7, but with an increase
in intermediate firms’ productivity from ϕ̄ = 10 to ϕ̄ = 20.
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Figure B.52: Structural composition implications of capital liquidation subsidies and taxes,
with ε = 0.5: increase in µ
Numerical modelling of the change in the balance between services and manufacturing in response
to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left panels show the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5.
The right panels show the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and
liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is the same as Figure 2.7, but with an increase
in capital depreciation from µ = 0.05 to µ = 0.1.
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Figure B.53: Structural composition implications of capital liquidation subsidies and taxes,
with ε = 0.5: increase in δ
Numerical modelling of the change in the balance between services and manufacturing in response
to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left panels show the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5.
The right panels show the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and
liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is the same as Figure 2.7, but with an increase
in intermediate firms’ death risk from δ = 0.1 to δ = 0.2.
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Figure B.54: Structural composition implications of capital liquidation subsidies and taxes,
with ε = 0.5: increase in θB
Numerical modelling of the change in the balance between services and manufacturing in response
to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left panels show the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5.
The right panels show the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and
liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is the same as Figure 2.7, but with an increase
in the bank’s liquidation value of capital from θB = 0.1 to θB = 0.2.
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Figure B.55: Structural composition implications of capital liquidation subsidies and taxes,
with ε = 0.5: decrease in γM and increase in γS
Numerical modelling of the change in the balance between services and manufacturing in response
to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left panels show the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5.
The right panels show the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and
liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is the same as Figure 2.7, but with a decrease
in the manufacturing sector’s output elasticity of intermediate goods from γM = 0.7 to γ = 0.6, and an
increase in the services sector’s output elasticity of intermediate goods from γS = 0.3 to γS = 0.4.
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Figure B.56: Structural composition implications of capital liquidation subsidies and taxes,
with ε = 0.5: increase in e
Numerical modelling of the change in the balance between services and manufacturing in response
to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left panels show the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5.
The right panels show the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and
liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is the same as Figure 2.7, but with an increase
in intermediate firms’ entry cost from e = 100 to e = 200.
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Figure B.57: Structural composition implications of capital liquidation subsidies and taxes,
with ε = 2: increase in ρ
Numerical modelling of the change in the balance between services and manufacturing in response
to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left panels show the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5.
The right panels show the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and
liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is the same as Figure 2.8, but with an increase
in households’ subjective discount rate from ρ = 0.02 to ρ = 0.05.
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Figure B.58: Structural composition implications of capital liquidation subsidies and taxes,
with ε = 2: decrease in β
Numerical modelling of the change in the balance between services and manufacturing in response
to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left panels show the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5.
The right panels show the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and
liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is the same as Figure 2.8, but with a decrease
in intermediate firms’ output elasticity of capital from β = 0.7 to β = 0.3.
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Figure B.59: Structural composition implications of capital liquidation subsidies and taxes,
with ε = 2: increase in φ
Numerical modelling of the change in the balance between services and manufacturing in response
to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left panels show the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5.
The right panels show the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and
liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is the same as Figure 2.8, but with an increase
in intermediate firms’ productivity from ϕ̄ = 10 to ϕ̄ = 20.
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Figure B.60: Structural composition implications of capital liquidation subsidies and taxes,
with ε = 2: increase in µ
Numerical modelling of the change in the balance between services and manufacturing in response
to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left panels show the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5.
The right panels show the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and
liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is the same as Figure 2.8, but with an increase
in capital depreciation from µ = 0.05 to µ = 0.1.
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Figure B.61: Structural composition implications of capital liquidation subsidies and taxes,
with ε = 2: increase in δ
Numerical modelling of the change in the balance between services and manufacturing in response
to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left panels show the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5.
The right panels show the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and
liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is the same as Figure 2.8, but with an increase
in intermediate firms’ death risk from δ = 0.1 to δ = 0.2.
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Figure B.62: Structural composition implications of capital liquidation subsidies and taxes,
with ε = 2: increase in θB
Numerical modelling of the change in the balance between services and manufacturing in response
to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left panels show the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5.
The right panels show the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and
liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is the same as Figure 2.8, but with an increase
in the bank’s liquidation value of capital from θB = 0.1 to θB = 0.2.
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Figure B.63: Structural composition implications of capital liquidation subsidies and taxes,
with ε = 2: decrease in γM and increase in γS
Numerical modelling of the change in the balance between services and manufacturing in response
to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left panels show the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5.
The right panels show the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and
liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is the same as Figure 2.8, but with a decrease
in the manufacturing sector’s output elasticity of intermediate goods from γM = 0.7 to γ = 0.6, and an
increase in the services sector’s output elasticity of intermediate goods from γS = 0.3 to γS = 0.4.
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Figure B.64: Structural composition implications of capital liquidation subsidies and taxes,
with ε = 2: increase in e
Numerical modelling of the change in the balance between services and manufacturing in response
to capital liquidation subsidies and taxes. The left panels show the situation where the underlying
reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.3, and liquidation subsidies range from σ = −0.1 to σ = 0.5.
The right panels show the situation where the underlying reversibility of investment is θ̄F = 0.7, and
liquidation taxes range from σ = −0.5 to σ = 0.1. This is the same as Figure 2.8, but with an increase




Proof of Lemma 3.1. The result follows immediately from setting both the differential
equations that characterise the dynamics of this economy, equations (3.15) and (3.17), equal
to zero.






= z − (1− α)A0kα+η−1 − ρ, (C.1)
so in the steady state, γzSS = 0 and zSS = (1− α)A0k
α+η−1
SS + ρ. Now suppose k̇ > 0, ċ > 0,
so that k < kSS and the economy is growing towards the steady state. Then
γz = z − (1− α)A0kα+η−1 − ρ






Since kSS > k by assumption, and α + η < 1, the term in the square brackets is negative,
so γz < z − zSS . Thus if z ≤ zSS , it follows that γz < 0, so z is getting further and further
below its steady-state level, and the economy never reaches equilibrium.
It follows therefore that z > zSS along the saddle path while the economy is growing.
Now consider the time derivative of γz,
γ̇z = ż − (1− α) (α+ η − 1)A0kα+η−2k̇
= γzz − γz (1− α)A0kα+η−1 − γzρ
+ γz (1− α)A0kα+η−1 + γzρ− (1− α) (α+ η − 1)A0kα+η−2k̇
= γz
[
z − (1− α)A0kα+η−1
]
+ γzρ+ (1− α)A0kα+η−1
[




= γ2z + γzρ+ (1− α)A0kα+η−1
{
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Suppose γz ≥ 0. Since k̇/k > 0 by assumption, and α+ η < 1, this would imply that γ̇z > 0.
We know that z > zSS , so if γz ≥ 0 and γ̇z > 0, the consumption-labour ratio is accelerating
away from its steady state level, and never reaches equilibrium. Thus we know that at all
points along the saddle path in the growth phase of the economy, z > zSS and γz < 0. The
consumption-capital ratio along the saddle path therefore looks something like Figure 3.4.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. We know from Lemma 3.1 that a negative shock to θ causes an
increase in kSS . At the moment of the shock, per-capita capital k remains unchanged, but
its growth rate may change. Thus denote by θ1, c1, k1, z1 the variables of interest on the
saddle path immediately prior to the shock, and let θ2, c2, k2, z2 be the variables on the new
saddle path immediately after the shock, so that θ2 < θ1 and k2 = k1. Let kSS1 and kSS2
be the steady-state levels of per-capita capital before and after the shock respectively, where
kSS2 > kSS1. We will define






= γz1 − γz2
= z1 − z2,
by equation (C.1), since k2 = k1. Suppose that k1 = kSS1, so that the economy is in the
steady state prior to the negative shock. Then γz1 = 0, so φ̇/φ = −γz2 = z1 − z2. Suppose
z2 ≥ z1; then γz2 ≥ 0, which we know from Lemma 3.2 is not possible in the growth phase
of the economy. Since the new steady state level of per-capita capital kSS2 is greater than
the previous steady state level of per-capita capital kSS1 = k2, then the economy is still in
its growth phase immediately after the shock.
Thus, conceiving of z (k) as a function of k (as in Figure 3.4), z2 (kSS1) < z1 (kSS1).















































Note that by equation (3.15), evaluated at k̄ (so that k1 = k2 = k̄),
k̇1 − k̇2 = (θ2 − θ1) k̄ < 0





































, then z1 is decreasing in k faster than z2 at that
point. Therefore if z2 ≥ z1 anywhere to the left of kSS1, it must be that z2 ≥ z1 everywhere
to the left of kSS1. However, we just showed that z2 (kSS1) < z1 (kSS2); assuming that both
z1 and z2 are continuous functions of k, therefore, this is a contradiction, and z2 < z1 for all
k < kSS1. Thus z2 looks something like Figure 3.6.
It follows that, given fixed k, a negative shock to θ causes a negative shock to z, and thus
to c.




































(θ + ρ+ g) + ρ
]
αA0
A0 (θ + ρ+ g)
= 1− α+ αρ
θ + ρ+ g
.
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− (1− α) y
k











+ [1− (α+ η)] k̇
k
. (C.3)
When the economy is in its growth phase, the second term in the above expression is clearly
positive. Suppose that ζ ≥ 1 − α + ρ (k/y). Then γζ > 0, and ζ is also clearly growing
faster than k/y, so ζ is diverging from its steady state level. Thus along the saddle path,
ζ < 1− α+ ρ (k/y). Substituting in for the growth rate of k,
γζ =
[







+ [1− (α+ η)]
[
A0k

































− [1− (α+ η)] (θ + ρ+ g) . (C.4)
Clearly, the second term in the above expression is positive, so subtracting it gives a negative
value. If
ζ ≤ η + ρ (k/y)
α+ η
,













and so ρ (k/y) < α. Thus












< 1− α+ αρ




ζ ≤ η + ρ (k/y)
α+ η
(C.5)
⇒ ζ < ζSS , γζ < 0.
Therefore if equation (C.5) holds anywhere to the left of kSS , then ζ diverges from ζSS and
never reaches its steady state. Thus along the saddle path of the economy, in the growth
phase, we have shown that
η + ρ (k/y)
α+ η






Now consider the time derivative of γζ ,
γ̇ζ = (α+ η)A0k









Since (α+ η) ζ > η + ρ (k/y) > η and α+ η < 1, it follows that the second term in the curly
brackets is negative. If γζ were also weakly negative, then it would also be decreasing, since
γ̇ζ < 0, and ζ would never converge to its steady state level. Thus along the saddle path
in the growth phase of the economy, γζ > 0. The consumption-output ratio therefore looks
something like Figure 3.7.
Proof of Lemma 3.6. A negative shock to θ leaves per-capita capital k unaffected in the
moment, and thus also leaves y unaffected, but by Lemma 3.3 there is a negative shock to
per-capita consumption c. It follows immediately that there is a negative shock to ζ = c/y.
Thus, in particular, we know that dζ/dθ > 0.
Now consider the effect of θ on ζ = c/y. Denote by θ1, k1, ζ1 the variables of interest on
the saddle path immediately prior to the shock, and let θ2, k2, ζ2 be the variables on the new
saddle path immediately after the shock, so that θ2 < θ1 and k2 = k1. Let kSS1 and kSS2
be the steady-state levels of per-capita capital before and after the shock respectively, where















− [1− (α+ η)] (θ + ρ+ g)
⇒ ψ̇
ψ




(ζ1 − ζ2)− [1− (α+ η)] (θ1 − θ2) .
Suppose that k1 = kSS1, so that the economy is in the steady state prior to the negative
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shock. Then γζ1 = 0, so ψ̇/ψ = −γζ2 . Since the new steady state level of per-capita capital
kSS2 is greater than the previous steady state level of per-capita capital kSS1 = k2, then
the economy is still in its growth phase immediately after the shock. Thus by Lemma 3.5,




(ζ1 − ζ2)− [1− (α+ η)] (θ1 − θ2) < 0






































So we have been able to put an upper bound on dζ/dθ at the steady state level of per-capita
capital kSS . Conceiving of ζ as a function of k, as in Figure 3.7, we wish to show the same
upper bound applies to this differential at all values of k ≤ kSS .



































Thus dχ/dθ is, on average, decreasing with k from its value at k̄ towards the value it assumes
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which contradicts equation (C.8). Therefore our original assumption that there was some k̄
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− [1− (α+ η)]
≤ 0,
so a negative shock to θ causes a weakly positive shock to the growth rate γζ of the
consumption-output ratio ζ = c/y.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. The growth rates for nS and nM were derived in equations (3.19)
and (3.20). If k̇ > 0, it follows by Lemma 3.5 that ζ̇ > 0. Thus ṅS/nS > 0 and ṅM/nM < 0,
generating structural change. Suppose there is a negative shock to θ:
(i) By Theorem 3.4, aggregate per-capita output growth ẏ/y and capital growth k̇/k both
accelerate in response to a negative shock to θ.
(ii) It is clear from equation (3.10) that xS (and hence X) does not change when there is
a shock to θ, so by Lemma 3.6 and equation (3.13) it follows that a negative shock to
θ causes a negative level shock to nS , and consequently a positive level shock to nM .
By Lemma 3.6, a negative shock to θ causes a weakly positive shock to ζ̇/ζ, and by
Theorem 3.4 it causes a strictly positive shock to k̇/k. Thus a negative shock to θ
causes a strictly positive shock to the growth rate of nS .






































θ + ρ+ g
)
.
By Lemma 3.1, a negative shock to θ causes a positive shock to kSS . Thus a negative
shock to θ causes a positive shock to nS,SS , and consequently causes a negative shock
to nM,SS .
(iv) Productivity in the manufacturing sector is given by a learning-by-doing externality










C.2. SECTOR CLASSIFICATION 213
By Theorem 3.4, a negative shock to θ causes a positive shock to k̇/k, and therefore
also to ȦM/AM .



















We have shown that ṅS/nS increases in response to a negative shock to θ, as does
k̇/k by Theorem 3.4, and g is clearly unchanged by θ. Thus capital accumulation











and g + k̇/k increases in response to a negative shock to θ. However, the effect of such




































so the sign of the equation (C.9) is ambiguous. Thus the effect of a positive financial
shock on capital accumulation in the manufacturing sector is also unclear: it could be
either positive or negative, depending on how the growth rate ṅM/nM responds to such
a shock.
C.2 Sector classification
Industries are classified into four major sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, services and
government) according to the methodology outlined in Appendix A of Herrendorf et al.
(2014, pp. 932-933). Employment data are aggregated by the BEA according to SIC code
from 1969-2000, and by NAICS code from 2001-2016. Table C.1 shows how BEA employment
data is classified into sector. Output data are aggregated by the BEA according to SIC code
from 1963-1996, and by NAICS code from 1997-2017. Table C.2 shows how BEA output data
is classified into sector.
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Table C.3: Timing of M&A bank branching deregulation
State Code Dereg. Year State Code Dereg. Year
Alabama AL 1981 Montana MT 1990
Alaska AK <1963 Nebraska NE 1985
Arizona AZ <1963 Nevada NV <1963
Arkansas AR 1994 New Hampshire NH 1987
California CA <1963 New Jersey NJ 1977
Colorado CO 1991 New Mexico NM 1991
Connecticut CT 1980 New York NY 1976
Delaware DE <1963 North Carolina NC <1963
District of Columbia DC <1963 North Dakota ND 1987
Florida DL 1988 Ohio OH 1979
Georgia GA 1983 Oklahoma OK 1988
Hawaii HI 1986 Oregon OR 1985
Idaho ID <1963 Pennsylvania PA 1982
Illinois IL 1988 Rhode Island RI <1963
Indiana IN 1989 South Carolina SC <1963
Iowa IA 1999 South Dakota SD <1963
Kansas KS 1987 Tennessee TN 1985
Kentucky KY 1990 Texas TX 1988
Louisiana LA 1988 Utah UT 1981
Maine ME 1975 Vermont VT 1970
Maryland MD <1963 Virginia VA 1978
Massachusetts MA 1984 Washington WA 1985
Michigan MI 1987 West Virginia WV 1987
Minnesota MN 1993 Wisconsin WI 1990
Mississippi MS 1986 Wyoming WY 1988
Missouri MO 1990
C.3 Timing of bank branching deregulation
The year of bank branching deregulation in each state is taken from Amel (1993), Jayaratne
and Strahan (1996), Krozsner and Strahan (1999), and Beck et al. (2010). Following this
literature, we take the year of deregulation to be the year that a state allowed bank branching
by merger and acquisition (M&A). Table C.3 lists the year of deregulation for each state.
C.4 Difference-in-differences regressions with pre-1997 data
Table C.4 replicates Table 3.3, restricted to pre-1997 data. This is to avoid the discontinuity
in the data when the BEA switched from aggregating data by SIC code to aggregating
data by NAICS code. None of these results directly contradict the results found in Section
3.5.1; that is, there are no coefficients that are estimated to be significantly positive using
one dataset and significantly negative using the other dataset. However, some coefficients
that are significant when estimated using the full dataset are not significant when estimated
using the restricted dataset, and vice versa. Nonetheless, the estimates of ‘Time*Dereg.’ are
significantly positive for services and significantly negative for manufacturing across both
datasets.
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Deregulation 0.116 0.620∗∗∗ −0.564∗∗∗ −1.572∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.205) (0.151) (0.267)
Time −0.449∗∗∗ 1.199∗∗∗ 0.993∗∗∗ −1.474∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.135) (0.088) (0.179)
Dereg.*Time 0.175∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ −0.239∗∗∗ −0.278∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.027) (0.025) (0.032)
Constant 35.908∗∗∗ 65.631∗∗∗ 43.312∗∗∗ 8.877∗∗∗
(0.779) (2.566) (1.284) (3.353)
Observations 1,054 1,288 1,054 1,288
R2 0.975 0.912 0.919 0.878
Adjusted R2 0.974 0.906 0.913 0.871
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Difference-in-differences OLS estimates of the effect of bank branching deregulation on struc-
tural composition, accounting for year and state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at
the state level in parentheses. ‘Deregulation’ is a dummy that is equal to 1 when a state has
deregulated, and equal to 0 otherwise. ‘Time’ is the time in years since deregulation (this
variable takes a negative value prior to deregulation). The year of deregulation is excluded
for each state. States that deregulated prior to 1963 are excluded (Alaska, Arizona, Califor-
nia, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Idaho, Maryland, Nevada, North Carolina, Rhode
Island, South Carolina and South Dakota). Data is restricted to the pre-1997 BEA dataset
(aggregated by SIC code).
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